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1CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTORY
1. Two Opposing World Views
Today as since the dawn of speculative thought, two world
views face each other. "These two systems have been like
doughty champions in the lists ready at all times to break
a lance together."^ The one, idealism holds that reality
as a whole and in all of its parts and phases is essential-
ly of the nature of mind. Fragile human reason, according
to most idealists is not a chance spark resulting from the
clash of blind forces, but the flame, however small
)
that
enables us to see with Plato the Supreme Reason inherent in
the very organization and in the functioning of the uni-
verse. 2 Moreover idealism holds that human ideals and
values do not inhere and glow in feeble man alone, but
form "an essential part of tne objective structure of the
universe
.
Opposed to idealism stands the equally ancient system of
materialism or naturalism. It denies almost everything that
idealism so boldly affirms.
Naturalism, challenging the cogency of
the cosmological, teleological, and moral
arguments, holds that tne universe re-
quires no supernatural cause and govern-
ment, but is self-existent, self-explana-
tory, self-operating; and self-directing;
1. Sellars, PPP,19£. 3. Brightman, Ml, 286.
2. Plato, laws, Book X,897C'.
?(
< ,
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that the world-process is not teleologi-
cal and anthropocentric, hut purposeless,
deterministic (except for possible
tychistic events), and only incidentally
productive of man. 4
Human reason and values have meaning and existence only
within the narrow range of human experience. These general
ideas all forms of naturalism can be said to nave in
common. However there are many forms of naturalism, as well
as of idealism; and the naturalisms of today, such as that
of Hoy Wood Sellars, are much more refined and are willing
to concede far more to idealism than the older and cruder
forms. Yet the sharp contrast between idealism and natu-
ralism, has not and cannot be obliterated. The fundamental
issue is simply whether in the final analysis the universe
is or is not of the nature of mind.
Perhaps it is not too much to say that Roy Wood Sellars
is the most objective representative of naturalistic thought
in America today. Hot only is he one of the keenest and
fairest critics of idealism, but more than that he has not
been satisfied with mere negative criticisms as is too often
the case with naturalists. His significance consists ’prima-
rily in the very interesting as well as comprehensive
system of thought which he has formulated. Before consider-
ing his fundamental criticisms of the various forms of
idealism relative to the basic philosophical problems of the
4. Puller, "Haturalism,"
in Runes ( ed
. ) , D0P,205.
,.
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day, it is imperative that some consideration be given to
the outstanding features of his system.
?
£ • The Essentials of Sellars’ System
i . Method
To understand any philosopher's system it is important
first of all to grasp his method. Perhaps Sellars’ method
is best understood in contrast to that of a fellow natu-
ralist, Dewey. In the first place, as over against Dewey,
Sellars does not over-emphasize
,
(one might almost say
glorify)
,
method as Dewey does. Yet no one can doubt that
he fully recognizes the importance of sound method. 6 Then,
in the second place, Sellars' method is not one-sided as
Dewey's. Dewey's method is confined to the experimental--
"the method used to secure consequences." 6 As. a result,
for Dev/ey thought is no more tnan an instrument of adjust-
ment, to enable the organism to adjust itself to its en-
vironment. Sellars also recognizes the importance of the
experimental metnod, the method of the sciences, 17 but be-
yond science there is philosophy. Science prepares the way
for philosophy by specializing in various fields and by
thus "doing more of the experimenting and of detailed ob-
servation. "8 Science therefore is of vital importance to
philosophy. Philosophy is dependent upon it for certain
vital information which it can make and must make use of
5. Sellars, PPP,6,180
6. Dewey, QC,££1.
7. Sellars, PPP,6.
8. Ibid., 6.
*t
K
*
,
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4in its wider generalizations. Science is the handmaiden of
philosophy; it prepares the way for it. But science is not
philosophy. "Philosophy, itself, is a persistent reflection
Q
upon these facts and concepts developed by the sciences."’'
"Philosophy is not something superimposed upon science so
much as something which science culminates in."-^ Conse-
quently philosophy while making use of the experimental
method of the sciences cannot confine itself to this method,
hut in harmony with its profounder and more comprehensive
task must find a more comprehensive method.
Sellars makes use of the method of analysis, as do
neorealists such as Perry, and sometimes he appears too
analytic nevertheless, his ultimate aim is always a synthe-
sis. He seeks to combine analysis and synthesis. Speaking
of the task of philosophy he says:
In short, the method of philosophy is
an analytic-syntnetic reflection upon
the world as it is spread out before a
mind full of the knowledge gained by
the sciences. It aims to be a penetra-
tive survey of reality as known. It
does not so much have a source of know-
ledge all its own ... as a duty to
bring human knowledge to its stage of
clarification and synoptic synthesis
Again he says: "For me, the task of the philosopner is to
analyze concepts and principles and to perform a labor of
synthesis."-^ He criticizes the coherence test of truth,
9. Ibid., 6. 11. Ibid., 181.
10. Ibid., 179-180. 12. Sellars, The Monist,
37(1927) ,T5T.

teaching it to mean mere consistency.
Consistency with other propositions is
not by itself a sufficient criterion of
truth. An assertion may follow with due
logical necessity from temporarily ac-
cepted premises, hut such an internal
relation cannot guarantee the system
as a whole .
^
Again in his Essentials of Philosophy he points out that
there are two objections to coherence as mere consistency;
first "self- consistency cannot be founded on itself," and
second, "more than one system of beliefs may be internally
coherent." It is obvious that he does not, like some
thinkers, consider inclusiveness as a part of coherence.
But he certainly makes use of the two together as is clear-
ly revealed by the following statement: "Such is the final
status of an accepted proposition. It must be self-con -
sistent and cover the facts. Thus Sellars’ method can
be said to be basically synthetic, not, however, without a
definite trend in the direction of a too exclusive use of
analysis, at times. It is this element that turns him away7
from idealism in the direction of physical realism.
Sellars’ method may also be said to be critical. He is
critical, on the one hand, of all forms of idealism, but
on the other no less of nai’ve realism, of neorealism and
of all forms of positivism. One of his favorite methods of
building up his own system is to expose the weaknesses and
inadequacies of all other systems, and to show that the
13. Sellars, Logic
,
298 . 14. Sellars, E0P,168.
'»
r
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6truth in them marks them as notning more than halt-way
houses to his own more comprehensive system. 1 ^ Sellars
tries to he fair to the systems which he is criticizing
and usually succeeds, hut sometimes one detects a tone of
dogmatic finality. This gives point to the following criti-
cism of Sellars’ Philosophy of Physical Realism : '’The tone
is polemical, and one after another of the worthies of
philosophy
—
past
,
present and future--are introduced at the
point of a sword, and pierced hy Sellars riding on the
charger, Physical Realism. "16
On the whole, however, Sellars' method may he said to he
positive rather than negative. Unlike Russell he takes no
special delight in tearing down the defences of idealism.
He does not destroy merely for the sake of destroying, nis
purpose is far more serious. He fears down and makes use of
what he considers usahle and thus huilds what he considers
a more comprehensive system.
We shall concern ourselves very little
with the refutation of idealism. Tne de-
velopment of a coherent realistic system
is of far more value, even from an argu-
mentative point of view, than a continu-
ation of the more or less dialectical
struggle between idealism and realism .
^
ii. The Three Chief Characteristics
Sellars' system may well he summed up in the three words:
15. Sellars, CR ,v-vii ,PPP
,
17. Sellars, ESN, 23.
138-154, PPR, 25-61.
16. Liorris, Phil . Rev . , 45(1934) ,205.
r•
c
,
•
.
•
•
.
7Realism, Naturalism, and Humanism. He is first of all in-
terested in epistemology, to the extent in fact, that one
critic in reviewing his Essentials of Philosophy complains
that it is "a bit top-heavy in epistemology."-^ 9 Some phi-
losophers such as Bradley lay little stress upon episte-
mology, but taking it for granted plunge at once into the
fathomless depths of metaphysics. But not so with Sellars.
Epistemology is like a keystone to an
arch, a sign that a view of the world is
complete and well-constructed. Gan a view
of the world be possibly considered final
until it has shown its ability to explain
how we know that the world is as our
theory states?^0
Sellars is a realist, but neither a naive realist nor a
neorealist, but a critical realist. He is never tired of re-
minding the reader that he is an epistemological dualist,
that in the act of knowing subject and object are not one as
subject as the epistemological idealist would have it or one
as object as the panob jectivist would say, but that in tne
knowing process subject and object are two, separate and
distinct
.
Our position, which we call epistemo-
logical dualism, agrees, then witn the
so-called ’axiom of independent reality.'
...The idealist, perforce, denies this
axiom.
Por Sellars it is impossible to intuit objects as naive
18. See Muelder and Sears, 20. Sellars, PPR,45.
DAP, 431 21. Sellars, BN, 23.
19. Adams, Phil. Rev. , 27 ( 1918 ) , 209
.
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8realism together with neorealism and also with epistemo-
logical idealism would have it. For Sellars as for Bowne,
knowledge is essentially interpretation. 22 Knowledge is not
an intuition of the stuff of things, hut rather an appre-
hension of their essential characteristics as disclosed by
science. "We shall witn science measure their dimensions
and decipher their organization." 22 Even more definitely
and clearly he says
:
.In knowing, we are not concerned with
the question of stuff either on the side
of consciousness or on the side of the
physical object known, but with characters
and meanings, on the one side, and charac-
teristics such as structure and behavior
on the other side. 4
Knowledge about things is mediated by ideas, and comes in
terms of ideas, but nevertheless this translation and tran-
scription of the characteristics of things in terms of ideas
is none the less a true version of the characteristics of
things. We cannot think about things in any kind of fashion
that we fancy. It is in the data that arise in the inter-
action of environment and mind "that the ultimate control
of judgments lies." 22 Sellars like Brightman, the person-
alist, holds to correspondence as "an implication of tne
knowledge-mediating capacity of ideas and not as a test of
22. Sellars, in Brake and 24. Sellars, Jour. Phil.,
Others
,
ECR , 190 , 198 . 24(1927), 241
.
23. Sellars, PPR,5. 25. Sellars, PPR,120.
(»
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9truth. 1,26
True ideas are knowledge -giving ideas
and corresponding ideas. They are such
that they disclose the denoted object
because agreeing with it. They are such
that we can think the object as it is
by means of them. To think the object
as it is is to think truly .
^
The mind then is capable of knowing objects, not, however,
as they are in themselves, but in terms of their essential
characteristics and properties as the mind is able to re-
produce and reflect them. But by virtue of being a mediated
knowledge it is never complete or pure, though capable of
continual increase.
Working, as it does, with sense-data as
its materials, the mind does exceedingly
well. It grasps much about tilings, and
this can be empirically stated. Yet know-
ledge can never be anytning but a pale
reflection of the object, knowledge
should not claim to be being.
Even though Sellars lays so much stress on epistemology
yet he realizes full well that the philosopher cannot rest
in epistemology, but that epistemology has ontological
"implication," 2 ^ pointing beyond itself; for the moment
that the inevitable question is raised, as to tne nature
of the object of knowledge which epistemology affirms
is possible, then the thinker has crossed the frontier and
entered the realm of metaphysics.
Sellars calls his system an evolutionary naturalism
,
(the
£6. Ibid., 115. See Brightman,
ITP, 49.
£7. Sellars, PPR, 130-131
.
£8. Sellars, BN, 37.
£9. Sellars, PPR,8£
.f
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title of the booh in which he mates the first really compre-
hensive attempt to formulate his system) Ee defines natu-
ralism as follows: "Naturalism stands for the self-suf-
ficiency and intelligibility of the world of space and
time . "31 Nature is not dependent upon any hind of super-
natural order. It exists in its own right and must be ac-
cepted as so existing, as a fact beyond which thought must
not dare to attempt to venture, for there is no beyond.
"Another way of putting it is to affirm the intrinsic en-
duranc
e
of physical systems in their very becoming. This
of course raises the question as to the explanation of the
order, the organization, and the creative impulse in nature
toward novelty and value. This is the roch upon which natu-
ralism has always been shattered. Gan Sellars escape ship-
wrech? Can he accomplish that which naturalists of the past
have failed to accomplish? He thinks that he can, and here
is where the evolutionary part of his naturalism becomes
evident. Emergent evolution is his principle of explanation.
The chief difficulty with past naturalisms and materialisms
was that, finding it impossible to fit novelties and values
into their systems, they went to the absurd extreme of deny-
ing their existence, and ended in reducing the richness and
diversity and glory of the world to the bare facts of
30. Written in 1922. 32. Sellars, Phil. Hev.,
31. Sellars, EN,2. 53 (1944) , 361
.
'-
' • • ? •
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physics. "In brief, past naturalism did not take evolution
seriously nor did it take mind seriously."*^3 Sellars tries
to cut the Gordian knot hy endowing nature itself with
creative power. "Matter I take to he creative, dynamic,
relational and self-organizing."*^4 "Back of pomp and circum
stance, hack of love and beauty and tragedy and happiness,
lies—matter. In short the physical is hut another term for
being. Nature then is ultimately matter with its wonder-
ful, miraculous creative powers.
In his emphasis upon emergent evolution Sellars’ thought
is related to that of S. Alexander and that of Lloyd Morgan
He is, however, far closer to that of S. Alexander, for
both are naturalists, while Morgan is a theist. There are,
nevertheless, two interesting differences between Sellars
and Alexander. First, while Sellars, as has been shown, en-
dows matter as the basic structure of nature with creative
power, Alexander, on the other hand similarly endows Space
rv C.
and Time. Secondly, Alexander thinks of the universe as
a whole as evolving seemingly without end or limit, 57 while
Sellars conceives evolution as no more than a local process
or a series of local processes, not affecting the universe
as a whole. Hence he is far more pluralistic then his
English comrade.
33. Sellars, SN,16. 36. Alexander, STL,Yol. I ,342;
34. Sellars, Phil. Rev., Yol .II ,46-48
.
53(1944) ,363. 37. Ibid., Yol. II ,361-364.
3o>. Sellars, PPR,6.
4f t
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Being a believer in the eternity of the
universe and skeptical of linear and
cyclical notions, I am naturally led to
suppose that the universe has always
been much as it is now, a variegated
existential domain v/ith a floor, much
the same everywhere, above which rise
here and there mountain peaks of emergent
becoming followed in time by recession.
The picture is that of a qualitative
rising and subsiding in quite plural
and local ways with a cosmic floor woven,
of particles in their dynamic relations.
Finally, as has already been said, Sellars differs from
Lloyd Morgan in that the latter is frankly theistic. For
Morgan, not only does the universe as a whole evolve, but
it evolves by virtue of a "scheme."^9 It is not independent
and self-explanatory, and emergence occurs simply because
behind it all and in it all there is God "as directive
activity within a scheme which aims at constructive con-
sistency." 4^
And this leads to Sellars’ humanism
,
the third character-
istic of the system. Holding that nature is self-existent
and independent, and endowing matter with creative powers,
Sellars, as has been seen, of course must reject theism.
The hypothesis of God fails "to explain the facts to which
it is relevant"—chiefly the facts of evil, 4 ^- and besides
there is a woeful lack of direct evidence for supernatural
activity.42 Purpose and the realization of ends there is
38. Sellars, Phil. Rev.,
53(1944) ,38in
39. Morgan, EE, 33.
40. Ibid.
,
33.
41. Sellars, IISR, 160.
42. Sellars, BOA, 147-148.
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indeed in nature, but it is only an empirical teleology
such as one finds in the functioning of organisms. It is
local and relative. To attempt to postulate teleology as
relevant to nature as a whole, in terms of guidance from
a supernatural Agent or agents is to go beyond what the
facts warrant. 416 "There is no central, brooding Will which
has planned it all."44 Nevertheless, Sellars believes in
values, that is he accepts them as facts wnich cannot and
must not be reduced to the merely quantitative as the old
materialism was in the habit of doing. Valuation is "an
intrinsic aspect of living."46 The "world of valuation" is
as real on its own right as the "world of description."46
But values are in no sense transcendent ; that is they have
their origin and root and abode only in tne soil of human
life. They have no cosmic rootage. 4 ^ It is at this point
that Sellars' humanism enters.
Religion is loyalty to the values of
life . The idea of the spiritual must be
broadened and humanized to include all
these purposes, experiences and activi-
ties which express man's nature. The
spiritual must be seen to be the fine
flower of living, which requires no
other sanctions than its own inherent
worth and appeal. We must outgrow the
false notion tnat religion is insepa-
rable from supernatural objects, and
that the spiritual is something alien
to man which must be forced upon him
43. Cellars, iSII , 337-338
44. Ibid., 343.
45. Sellars, BPP,451.
46. Sellars, Phil. Rev.,
35(1926) ,124.
47. Sellars, PPP, 464-469
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from the outside. The spiritual is man
at his best, man loving;, daring;, creat -
ing, fighting loyally and courageously
for causes dear to him .4~8~
iii. Relation to the Older Forms of Materialism and
Naturalism
Materialism like idealism has had a long history* As all
forms of idealism can be traced back to Plato so likewise
all forms of materialism and naturalism find their source
in Democritus who about 420 B. C. taught that "only the
atoms and the void are real."^ Materialism has varied
greatly throughout its history, but its ultimate principle
of explanation has always been matter conceived in some
fashion after the manner of Democritus. Throughout its his-
tory it has been far more successful in attacking the weak-
nesses of idealism than in establishing its own system as
a comprehensive philosophy. Old-fashioned materialism with
its hard atoms, not unlike pellets of shot, has proven in-
capable of explaining such facts as order, organization,
interaction, novelty, mind, values. In sheer desperation
to save its own system from total collapse, it has usually
attempted either to deny these facts or to explain them as
accidental and chance occurrences witnout any real rootage
in reality. But the idealist could always retort that, in
so doing, materialism was not empircal in its treatment of
48. Bellars, NSR,7. 49. Democritus, "The Fragments,"
in Bakewell, BAP, 60.
.
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whole fields of human experience; and more fundamentally
still the idealist could insist that since mind is Jmown
directly and immediately while matter is known only second-
arily and mediately and always in terms of mind, that mind
must therefore he the more real of the two. Thus old-
fashioned materialism was never able to meet the idealist
in fair and open comhat, especially after Berkeley's devas-
tating attack- More will he said about this in the chapters
which follow.
However old-fashioned materialism lingered until the ad-
vent of modern physics. Modern physics with its electro-
magnetic theory of matter gave the older form of material-
ism its deathblow beyond all hope of recovery. After
discussing the revolutionary changes in tne conception of
the atom, Eddington adds: "Whatever further changes of view
are in prospect, a reversion to the old substantial atom is
unthinkable • As a result materialism has either had to
close shop or else undergo a radical transformation. It is
in answer to this challenge that systems such as those of
Roy Wood Sellars and S. Alexander have arisen.
Sellars never tires of emphasizing the differences be-
tween his system and that of the older materialists, ne
would not agree with Democritus that "only the atoms and
the void are real"—that is the atoms interpreted in the
50. Eddington, HPY/,3.

sense of hard shotlike pellets. As has been pointed out
Sellars rejects the older forms of materialism and natural-
ism which sought to reduce all the rich and varied facts of
the world to the bare facts of physics. He also seeks to
interpret his "reformed materialism," as he sometimes calls
his evolutionary naturalism, in a way that is consistent
with modern physics.
It goes without saying that I am not
seeking to resurrect an outmoded type
linked inseparably with an outgrown
form of physics, nemocritean or classi-
cal. Ho; it must be a reformed material -
ism ; it must be a kind of materialism
which is philosophically and scientific-
ally sophisticated.^
Sellars' epistemology is closely related to nis metaphysics
Thus in reinterpreting matter he relies on his epistemology
Since he is a critical realist, he holds that matter is not
and cannot be intuited as a stuff. The most that the human
mind can do is to interpret the given sense data by means
of ideas. Therefore the result is not the intuition of a
stuff, or hard atoms, but rather a thing is apprehended in
terms of its essential properties and its essential charac-
teristics. In his interesting article, "Dewey on Material-
ism," Sellars says, in opposition to Dewey's rejection of
epistemology and metaphysics
:
My own line of procedure .. .was to inte-
grate epistemology and ontology in terms
of a physical realism based on the dis-
51. Sellars, Phil , and men . Hes., 5(1945), 561.
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tinction between sensing and a denota-
tive and characterizing perceiving. I
was thereupon led to take such cate-
gories as substance, causality, space,
time, organization, and emergence
seriously and to move in the direction
of a reformed, qualitative, and dif-
ferentiated materialism.
Again, in his outstanding book. The Philosophy of Physical
Realism
,
he says:
One of the past weaknesses of materi-
alism was its epistemological simplicity.
In this respect it was very line classic
physics, as Eddington nas pointed out.
The ontological imagination was stulti-
fied at the start by an almost perceptual
pictorialism of microscopic billiard
balls. Both physicist and philosopher
are agreed to-day tnat scientific know-
ledge is abstract and conceptual and
that there is no such intuition of being
as was once supposed.
It will be readily seen then, tnat Sellars attempts to
square his ontology, his conception of matter with tne
facts of physics by means of his epistemology, just as over
against the old materialism he makes room for values and for
mind and novelty in general by means of the doctrine of
emergence. "The physicalism of which I am going to give an
exposition demands an approach through critical realism and
the theory of emergent patterns. "54 This statement is
fundamental for the understanding of Sellars' system.
As has been made clear, Sellars is everywhere critical of
the old materialism. Yet he avows his intellectual kinship,
52. Ibid., 382. 54. Sellars, Ibid., 5.
55. Sellars, PPR,5.
f t
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otherwise he would not call his own system, "a reformed
materialism.” In what then does this kinship consist? He
himself asks the same question and answers it as follows;
But why materialism? My answer is that
I believe in ontology, in a theory of
existence ; and I know of no other term
which, in the last analysis, is more
candid, more indicative of a readiness
on the part of naturalism to grapple
with ontology, then the term material-
ism.... If material things exist, we .must
be either materialists or dualists.^ 5
The new or reformed materialism is akin to the old first
of all in the fact of the use of the term matter, even if,
as has been seen, it means by matter, a glorified, almost
mystical entity.'^ 6 nothing is more important in understand
ing this reformed materialism than to grasp its conception
of the nature of matter, but at this most essential point
Sellars is not too clear. On the one hand he ’'would give
existential status to atoms and electrons; on the other
hand he insists, as has been shown that tne human mind can
never really grasp the ultimate nature of things, but only
their characteristics and properties as sucn are disclosed
to mind through ideas. This rigntly provokes the very
relevant question of Brightman;
When you say, ’why materialism,
’
you
seem to me to avoid a very important
issue. If by material you mean only
55. Sellars, Phil , and Phen . 57. Sellars, Phil, and Phen.
Res., 3(1943) ,381. Res.
,
3(19137, 389.
56. See page 11 of this Dissertation.
t.
.
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1 extra-mental' (i.e.) beyond tiie human
mind, all idealists believe in matter;
if you mean something absolutely non-
mental, as I tnink you do, you should
say so. oQ
In short Sellars' conception of matter does not seem to be
too clear. But in his most realistic moods he conceives
matter in terms of basic structures out of which the com-
plexity of the universe arises, and which endure as simply
organized systems. He speaks of these as "primary endurants
whicn form what I called secondary endurants," which, how-
ever, must not be "pictorized in billiard-ball terms.
Again he speaks of these atoms "particles in their dynamic
relations," and as such composing the "cosmic floor" from
which more complex structures arise. It seems evident,
then, that while Sellars rejects the hard solid atoms of
Democritus he certainly does hold that material atoms really
exist in their own right and that they possess the marvelous
creative power whicn nature displays. In so far as he holds
to matter as something non-mental and as the final princi-
ple of explanation he is certainly related to Democritus
and can rightly call his system, "reformed materialism."
In so far as Sellars recognizes mind with its capacities
as unique and creative, and efficacious he certainly breaks
with the old materialism. But in the final analysis he
makes mind absolutely dependent on the physical, on the
58. Brightman, Letter to Dr. Sellars, Oct. 5, 1945.
59. Sellars, Phil . Rev., 52(1944) , 571
.
60. Ibid., 380.
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brain, and on the physical order of which the brain is a
part. The following passages taken from various writings
are interesting confirmations of this fact. "Consciousness
is in the brain in tne sense that it is part of the nature
of the brain when it is functioning." 6^ "To me with my
view of the identity of mind and brain, spirits are im-
possible "The mind as a continuant is the brain and
the brain is spatial and in spatial relations with other
physical systems. "63 "The mind is the brain as known in its
functioning. " 64: Finally, "that which is physical is real,
and that which is real is physical." 66 In other words like
Democritus, and the whole school of older materialists,
Sellars holds that mind as such has no real or metaphysical
standing. It is but an aspect of matter upon which it is
finally absolutely dependent. This gives point to Professor
Pratt's contention that Sellars has done nothing "to help
materialism out of its old dilemma of being forced either
to identify consciousness with the brain or to deny its
efficacy.
"
66
iv. Summary
Before turning to the discussion of the various systems
of idealism which Sellars criticizes it may be well to give
a brief summary of his system in terms of the following
theses. First, relative to his epistemology:
61. Sellars, CR,59. 64. Sellars ,3H , 300
.
62. Sellars, Sir, 268. 65. Sellars, PPR,13.
63. Sellars PPR,434. 66. Pratt, iiAS,46.
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(1)
. The object exists apart from the mind as some-
thing separate and distinct.
(2)
. Knowing is a relation then, between two reali-
ties, mind and object--epistemological dualism.
(3)
. Things cannot be directly intuited, but their
essential properties and characteristics can be denoted.
(4)
. Knowledge is essentially interpretation in
which the mind selects its objects 'and mediates the charac-
teristics of such by means of ideas.
Second, relative to his metaphysics:
(1)
. It constitutes a frank rejection of the older
forms of materialism in so far as it sought to reauce mind
and values to the level of physics.
(2)
. It is naturalistic pluralism resting on the
self-sufficiency of the natural order as composed of certain
very simple, basic enduring structures out of which all
else arises.
13). It seeks to explain mind in terms of the inner
functioning of the brain and thus making it merely in the
last analysis an attribute and a form of physical process.
(4)
. While holding to values as germane and es-
sential to man and to human life, yet it conceives them as
having no reality or meaning apart from man in the sense of
cosmic rootage.
(5
. Matter is endowed with, a creative power which
finds expression in the facts of emergent evolution.
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CHAPTBB II
PHILOSOPHIC IDEALISM
1. Significance and Meaning
In order to understand and evaluate Sellars’ criticisms
of idealism properly, an understanding of idealism in
general, and of its many particular types 160011163 impera-
tive. How, as Brightman has pointed out, "it would he safer
to admit that it is impossible to define the generic term
idealism with precision.”-1- On page 1 of this dissertation
idealism was designated as the system which nolds that tne
world is an expression of mind, more exactly idealism is
the belief that reality is of the nature of mind, and that
values are objective. If mind is taken in tne very broad
sense of the psychical this definition will be inclusive
enough to cover all types of idealism, including types such
as that of Bradley in which reality is conceived in terms
of a unity of experience or feeling. Perhaps the best work-
ing definition of idealism is the following proposed by
Brightman: "All idealism is characterized by belief in the
ultimate reality or cosmic significance either of mind
(using the term in the broadest sense) or of ideals and
values revealed to and prized by rnind."^
Since idealism tends to regard reality as of the nature
of mind or idea the charge of solipsism is sometimes brought
1. Brightman, PCI, 172. 2. Ibid., 172.
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against it. But aside from certain indiscreet expressions
on the part of idealists this charge is groundless as far
as the fundamentals of idealism are concerned.
Idealism. . .which is confessedly mo-
nistic, need not he subjective; acknow-
ledged idealists deny the reduction of
the world to a phase of one’s mind.... The
differentia of idealism from subjectiv-
ism is the belief in a Great Hind who is
more than any of us; subjectivism fixes
upon the private mind as the last term
in metaphysics.®
Arthur Scnopenhauer came perhaps as close to solipsism as
any idealist. He begins his book. The World as .Jill and
Idea
,
witn the strange words:
"The world is my idea" --this is a truth
which holds good for everything that
lives and knows, though man alone can
bring it into reflective and abstract
consciousness
But that Schopenhauer is not a solipsist is evident from
the fact tnat he holds tnat sometning lies bacx of nature
and produces it --the Idea, the Will.® Leibniz and Berkeley
too have been accused of solipsism, but as will be seen in
the discussion of their philosophy, both taught the de-
pendence of nature and of human minds upon a Supreme Mind
.
Consequently it will be maintained throughout the disser-
tation that any identification of idealism with solipsism
on the part of naturalists or realists rests on a mistaken
notion of the real nature of idealism.
3. Sheldon, SSPD,43. 5. Ibid., Book I , 25 , 169 ;Book LI,
4. Scnopenhauer, WWI.Book 1,3. 174-175; Book 111,220-221.
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The word idealism, as Hocking has said, is perhaps not
the best one to express the great historic system under
consideration. Hocking thinks that mentalism or spiritual-
ism might serve better. ^ It is interesting to note that
Sellars uses the Is. tter term as a synonym for idealism in
general. ^ In fact he goes so far as to say that it might
be a better term in view of the fact tnat "idealism has
come to be identified in exact philosophy with epistemo-
logical idealism," and also because it has been associated
too much with "ethical and religious idealism, tnat is,
with eulogistic attitudes, to serve well as a technical
O
metaphysical expression." However, as Hocking observes,
spiritualism, too, has "been drafted to otner uses." 9 At
any rate tne term idealism is "so embedded in the history
of philosophy" that any attempt to eradicate it will
probably fail.-*- 19 Consequently the time-honored name will
be retained in the dissertation.
2. Origin and Development
Though the term idealism was first used in the Seven-
teenth Century, yet idealism, as a philosophy has its roots
much farther back in the past. In fact it is not too much
to say that it can be traced back to its source in primi-
tive animism--"the belief in mental agencies as causing
natural phenomena"1•^--man , s first trembling step toward
6. Hocking, TOP, 248. 9. Hocking, TOP, 249
7. cellars, HN,15,84. 10. Brightman, P0I,172.
8. Sellars, PPP,192. 11. Hocking, TOP, 252.
•.
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philosophy
It would seem that from a very remote
period men of almost all races have
entertained the belief that the living
man differs from the corpse in that
his body contains some more subtle thing
or principle which determines its
purposive movements, its growth and
self-repair, and to which is due his
capacity for sensation, thought, and
feeling. For the belief in some such
animating principle, or soul, is held
by almost every existing race of men,
no matter how lowly their grade of
culture nor how limited their mental
powers; and we find evidences of a
similiar belief among the earliest '
human records. 2
Idealism has had a long and worthy history. Long does not
exaggerate when he says:
Inasmuch as pure or basic jiaterialism
has been an infrequent doctrine among
major thinkers, the history of philoso-
phy broadly understood, is largely the
history of idealism.
There are intimations of idealism in Xenophanes, the Theo-
logical Eleatic who flourished 570-480 B.C.,^ especially
in the following passage:
There is one god, supreme among gods
and men; resembling mortals neither in
form nor in mind.
The whole of him sees, the whole of
him thiruis
,
the wnole of him hears.
Without toil he rules all things by
tne power of his rnind. 1 ^
There are intimations of idealism likewise in Anaxagoras
12. HcDougall
,
BM,1. 14. Thilly, HOP, 26.
15. nong, "Idealism," in 15. Xenophanes, "The Fragments,"
Runes, D0P,137. in Bakewell, SAP, 8.
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who flourished about 428 B. 0 .-^ According to this pioneer
of thought, "Mind knows all things”, and "mind also regu-
lated all things."^ 7 Plato, wno will he discusseu later,
may he said to have given the world the first comprehen-
sive philosophical system, a system wnicn in spite of real-
istic and dualistic elements, yet is basically idealistic.
however idealism in its most characteristically modern
form did not appear until the Seventeenth Century. It can
he said to have begun with the speculations of Descartes
and Locke. As has already been made clear, idealism tends
to emphasize the significance of mind as the clue to reali-
ty, as the explanation of the universe. It owes a great
debt to Descartes, in that he clearly brought to the modern
mind the significance of self-consciousness as the starting
point for philosophy. Being able to doubt all else, he
found it impossible to doubt the existence of the doubter.
This basic fact was assumed in the very act of doubting.
"I am, I exist, that is certain. This together with the
persistence of ideas coming to him from without leads him
to the farther fact, the existence of an external world,
and of God. But there is a basic dualism in Descartes which
he is never able to overcome, namely that existing between
mind and nature, and mind and body, nis philosophy is only
16. Thilly
,
HOP, 33. 18. Descartes, UEP,78
17. Anaxagoras, "The Fragments,"
in Bakewell, SAP, 52.
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a half-way house to idealism.
Taking his oue from Descartes as to the primacy of
thought, of idea, Locke went a step farther and insisted
that thought has ideas as its objects.-1-^. There are no
innate ideas. "Let us then suppose the mind to he, as we
say, white paper, void of all cnaracters without any
ideas.
"
2^ How then is knowledge possible, according to Locke
His answer is that ideas come through experience. Objects
impress themselves upon our senses which in turn gives rise
to ideas as representations of objects. But one can know
objects only through these ideas which are externally a-
roused. Locke also denied the objectivity of secondary-
qualities, but held on to the objectivity of primary quali-
ties as being inherent in the substances underlying objects.
Consciousness of these primary qualities arises in the mind
through direct impressions upon it. 2 -1- Locke’s reduction of
secondary qualities to subjective factors and his theory
that thought has ideas as its objects, lead to the mental-
ism of Berkeley, in whom idealism appears for the first time
in a pure form. As is well known the mentalism of Berkeley
in turn aroused the sensationalism of Hume, and Hume served
to awaken Kant from his "dogmatic slumbers," 22 wnicn lead
to the Critical Philosophy. The Critical Philosophy in its
turn provoked the movement which, beginning with Ficnte
19. Locke, EHU , Bo ok 11,121. 21. Locke, EHU,17S.
20. Ibid., 122-125. 22. Kant, PTFM.7.
*.
-
.
'
.
•
r
•
•
.
28
reached its logical conclusion in the absolute or logical
or organic idealism of Hegel and his school. The excesses
of the absolutists finally lead to the rise of personalism
which drawing elements from Berkeley, Leibniz, Hegel and
Kant, as well as from Plato and the great Hebrew Christian
tradition, may well be termed the culmination of the whole
idealistic movement. And as such, it will be seen tnat it
bears the brunt of Sellars 1 criticisms of the metaphysics
of idealism though he calls it by name only a few times.
^
3. Principles of Classification
Idealism, as has been seen, is hard to define, for it is
a great stem from which many snoots have sprung. Some of
them are so distinct that it is hard to recognize them as
belonging to the same parent-stem. What contrast could be
greater than that between personalism on the one hand which
finds the clue to reality in the self-conscious self, and
Bradley's system on the other which looks upon the self as
mere appearance, and thinks of tne highest reality as an
unconscious, impersonal Absolute? Plato's system, Berkeley^
mentalism, Kant's Critical Philosophy, Hegel's absolutism,
and personalism all have a right to the name idealism. All
are anti-materialistic and regard reality as basically
mental or psychical as at least dependent on mind, as in
the case of Kant.
Perhaps the two best classifications of idealism are
2b. bee, for example, Sellars, PPH,vii.
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tnose of Hoernle^ and Brightman. It is interesting to note
that botn divide idealism into four chief forms. According
to Eoernle^ idealism consists of the following:
(a) Spiritual Pluralism
,
which in-
terprets Reality as a Society of
Spirits; (h) Spiritual Aonism
,
which
interprets Reality as the manifestation,
or objectification of a single Spiritu-
al Energy* (c) Critical (Kantian) Ideal -
i sm
,
which avoids offering a theory of
Reality but mahes clear that every form
of experience, because of the universal
and necessary principles of 'Reason' in
it, has a contribution to make to the
theory of Reality, (d) Absolute Idealism
,
whicn attempts a synthetic, or synoptic,
interpretation of Reality in tne light
of its various 'appearances.' 24
"There are...," says Brightman, "at least four main types
of idealism."
The first, tne Platonic, asserts the
objectivity of value. The second, the
Berheleian, holds that all knowable
reality, and perhaps all reality
uberhaupt
,
is of tne nature of conscous-
ness. Tne tnird, the hegelian, points
to the coherence of one absolute system
as the only true value of existence.
The fourth, tne Lotzean, finds in self-
hood or personality an ultimate fact of
fundamental significance
.
2^
Both classifications have their merits, and their defects.
Eoernl/'s is especially deficient in not having a place for
Platonism, and in separating (b) from (d)
.
Again in Bright-
man' s classification the place of Leibniz's philosophy,
which is certainly a form of idealism, is not clear, though
24. Hoernle^ IAP,306. 25. Brightman, P0I,171.
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privately he has informed the student that he regards it
as a form of the Lotzean. Consequently in the pages that
follow, both classifications will be made use of. The
classification will be as follows, first Platonism, second
Berkeleian mentalism, third speculative, divided into two
branches, the Kantian and tne Hegelian, and fourth, person-
alism with its two hinds, tne pluralistic of Leibniz, and
the Lotzean.
4. A Brief Consideration of tne Four Chief Types
i. Platonic Idealism
Plato was the first great idealist who made any attempt
at the formulation of a comprehensive system. In the ear-
lier stages of his thought he seems to have been less
idealistic than in his later. In his earlier stages he is
more realistic, as for example, in the stress that he laid
on the forms and other realistic factors. Again in the ear-
lier stages of his thought his conception of God as Kind
is not nearly so explicit as in his latter, his conception
of God in The Republic
,
and expecially nis relation to the
forms is far less clear. Though in one place Plato speaxs
of tnem as created by God, there are other passages in
which one gains tne impression tnat they exist external to
p riHim. However in The Laws
,
he is more definitely ideal-
26. Compare
,
Hep
.
,
Booh X,597b v/ith
Boon V ,476a, wnere Beauty is spoken
of as an essence, also with VI, 508
where tne Good is almost deified.

istic in the modern sense.
Soul is prior to body, body secondary
and derivative, soul governing in the
real order of things and body being-
subject to governance ... .Soul, then,
by her own motions stirs all things in
shy, earth, or sea. '
But Plato to the last remains a dualist or pluralist.
"Plato is a dualist or pluralist. The Receptacle (certain-
ly) and the Pattern (probably) are external to God.” 2^ The
conception of tne ideas or patterns or forms and other
factors beside God constitute tne unique element in Pla-
tonic philosophy which have served to distinguish it from
other forms of idealism. But Plato’s insistence on the
primacy of mind,, and on tne objectivity of value, and his
opposition to materialism certainly mark him as the first
great idealist.
Plato has been and continues to be an influence to be
reckoned with, not only in philosophy as such, but in tne
general stream of thought whicn nourishes life. Sellars is
right in pointing to Plato’s influence on the Transcen-
dentalist movement in American Literature .
^
Ho one can
understand modern idealism adequately without first tracing
the course of this mignty river bacx to Plato. It is inter-
esting to note that Sellars recognizes Platonism and Kanti-
anism as his two chief enemies.
27. Plato, nav/s
,
Book A, 896c, e.
2d. Brightman, BOB, 529.
29. Sellars, PPP, 454-457.
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As we pass from problem to problem, we
shall see that the two great enemies of
an evolutionary naturalism are Platonism
and Kantianism * Both deny this self-ex-
planatory character of nature * In a sense,
they are both supernatural j,stic . They
desire to transcend space.
ii. Berkeleian Mentalism
Berkeley’s revolutionary philosophy embodies three funda-
mental concepts, his conception of matter, his conception
of God, and his conception of the nature and status of
human spirits. How philosophers since the days of tne Greeks
had conceived matter as real in one of two ways. Those who
followed Democritus conceived it in terms of indivisible
atoms, the stuff of the universe, of which all things were
made, even minds. Idealistic philosophers on the other hand
tended to conceive it after the manner of Aristotle as a
substratum.*^- This substratum was thought of as a core of
being which held together the accidents or qualities of
things, and as persisting amid all change as tne absolutely
fixed abiding center of being. Locke in his Essay on human
Understanding; separated primary from secondary qualities.
The latter such as hot, light, color, taste, pain he re-
garded as subjective, produced in the individual as an
effect of things. But primary qualities he conceived as
inhering in things. Bulk, figure, number, situation and
motion and rest are really existent in things. At tne basis
30. Sellars, M, 2.
31. Aristotle, Met., Book II ,1042,25-1042b,5.
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of things there is substance
,
an unknown and unknowable
thing which must be postulated as the "support" of the
primary qualities.*32
Berkeley goes a step further than Locke. Locke admitted
that substance is unknown and unknowable. Berkeley, while
retaining spiritual substance, rejects substance alto-
gether in the sense of a mysterious material support or
a core of being holding together the qualities of things.
The only substance which he admits as the support of things
is spirit. "That there is no substance wherein ideas can
v
exist beside spirit is to me evident. Berkeley dissolves
things into sensations. He utterly rejects Locke's division
of qualities into primary and secondary. The former are as
subjective as the latter.*34 As a matter of fact the human
mind does not know primary qualities as existing objective-
ly in things. Such are known only as sensations arising
within the mind itself. "Sensible things therefore are
nothing else but so many sensible qualities, or combinations
of sensible qualities."'30 Things are just as they are ex-
perienced in the perceiving mind. "Their esse is neroipi .
nor is it possible they should have any existence out of
trie minds or thinking things which perceive them."*30 How-
ever there are two kinds of ideas, active and passive. The
22. Locke, SHU, 169-171, 290-292. 25. Ibid., 12.
22. Berkeley, DHP, 101. v 26. Berkeley, PhX, 259.
24. Ibid., 21-26.
*.
•
..
*
•
former are due to tne will of tne individual and can be
excited and shifted at pleasure , but tne latter tne indi-
vidual must receive as given, for such are none other than
the unchangeable order of nature "the admirable connexion
whereof sufficiently testifies tne wisdom and benevolence
of its Author.
For Berkeley, then, since material reality is given in
terms of idea and in no other way, it is idea. As a result
Berkeley, as was stated on page 23 of this dissertation,
has been frequently charged with solipsism. But this has
been due to a misunderstanding of his system. Bacx of tne
fixed ideas there is God who causes these ideas to arise.
There is a fixed order in the ideas due to the activity of
God upon minds. This order remains as unchangeable and
constant as for tne most confirmed materialist, and what is
more such an order is certainly far more intelligible.*^
Without God, the Supreme Person, Berkeley's whole system
would be left hanging in the air, but grounded in the
purpose and activity of God, it needs no otner ground of
support
.
Finally there is his conception of human spirits, ilatter
is nothing more than an orderly series of sensations, but
the same is not true of human spirits. "I myself am not my
ideas, but somewhat else, a thinking, active principle tnat
37. Ibid., 273.
38. Berkeley, PHK, 273.
39. Berkeley, DHP, 62-64,
also PHK, 273-274.
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perceives, knows
,
wills, ana operates about ideas . In
other words as God is the Supreme Agent, so likewise human
spirits in their limited fashion are also agents, and not
mere complexes of sensations after the manner of things. A
self is not an idea, but a being capable of having and
using ideas.
Berkeley has been discussed at length for three obvious
reasons. First, because of the purity of his idealism. He
absolutely disposes of the materialistic concept of matter.
Second, because of his emphasis on the nature and unique
status of personality, ne is a personalist before lotze and
Bowne, though most personalists would refuse to follow him
in his epistemological idealism. Third, next to Kant there
is no philosopher whom Sellars criticizes more frequently
and more thoroughly, for he realizes that he cannot vanquish
idealism until he first disposes of Berkeley,
iii. Speculative Idealism
(1). The Critical Idealism of Kant
Ho modern philosopher with the possible exception of Hegel
has been more influential than Immanuel Kant. In Kant both
"idealistic and realistic tendencies are at work."^ Though
second to none in emphasizing the dynamic power of mind,
yet Kant definitely rejected epistemological idealism. He
criticizes idealism for assuming’ that "the only immediate
40. Berkeley DHP, 95.
41. Baton, KLQ2, 68.
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experience is inner experience , " and contends that tnere is
a permanent element in perception which is not of the mind's
42
making, but to which the mind must of necessity conform.
However, in spite of his emphatic rejection of epistemo-
logical idealism Kant is essentially an idealist. Both
Brightman and Loernle classify him as such, 45 and Swing
even goes so far as to say, "He was indeed, much more than
Berkeley, who had hardly any followers prior to Kant, the
founder of the 'idealist school*'
"
44 Likewise Pringle-
Pattison designates Kant as an idealist in tne "metaphysi-
cal sense."
The Kantian scheme might, indeed, be
described as idealism in the metaphysi-
cal sense, inasmuch as it regards the
kingdom of ends--the etnical common-
wealth of self-legislating spirits—as
the noumenal world or ultimate reality,
of which the world of sense is the
phenomenalizat ion. 0
Finally Sellars in recognizing Platonism and Kantianism as
tne "two great enemies" of evolutionary naturalism, desig-
nates them both supernaturalistic
,
that is idealistic in
the metaphysical sense. "Both deny tnis self-explanatory
character of nature. In a sense they are both supernatural-
istic. They desire to transcend space."45
An analysis of Kant snows at least four idealistic
42. Kant, OPR, B275-276. 45. Pringle-Pattison, "Ideal-
43. Brightman, P0I,170, ism," in Baldwin, DPP, 501.
Hoernle', IAP, 306. 46. Sellars, SB, 2.
44. Swing, "Kantianism," in
Runes, TCP, 258.

elements. Firsts there is his empnasis on the dynamic
creative nature end role of mind in the organization of
experience. At times in fact Kant is definitely a self-
psychologist
.
4
7
Second, at times he hints at an idealistic
doctrine of things-in-themselves as the result of the Di-
vine energizing. 4® Third, as Smith in his excellent Commen -
tary to Kant’s Critique insists, the modern theory of co-
herence so closely identified with idealism has its be-
ginning in Kant. 49 Fourth, and in a real sense most evident
of all, as Pringle-Pattison points out, there is Kant’s
ethical theistic idealism.®® The pure practical reason linh
man with the Kingdom of ends witn the real order of things
which lies bach of the phenomenal order, and finds it an
order of kind. As Kant himself puts it:
Thus the moral law, by means of the
conception of the summum bonum ... as
the object of a pure practical reason,
determines tne concept of tne First
Being as the Supreme Being ; a tiling
which the physical (and in its higher
development the metaphysical); in
other words, the whole speculative
course of reason, was unable to effect.
The conception of God, tnen, is one
that belongs originally not to physics,
iL .e_ . to speculative reason, but to
morals .
®
4
However, in spite of the presence of tnese genuine ideal-
istic elements ,which mahe Kant essentially an idealist, yet
47 . see especially, Kant, 50. Pringle-Patti son
,
"Ideal-
CPR, B132-156. ism," in Baldwin, DPP, 501
48. Ibid., B567-569. 51. Kant, COPE, 285.
49. Smith, CKPR, xxxviii-xxxix.
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he is not a pure idealist lixe Berkeley. Recognition must
he given to the fact which Baton points that in Kant both
"idealistic and realistic tendencies are at work."°^
(2). Absolute Idealism
Absolute idealism is singularistic or monistic in the
quantitative sense. Reality is conceived as organic, the
parts and phases of which are a part of the all-inclusive
One, the Absolute. Absolute idealism went through five
stages of development. The first is found in Fichte, who
rejecting Kant 1 s thing-in-themselves
,
made the self-
C r2
conscious self his primary metaphysical principle. ° But
Fichte took from Kant the doctrine of the primacy of the
practical reason, and conceives the universe of finite be-
ings as united under the dominion of one sovereign Yifill.°4
Fichte, while reminding one of Descartes in his emphasis
upon self-consciousness, yet definitely rejects all dual-
ism. flatter does not exist apart from mind. "Reason alone
exists; the Infinite in Himself, —the finite in Him and
through Him. Only in our minds has he created a world." 00
For Fichte the whole theater of nature exists but for one
purpose, the realization of duty.^°
The second stage of the development of absolute idealism
came with Schelling. This in reality represented a turning
52. Baton, KME, 68. 55. Ibid., 158.
53. Fichte, VOM, 88-92. 56. Ibid., 161-162.
54. Ibid., Ill, 151-154.
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back to Spinoza; for Schelling conceived the Absolute im-
personally, as "complete indifference."^ The third step
came with Hegel who along with Plato, Aristotle and Kant
shares the honor of being one of the greatest minds that
humanity has produced. In Hegel absolute idealism, which
in its modern form at least begins with Fichte, finds its
classic expression and realization.
The consummation of this who 1 e rich and
varied development is formed by Hegel * s
logical idealism . He signified in the
main a return from Schelling to Fichte,
a giving up of the thought that the
living wealth of the world can be de-
rived or deduced from th
absolute indifference
^
The central idea of Hegel's system is that Reality is an
organic Whole
,
the parts of which considered in isolation
are mere abstractions, and can be understood only relative
to the Whole. "The truth is the whole. It is not a static
whole as is often supposed. "It is self-becoming
,
self-
development . For is reality a mere flux. It is a dia-
lectical process in which Spirit, representing the higher
rational and spiritual capacities, is ever seeking fuller
expression, and fuller realization. 0 Again it is a ration-
al process heading toward a goal, and that goal is Freedom,
conceived not in terms of caprice but in terms of a state
of affairs in which the highest capacities of man will
57. Windelband, u0P,608. 60. Ibid., 11, 16.
58. Ibid., 611. 61. Ibid., Vol .II , II , 327-329
.
59. Hegel, POM, Vol. I, II, 16.
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find the fullest possible realization. 62 The dynamic factor
behind the whole process, the all-inclusive unity in which
it is embraced, and in a sense the goal toward which it is
heading is the Absolute, who is ever seeking fuller and
k a
fuller expression of His inexhaustibly ricn potentialities. °
Sometimes Hegel makes it appear that this Absolute is the
blind impersonal All of pantheism, a return to Spinoza. 0^
But a consideration of Hegel’s system as a ./hole with its
emphasis upon Heason and Purpose weighs the balance in the
direction of a possibly more personalistic conception of
the Absolute. However Hegel is not clear at this point and
as a result two well known schools of Hegelians have appear-
ed, one emphasizing the personalistic elements and the other
the impersonalistic
.
The fourth type of absolute idealism is that of thinkers
such as Bradley. Following in the footsteps of Hegel,
Bradley uses the synoptic method and seeks the ideal of
seeing reality as an organic V/hole. But Bradley out-hegels
Hegel. He is not as empirical and concrete as Hegel. He has
little regard for history but builds nis system upon logic,
upon the principle of coherence. "Ultimate reality is such
that it does not contradict itself; here is an absolute
criterion." 06 Anything and everytning which is contradictory
and relative belongs to the realm of appearance. It pos-
62. Hegel, POH, 34-25; Also 101. 64. Hegel, P0M,Vol.II,
63. Ibid., 101. 330-331
65. Bradley, AAR, 136.
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sesses a relative existence and reality, but no absolute or
ultimate reality. Bradley taxes up one thing after another,
beginning with secondary and primary qualities, then ma-
terial things, space and time, and ending up with mind and
values, and by critical examination and analysis reveals
contradictions whicn relegate each in its turn to the limbo
of appearance, ho naturalist has ever dealt more severely
with the concept of the self than Bradley, the idealist.
Sellars, the naturalist, does far more justice to the facts
of mind.^ For Bradley in snort, nothing is truly real ex-
cept the all-embracing Absolute, conceived as the totality
of experience. "That Reality is one system which contains
in itself all experience."^ Relations for Bradley are in-
ternal so that he can easily imagine all distinctions as
mere appearances which are broken down and transcended in
the Absolute so as to form a harmonious Whole. "Reality,
consists ... in a higher experience, superior to the dis-
tinctions which it includes and overrides."^ In the Abso-
lute good and evil, truth and error and all the distinctions
of our ordinary human experience somehow flow together as
many rivers flow into the sea and lose their identity.
The fifth type of absolute idealism is the personalistic
.
Tnose absolutists taking their cue from the personalistic
element in hegel develop personalistic absolutisms. Among
66. Lbid. ,101-102,81 ,94,119. 68. Bradley, AAR, 536.
67. cellars, BN, 16-18. 69. Ibid., 195.
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these none are more topical tnan Josiah Royce and Hocking.
For both the Absolute is conceived as the world Self em-
bracing all other selves as parts who yet, however maintain
their self-identity something like the Gulf Stream main-
tains its identity in the Atlantic. "There is, then, at
last, but one Self, organically, reflectively, consciously
inclusive of all the other selves, and so of all truth."’7(-)
"I shall go farther with idealism, and say that tne world
is a self . • .Within the Selfhood of substance there is room
71for all tne unfathomed majesty of reality."
iv. Personalism
(1) . Leibnizian Pluralistic Personalism
It is interesting to note that botxi nocking, tne idealist,
and Sellars, the naturalist regard Leibniz as the "first
thorough-going idealist." 172 Many thinkers would seriously
question the accuracy of this estimate; for there is a
mechanistic or deterministic element in Leibniz, which as
Morris rightly puts it ie never harmonizes with "the main
spiritualistic tendency."’72
Leibniz is definitely a pluralist, and a panpsychist. The
universe is many. It consists of a hierarchy of monads at
the head of which is God. The monads or simple substances
owe what degree of perfection they possess to "the influ-
70. Royce, 2MP,379.
71. Hocking, TOP, 440-441.
72. Sellars, R1J,194; Hocking, TOP, 254.
73. Morris, KGPR, 31.
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ence of God, but . . .their imperfections come from their own
nature which is incapable of being without limits • But
having "no windows" the monads whould not be able to inter-
act if it were not for the Divine intervention. ^ God for
Leibniz is "Power
,
which is the source of all; also know-
ledge
,
whose content is the variety of ideas; and finally,
nr
Will, whicn makes changes or products.”' 0 He distinguishes
sharply between God's relation to human beings (spirits),
and txie rest of creation. While ordinary monads according
to their capacity can in a measure reflect the universe,
spirits are "images of Divinity itself," by virtue of being
"capable of knowing the system of the universe." Consequent-
ly human beings are capable of entering into a real fellow-
ship with God which is impossible to the rest of creation.
The relation of God to human beings then, is not like that
of an inventor to the maciiine which he invents, but more
like that of a "prince to his subjects, and indeed, what a
father is to his children.
Both in his stress upon God as Will and as Power, and in
his conception of human personality as unique, and as
constituting a unique personal relationsxiip to the Creator,
Leibniz is definitely personalistic
,
a personalist before
Lotze and Bowne. However he is more definitely and radical-
ly pluralistic. In this as well as in the mecnanical or
74. Leibniz, Til, 240. 76. Ibid., 244.
75. Ibid., 220-225
,
246. 77. Ibid.; 266...
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deterministic element which appears in nis system he differs
from the Lotze-Bowne School.^
(2). The Lotze-Bowne School
In the Lotze-Bowne School of personalism many of the
things which are dark in Hegel Become clear. Bor example,
Hegel's concept of personality is not too definite. The
genius of personalism lies in its insistence that only
persons, selves, are metaphysically real.
Thoroughgoing personalism is idealistic.
It finds in personality the key to reali-
ty. Only the personal is metaphysically
real. The material world is phenomenal.
°
The personalist does not speak of "the Ideas" as Plato might
or "the Idea," as Hegel does. Ideas are products of mind
and have no reality apart from such. i.ioreover the universe
is but the energizing of the Supreme Herson, God.
Personalism faces the facts with the
hypothesis that the unity of the universe
is due to one Supreme Person or Hind, so
that all the laws of nature, the relations
and interactions of tilings and persons
are dependent on his will and purpose.
If unity be conceived as the expression
of mind, such unity is compatible with
as much difference and plurality as mind
is capable of. 0
Personalism of the Lotze-Bowne School is more monistic
than Leibniz. It steers between the Gharybdis of extreme
metaphysical monism and the Scyl'la of extreme metaphysical
78. Compare Leibniz, Til, 266-268
with Bowne, net., 137-128.
79. Knudson, POP, 76.
80. Brightman, ITP, 220.
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pluralism. It seeks to embody the best that is in both Hegel
and Leibniz. "We have--apart from personali sm--either a
block universe or a sawdust universe." 1^-1- Persons for person-
alism are not in the same category as things. Things are
not equally real. Personalism would not agree witn Sellars
that "stars, plants, ants and human beings are equally
real . "^2 Persons are created and endowed witn a large
measure of freedom, while things are produced and have no
freedom in the personal sense. The pluralistic tendency in
personalism consists in the freedom with which the Supreme
Person endows the persons which He creates, so that the
universe becomes a society or community instead of a mere
order. The monistic element consists in the fact of the
recognition of an irder in the universe, and that persons,
as well as things in the final analysis, are subject to
that Order, and wholly dependent upon it, as the expression
of the Supreme Person through whom alone, and in whom alone,
all things exist.^
modern personalism is closely related to classical theism
in three ways. First, in holding to the absoluteness of God
in the sense of being "the one independent causal ground
of the world," second, in holding to the doctrine of cre-
ation, and third, in holding like classical theism to a
dualistic theory of knowledge. It differs from the latter
81. Ebid., 220 . 85. Bowne, Met., 100-101
82. Sellars, PPR, 6.
./
*
in three interesting ways, first, in conceiving nature in
purely idealistic terms. Nature for personalism does not
have the "quasi-independent" existence that it is inclined
to have for traditional theism. Second, personalism lays
more stress on personality as the ontologically real. Third
while traditional theism has been more rationalistic,
personalism is inclined to he more voluntaristic .®^ "It
lays more stress on the will than the intellect and incline
to the view that life is deeper than logic."®®
Though relatively modern as a distinct philosophical
movement, yet as a tendency personalism is as old as phi-
losophy itself. Flewelling finds personalistic elements
as far back as Heraclitus.
The trend toward naming qualities of
personality as ultimate reality began
at least as early as Heraclitus (536-
470 B.C.) who affirmed mind as the
fundamentally real because it alone
had the power to differentiate itself
from the objective world and from its
own experiences.®®
But personalism is even more evident in Anaxagoras as
flewelling recognizes.
These personalistic elements appear
also in the cosmogony of Anaxagoras
(500-430 B.C.) who gave philosophy an
anthropocentric trend by affirming that
mind is the foundation of existence, the
force which arranges and guides.®'
84. Knudson, POP, 64-67.
85. Ibid.
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67.
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Regarding modern personalism it xias been truly said:
Roughly speaking, it owes its spiritual
individualism and activism to Leibnitz,
its immaterialism to Berkeley, its e-
pistemology and ethical conception of
personality to Kant, and its general and
distinctive formulation to Lotze. 88
Lotze holds that God is a self-conscious Being, and that
the Laws of nature are but His ways of acting. Moreover for
Lotze as for personalists generally not only are "minds
Real," but "all that is Real is rnind." 8 ^ Moreover Lotze as
Bowne after his emphasized the idea that abstractions have
no reality apart from mind, and do not exist as conditions
upon which mind is dependent for its reality. Mind for
Lotze is the deepest, the most basic reality. This is the
very essence of personalism. Lotze had a tremendous influ-
ence both in England and in America. In fact Knudson goes
so far as to say:
It is largely to nis influence tnat the
revival of theism during the past thirty
or forty years is due, a revival so mark-
ed that it is acknowledged to be tne most
striking movement in contemporary pniloso-
phy of religion. 88
In America personalism was especially developed by Bowne
who further purged the concept of personality from sub-
stantialistic elements, "grounded it in the Kantian episte-
mology, developed its implications in a comprehensive way,
and made it the center and constitutive principle of a
88. Knudson, POP, 62. 90. Knudson, POP, 62.
89. Lotze, MIG, Vol. I, 642.
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complete metaphysical system. " Personalism continues as
one of the most vigorous philosophical movements in the
world today. In England the influence of personalists such
as James Ward, A. S. Pringle-Pattison, H. Rashdall, W. R.
Sorley, G. C. Webb and otners has been tremendous. Likewise
Charles Renouvier in Prance and Rudolf Eucken in Germany
have made impressions which continue. In America the two
chief centers of the movement are Boston University, where
Knudson, Brightman and DeWolf exercise a great influence,
and the University of' Southern California wnere Ralph T.
Plewel'ling is the directing figure. B. S. Brightman' s con-
ception of God as Infinite-finite
,
God as containing an
irrational element, "The Given," is an interesting variation
and one of the most unique and interesting solutions of the
problem of evil ever attempted in the whole history of the
personalistic movement. 92
Personalism has been discussed at length for two reasons.
Pirst
,
because it seems to be the system in which idealism
must culminate when all the facts are taxen into consider-
ation. Both Plato and Rant represent a hopeless dualism
which they never transcend. Begel is vague at the place of
greatest concern, the nature and status of individual
personality. Bradley does violence to the most concrete and
evident facts of human experience in attempting to dissolve
91. Ibid., 85-86
92. Brigntman, POR, 536-527.
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the riches and glorias of the universe in a colorless
Absolute, termed the totality of experience, now experience
is possible apart from a mind or self, Bradley never really
made clear. Again Berkeley was skating on thin ice when ne
insisted that the world is no more than a series of presen-
tations which the Divine Mind makes to the human. He needed
to ground his thinking in the idea of the world as the Di-
vine energizing, and as consequently something more than
mere presentations. Thus he might have saved his system
from the constant charge of subjectivism. In short, person-
alism in its concept of the Self as not only thinking, but
willing, active, creative, and space and time transcending
seems to represent idealism at its best, and as such consti-
tutes the greatest challenge to naturalism today.
The second reason for emphasizing personalism is that
Sellars recognizes that the greatest challenge to his
system is the mind-body problem, along with tne problem of
value, lersonalism more than any other form of idealism
emphasizes, as has been shown, the unique status of person-
ality, of the self, as an empirical fact laden with pro-
found metapysical import. Again personalism realizes the
significance and status of values and gives such tne place
in reality which they seem to demand. In the words of
Flewelling
:
The cosmic order, being personal is also
ethical and the moral mandates are written
,•'
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into the nature of tilings. The moral
laws are held to he as inexorable in
their outworking as any other laws of
nature.... Aesthetically, Personalism
maintains the cosmic and personal
character of the forms of beauty to
which normal personality can respond
and in which it can find pleasure and
self-expression because of an inherent
harmony between persons and things....
Values are thus given a standing in the
nature of things as certain and as
direct as that of natural or pnysical
phenomena. ^3
Thus the final issue in this dissertation is not between
Sellars and Plato, or Kant, or Hegel or Bradley. The final
issue is between naturalism at its best as represented by
Sellars, and idealism at its best as represented by person
alism. Sellars' clashes with the other systems will but be
in preparation for the final battle with personalism which
will center in the mind-body problem and the closely re-
lated problem of value. For tne critical naturalist feels
himself "on his mettle"^4 when he approaches the mind-body
problem.
It is true, of course, as nas been stated before, tnat
Sellars mentions personalism by name only a few times. In
fact in his discussion of the mind-body problem he directs
his immediate attack against Bergson more directly tnan
against any other pnilosopner. Bergson is not a thorough-
going personalist. There are definite realistic and prag-
93. Flewelling, "Personalism,"
in Hunes, TCP, 324-325.
94. Sellars, 3N, 286.
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matic tendencies in his philosophy, however, especially
when it comes to the mind-body problem he is in many ways
in accordance with personalism. In fact in his last booh
the note is definitely personalistic •^ however he does not
stress personality as a metaphysical principle in tne
definite as well as comprehensive way that personalists do.
hence the contention that the final battle is between
personalism and Sellars' naturalism. But before a dis-
cussion of Sellars' criticisms of idealism is attempted
some attention must be given to the many points of agree-
ment between his system and idealism. To this important
question the next chapter will be given.
95. Bergson, TSLIR, £40,££8, 305
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CHAPTER III
FUNDAMENTAL LIKENESSES AND DIFFERENCES OF
EVOLUTIONARY NATURALISM AND IDEALISM
1.
Methodological
One of the fundamental differences between idealism and
naturalism is that of method. The idealist stresses syn-
opsis. Convinced with Kegel that "the truth is the whole
,
he seeks the widest and most inclusive knowledge. The whole
of human experience in all of its richness and diversity
is his goal. The naturalist like the neorealist, on the*
other hand, is inclined toward analysis, he is dominated by
the idea that the truth can be found by picking things to
pieces in the hope of finding simple, ultimate units with
which analysis must stop. The modern naturalist is inclined
to be an extreme analyst to the extent of belittling reason*
John Dewey is at times very strongly inclined in this di-
rection. 2
2Sellars is decidedly more analytical tnan the idealists.
This leads him to find in the atom, not in the old
Democritean sense of a hard substance, but in the sense of
the simplest form of organized energy, his ultimate princi-
ple of explanation, he simply picks matter to pieces with
the scientist until he comes to the simplest structures
which science at this stage recognizes, the atoms, and then
1. Hegel, POM.Vol.I ,11 ,16.
2. Dewey, Q,C,23,221.
3. Sellars, BN, 134.
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proceeds to take them as his ultimates. 4 Sellars is more
likely to accept the latest conclusions of the sciences as
the last court of appeal than is the idealist, he is in-
clined to he less critical of the sciences, he very greatly
admires "science and its methods."^ However, as was pointed
out in Chapter I, Sellars does not identify philosophy with
science or attempt to make philosophy a mere handmaiden of
science. Philosophy uses the material of the sciences as
its starting point for the purpose of its wider generali-
zations. Science cannot explain "its own existence and
nature. It makes certain basic assumptions sucn as tne
capacity of the human mind to know tne world which philoso-
7phy alone can justify, in so far, tnen, as Sellars does
not identify philosophy with the sciences, and even pro-
poses that in certain vital respects science must loox to
philosophy, he is in harmony wita idealistic metnod. how-
ever it still remains true that he is inclined, to be less
critical of tne sciences than is idealism and even to look
to science for his ultimates.
Again though Sellars is more analytical tnan idealists,
yet he is at the same time more synthetic than most natu-
ralists. he makes it plain that he holds that it is the
business of philosophy to gather together tne findings of
4. Sellars, Phil, and Phen. 5. Sellars, Jour. Phil.,
Hes. ,5311944) ,271,276. 41 ( 1944 ) , 542
.
also, Phil, and Phen. 6. Sellars, PPR,45.
Res . ,3(1942) ,389,392. 7. Ibid., 46
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Q
all the sciences and to seek "coherence in tneir synthesis."
"The philosopher is a synthesist hy profession."^ And again
he says: "For me, the task of the philosopher is to analyze
concepts and principles and to perform a labor of synthe-
sis."1^ It is in his use of synthesis along with analysis
that makes it possible for him to do more justice to the
facts of mind and value than most naturalists are inclined
to do. In so far then as Sellars makes use of syntxiesis, he
is definitely approaching the synoptic method of idealism,
though he stops short of synopsis in the full sense of the
term.
Moreover not only in his stress upon synthesis, hut also
in his high regard for reason Sellars approaches idealism.
He is never guilty of belittling reason as Dewey is. He
respects reason as much as most idealists as far as method
is concerned, and is the untiring foe of all forms of posi-
tivism and agnosticism. In fact he goes so far as to say:
"I am myself a rationalist and sceptical of the self-
contradictoriness of reason."11 Relative to method then,
while Sellars is far more analytic and radically empirical
then are the idealists as a group, yet in so far as he
gives a paramount place to reason and to synthesis he is
approaching the basic method of idealism.
8. Sellars, DPP, 14.
9 • Ibid
. ,
15.
10. Sellars, The Monist
, 37 (1927 ), 151
.
11. Sellars, PPR
, 341
.
-
55
2. Epistemological
As was seen in Chapter I, in the discussion of Sellars'
epistemology, Sellars is an epistemological dualist. He is
the untiring foe of all forms of epistemological monism,
he they idealistic or realistic. In the next chapter con-
sideration will he given to his chief criticisms of episte-
mological idealism.
however all forms of idealism are not monistic as far as
their epistemology is concerned. Personalism is in fact
frankly dualistic. hnudson in his rhilosophy of Personalism
names "tne dualism of thought ana thing, or idea and object"
as tne first principle of personalism, he names "tne cre-
ative activity of thought," and the "trustwortniness of
reason," as second and third principles. 1 ^ In the discussion
of method it was shown that Sellars is certainly in sympa-
tny with the trustwortniness of reason, and later in this
chapter it will he shown that he allows mucn room for "the
creative activity of thought." Much then as Sellars differs
from personalism as far as the final issues of metaphysics
are concerned, yet relative to the fundamentals of episte-
mology he sees almost eye to eye with personalists. Perhaps
it is not amiss to compare his epistemological views with
tnose of Bowne at this juncture.
Por Sellars tne mind cannot intuit objects, x.or can
12. Knudson, POP, 99
Si
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objects stamp themselves upon the mind as the old materi-
alists thought. Objects are indeed capable of stimulating
the mind to an activity, that can arouse sense-data wnich
are valid for thougnt; but, nevertheless, sense-data are
not knowledge as some thinkers vainly imagine. It is only
the "material for knowledge . " "Knowledge must be quarried
out of it by patient comparison and ingenious experimental
control. Hence knowledge is for Sellars a translation of
sense -data into the medium of thought. Knowledge is es-
sentially an interpretation in terms of the mental. "The
knowledge content is a direct interpretation of the physi-
cal reality, that is, we are compelled to think the physi-
cal realm in terms of predicates which we have achieved in
our experience
.
For Bowne, likewise, objects are not directly intuited
nor is sense perception knowleuge. Objects through their
impressions- upon the senses may indeed serve to awaken the
mind to activity, but sensation is not knowledge. It is
only the raw material of knowledge.
Thought does not rest in the appre-
hension of sensations as having simple
and identical qualitative contents, it
proceeds to relate them variously and
interpret them. Only thus does thought
reach a world of reality and a rational
system. D
15. Sellars, Phil. Rev.
35(1924) ,581.
14. Sellars, EN,37.
15. Sellars, Phil. Rev .
,
27(1918) ,511.
16. Bowne, TTK,46.
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There are two implications of Sellars' epistemology which
seem to he clearly idealistic. Sellars, like Bowne, he-
lieves that the mind can know things, or at least their
basic characteristics. "If we are not to he agnostics, we
must hold that knowledge does reveal the object."-^ This
knowledge while never complete is yet valid. In other words
there is a definite correlation between tnougxit and tning. 1 ^
The best explanation of this strange correlation^ so sug-
gestive of Cosmic Purpose Ghat Sellars can offer, is the
following whicn seems to be more of an assumption rather
than’ a serious attempt at explanation: "The critical real-
ist makes mind a part of nature and, therefore, witn the
1 9
same categorical structure as nature." Bowne, on the
other hand, finds the explanation of this strange corre-
lation in the idea of a purposive arrangement. Things "are
cast in the molds of thought. Thus idea and object fit
together as hand and glove because they were made to fit
together. Things can be understood by human reason because
there is a reason, an order in things that answers tne
reasonings of the human mind. "Over against the human
reason whereby nature exists for us is a supreme reason,
through and in which nature has its real existence.
But there is a still more directly idealistic implication
in the epistemology of Cellars, he holds that tnings do not
17. Cellars, Phil . dev .
,
19. Sellars, PPR,298.
52(1924), 581 20. Bovine
,
TTK.296.
18. Sellars, BIT, 27. 21. Ibid., 242.
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impress themselves directly on the mind, he rejects the
copy theory. 22 In fact, he goes so far as to say: "We shall
never see the face of external tnings." 2^ And yet he be-
lieves that human knowledge is valid for objects, that is
the mind can denote the essential characteristics of things.
But since tnis does not involve a direct intuition of the
thing the thing itself it must involve a representation of
the thing in mental terms, in terms of mind or ideas.
"Knowing involves mediation by appearance or content
.
25This content of knowledge is of course essentially mental.
If things then cannot be known except in terms of tneir
characteristics which are known only in terms of mind and
in no other way, the conclusion seems to follow that things
are in their essential nature of trie order of mind. In
criticism of Cellars 1 chapter, "Knowledge and Its Cate-
gories," in Essays in Critical healism
,
miss Calkins justly
makes the criticism that Sellars, along with Lovejoy and
Pratt, seems to approach the idealistic instead of the
realistic point of view. 2 ° In answer, all that he has to
say is: "I find the statement ambiguous, if she had said
mentalistic instead of idealistic 1 would have agreed with
her." Sellars tries hard to distinguisn between idea and
22 .
25.
24.
25 .
Sellars
,
BN, 37. 26. Calkins
,
Jour. Phil.,
Sellars, PPR , 5
.
23(1926) ,706, note 25
Sellars Phil . Rev
.
,
27. Sellars Jour. rhil.
,
55(1924) ,383. 24(1927) ,241.
Sellars BN , 51
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the mental as for example in the following:
When I have said that the appearance is
mental, I have meant that it is a pre-
sented complex within the complex act of
knowing. The complex, structured pulse
of consciousness is for me a variant or
creation of tne brain-mind ... .in knowing,
the content is not an 'idea 1 but a
character-complex which we are asigning
to an object as its cnaracteristics. But
the whole act of knowing is, nevertheless,
a complex pulse of consciousness. 2®
Here Sellars seems to mean by the term mental nothing more
than the functioning of the brain or at best a "presented
complex" within that functioning. Nevertheless he has a
hard time getting rid of the term idea with all of its
idealistic implications. For example in the chapter on "The
Categories of knowledge," referred to above he "holds tnat
knowledge of objects is mediated by ideas which are in some
pq
sense distinct from the objects of knowledge." And again
he asserts: "All that the postulate of knowledge seems to
me unequivocally to demand is that the object have a
structure ana relations and powers which can be revealed
in the content of the idea." 2^ Here he certainly speaks of
the mental content as ’"idea" 1 . On the basis of his episte-
mology one can rightfully draw the conclusion that at times
he is not far from the Kingdom of Idealism; for objects are
28. Sellars, Phil. Rev.,
33(1924), 584
29. Sellars, "The Categories of
Knowledge," in Drake, Sellars
and Others, BCR, 190.
30. Ibid., 198-199.
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never directly intuited nor are they copieu, hut rather
revealed in terms of ideas or mental contents, he must
either admit that objects are of the nature of mind or else
frankly hold with Kant, the existence of things-in-them-
selves. The criticisms of Sidney Hook, a fellow naturalist,
hut of pragmatic bent, is relevant at this point:
My impression is that he does not es-
cape the epistemological trap set hy
Locke. He tries to break out of it hy
fiat and a new set of terms. I do not
understand what his 'objectives' or
' deno tables' are, why he is entitled
to them if perception is the basic act
of knowledge rather than a guided phase
in the activity of judgement, and by
what right he assumes that their nature
is 'disclosed 1 (another ambiguous term)
by 'sensory symbols' in recognition. He
says it is meaningless to talk about
things-in-themselves, but it seems to
me that on his view they would have to
exist anyhow since tne sensory elements
whicn in some way 'disclose' objectives
are not regarded as part of their nature. 01
On the one hand, as has been pointed out repeatedly,
Sellars certainly chooses the alternative of postulating
things-in-themselves, however much he may deny tne ex-
istence of such. The following statement certainly does
imply that there exists something which makes appearances
possible: "We shall never see tne face of external things."
The implication here is that there lies something beyond
the appearances which the mind cannot grasp, since things
31. Hook, Jour. Phil.,
41(1944)7547-548.
32. Sellars, PPR, 5
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always appear in the garb of thought yet are distinguish-
able from the mental content through which they reveal them-
selves. This gives point to Hook's criticism that on Sellars'
view things-in-themselves would "have to exist anyhow since
the sensor;, elements which in some way 'disclose 1 objectives
are not regarded as part of their nature ." In an article in
The Journal of Philosophy Sellars attempts to answer nook
by asserting that "tne responsive reference" (of perception)
"is directed and direct," toward things and that tne same
thing is true of "tne characterization." "knowledge does not
impinge on phenomena but on things in commerce with the
organic knower. nevertheless nook's cnarge that Sellars
cannot rid himself of things-in-themselves seems to hold.
If things are Known only in terms of thought and yet are
not of the nature of thought but something other than
thought then Sellars must postulate things-in-themselves
lying back of appearances.
But while, on the one hand, Sellars seems to presuppose
unknown things-in-themselves, on the other hand, ne con-
tends that the human mind can know things—tnat is their
essential characteristics and pattern. "It is not the stuff,
or being, of external things that we grasp but their
pattern."^ In what then does tne essential nature of a
thing consist? "To be a tiling is to be a that-what, tnat
32. Sellars, Jour. Phil.,
41(1944) ,692.
34. Sellars, PPR, 282.
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is, something which can be denoted, because having ex-
istence, and, by that very fact, determinate in its
nature . "^5 it will be seen that Sellars makes good nis case
against Berkeley, that is, in so far as Berkeley tends to
regard things as mere presentations; but on the other hand
Sellars' epistemology certainly seems to imply idealism in
the personalistic sense—that is if he is to escape the
Kantian idea of unknown and unknowable tnings-in-tnemselves
Bitner there is an unknown something wnicn lies beyond the
reach of thought, or else, since mind can grasp more and
more of their characteristics and order and pattern and
nature in terms of mind, things are tne result of mind
,
"cast in the molds of thought. It would clarify much
that is vague in the epistemology of Sellars if he would
try to come to grips with personalism, witn which he has so
much in common, especially in epistemology, but which is
also his strongest foe, especially wnen it comes to tne
basic issues of metaphysics to which epistemology leads,
and to which some attention must now be given.
3. Metaphysical
Sellars, as was shown in Chapter I, has definitely reject
ed the old Democritean atomism, as indeeu. he must on two
counts, first, on the basis of nis own epistemology which,
as has been seen, causes him to insist tnat "it is not the
35. Ibid.
,
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36. Bowne, TTK, 296.
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stuff, or being, of external tilings that we grasp but their
pattern ; and second, the electro-magnetic theory of
modern physics. Yet he styles his system' as "tne new materi-
alism," or better still as "the new physicalism. " He does
this for three reasons, first in contrast to other natural-
isms such as that of Dewey "which is tnin in its ontological
possibilities," second, the term "physicalism," or "physi-
cal realism," "brings into relief the basic and perennial
questions of philosophy, such as tne place of mind in the
physical world," and tnird, "it is time that the newer
conceptions of matter find their philosophical interpre-
tation. Basically it is the third which mahes the name,
"tne new physicalism," or "the new materialism" appropiate
to his system.
Uow'in so far as Sellars is a materialist he of course
differs fundamentally from idealism. However, as he de-
velops his conception of matter he seems to travel a road
which may end in idealism. Sellars believes that tnere is
a stuff of wnich existing things are made, but this stuff
cannot directly impress itself on the mind as the older
materialists would have it. This stuff discloses its
characteristics only through the interpretative processes
of the mind. "It is .. .possible to have a positive, cate-
gorical notion of matter or stuff. 'Our concepts disclose
37. Sellars, PPR, £8£. 39. Sellars, Phil. Rev.,
38. Ibid., 4. 53(1944) ,556.
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the characteristics of tilings, which are to be recognized
as expressions of the stuff of exist ence . "4^ Y/hatever this
mysterious "stuff" may turn out to be, yet atoms exist, not
as hard uncuttable substances but as definitely organised
energy--the simplest and most basic conceivable wnich
constitute as it were a floor to nature. 4^ "At the very
least, matter is of the stuff of electricity."42 This
certainly is a concession to idealism; for matter tnat is
not hard and inert, but in the last analysis of the nature
of energy can much more easily be understood as the activi-
ty of objective Hind as idealists from Leibniz to Bowne
have insisted. God for Leibniz is not only ".Knowledge," but
A.rz
also "Power," and "Will, whicn makes changes or products."
If matter is in tne final analysis of tne nature of "stuff
of electricity" it seems to be best understood as the ex-
pression of a "Power " or "Will " . It seems logical to con-
clude with Bowne that "the material world . . .is . . .a product
of one infinite, omnipresent, eternal energy by which it is
continually supported, and from wnich it incessantly pro-
ceeds."44 Relative to Sellars ' ascription of activity to
matter, Parker, his colleague at the University of Michigan
makes the following interesting comment
:
The ascription of activity to matter,
40. sellars, PPR,viii-ix. 42. Sellars, PPR , 321
.
41. Sellars, Phil. Rev., 43. Leibniz, TM , 244
.
53(1944), 371, 380. 44. Bowne, iiET , 242-243.
Also Phil . and Bhen .
Res. 3T1943) ,389.
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is I believe, the most radical of Sellars'
reforms, and deserves tnerelore careful
consideration. I would not quarrel with
him on account of it; quite the contrary,
I would welcome it, but I insist that
it utterly destroys the concept of matter
as a negation of spirit, i’or again i ash
the Jamesian question, What is activity
known as? What is the 'base' of the
concept? .. .When therefore Sellars says,
There is activity in nature, either what
he says has no meaning for me... or else
he means, There is in nature something the
like of which I experience in volition.^ 0
Sellars attempts to answer barker's keen thrust in a later
number of The Philosophical Review . lie contends that the
categories are not derived from mind but are definitely
empirical in the sense of being derived directly from
things, and that the most basic is the concept of matter as
both active and enduring.
Do not these functional operations of
the organic self give rise to such mean-
ings as agency
,
endurance
,
capacity?
And must we not consider these cate-
gorial meanings empirically signifi-
cant? I think they are; and tnat is why
I am a materialistic substantialist
.
4b
The doctrine of the categories is
through Kant rather than around him.
Hence the categories are conceived as
empirical and not as a priori . And,
Parker and Brightman notwithstanding,
it is thus possible to nave a positive,
categorical notion of matter or stuff
The fundamental question as to the derivation of the cate-
gories will be discussed in a later chapter. Suffice it to
45. Parker, Phil. Rev., 46. Sellars, Phil. Rev.,
55(1944) ,584-385. 53(1944) , 549
.
47. Ibid., 556.
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say here tnat Parser still se9ms to nave the best of the
argument for a number of reasons, I’irst, there is tne
question as to who is the most empirical, the idealist or
the realist. But since mind is known at first hand, and
matter only at second hand, and as Cellars himself admits,
only as it is translated into mental terms, therefore it
would appear that the idealist has the better of the argu-
ment. Then, in the second place, the fact still remains
that dollars ascribes activity to matter, and tnat an
active matter which Sellars must conceive in terms of
energy is best explained in terms of objective Jill.
But Sellars does not stop with the ascription of activity
to matter. As was seen in Chapter I he ascribes activity
and organizing and pattern-forming power to matter. ’’Matter
I take to be active, dynamic, relational and self-organiz-
ing."^ And more than tnat as was also pointed out in Chapter
I he ascribes all the wonder and grandeur of tne universe
to matter so that it becomes something altogetner different
and far more wonderful tnan tne much more simple concept of
matter as conceived by modern physics. In snort at this
point Sellars seems to be approaching idealism by tnus
endowing matter with all the powers and qualities which are
directly observed in mind alone. At any rate if ne is not
at this point approaching idealism in the personalistic
48. Sellars, Phil. Rev.,
53 ( 1944 )
,
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sense he is certainly not far from some form of pan-
psychism. The "new materialism" then may not turn out to he
quite as materialistic as it seems at first sight. In fact
Parker goes so far as to say, "Each step he has taken in
the reformation of materialism is a step nearer to spiritu-
alism--one more and he will he there. In so far then as
Sellars defines matter in activistic terms, he approaches
idealism; hut in so far as he insists that the universe is
basically non-mental and that a mysterious non-mental
"stuff" lies at the base of' tilings of which matter in the
form of atoms is the simplest structure out of wnich more
complex structures rise, he is certainly at odds with ideal
ism. But again is in the consideration of cellars 1 episte-
mology it must he emphasized that he has really never
grappled to the finish with the most formidable type of
idealism--personal idealism.
It is in the mind-body problem, as was pointed out in
Chapter II, Chat Sellars and personalism will really have to
come to grips, nis criticisms of the basic concept of
personalism will be dealt with at length in a later cnapter
It becomes necessary now to consider how much Sellars nolds
in common with idealism and just where he differs, relative
to such novelties as mind, organization
,
teleology, and
values
.
49. Parker, Phil. Rev.,
53(1944) ,385.
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It will be remembered from the discussion in Chapter I
that the older types of materialism and naturalism finding
no place for novelties in their systems sought to reduce
all such--all the complexity and glory and grandeur of the
world to the dead level of the world of physics. These
systems sought to explain the higher in terms of the lower
as over against idealism which tends to explain the lower
as a stage of the higher. As a result the older material-
isms and naturalisms simply could not withstand the assaults
of idealism and had to give way to the newer forms which
try to make room for novelties. It was also shown in
Chapter I that Sellars recognizes this utter failure of tne
older forms to do justice to the fact of the rise of novel-
ties. He rejects reductionism and seehs to do justice to
mind and organization, the facts of seeming purpose in
nature, and finally values. In fact he goes so far as to
say : ” 1- would not be understood as refusing to recognize
the truth of much of that for which idealism stood in oppo -
sition to the older naturalism . "
^
First of all, he tries to do justice to the fact of mind.
He definitely rejects behaviorism. In fact one can detect a
measure of scorn in this rejection.
If. ..any psychologist comes to me and
says that there is no such thing as
consciousness, I simply reply that he
does not hnow what he is saying. He
50. Sellars, EH, 19
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may be a very good student of animal
behavior. But behavior is not a premise
from which the denial of consciousness
can be deduced.
He likewise rejects epiphenomenali sm : "The old, deductive,
mecnanical necessitarianism which thought of man as a
macnine and consciousness as a mere psychic illumination
has received a shrewd blow."°^ He takes pains to make it
clear that ne recognizes mind as unique, efficacious and
creative. "The situation is unique. Only in consciousness
does nature know itself." 5 ^ "The conscious self sits in the
watchtower of the brain to guide the organism’s behaviour." 5^
Again speaking of consciousness Sellars says, "Literally,
it assists the brain to solve problems." 5 ^ These passages
might well come from a self-psychologist
,
and have led some
tninkers such as Pratt to question whetner Sellars is
after all a naturalist, whether he does not give mind such
a significant place as far as its efficacy and creativity
are concerned that ne has really overthrown his own natural-
ism.^ And certainly it cannot be denied that in so far as
Sellars empnasizes the uniqueness, the efficacy and the
creativity of mind he is at one with idealism. Hevertneiess
,
as was made evident in Gnapter I, ne still holds on to his
naturalism by enlarging the concept of the brain as a
51. Ibid., 18. 55. Sellars, Phil. Rev.,
52. Ibid., 278. 27 ( 1918) , 158
.
05. Ibid., 510. 56. Pratt, Phil. Rev.,
54. Ibid., 518. 45(195677164.
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physical system so as to make it capable of all the wonders
of consciousness. Basically consciousness is no more tnan
a "character of the neural system in action. It is an
emergent from matter. How matter can come to know itself
and guide itself is of course a mystery which Sellars does
not attempt to fathom. He accepts it as a fact beyond which
the thinker must not probe.
Sellars stresses tne place of purpose ana organization in
his system. Purpose of course finds its highest expression
in man's self-consciousness. But even far below man in tne
smallest organisms there is organization and a correlation
of processes which shows evidence of purpose of a Hind.
./hen the biologist carefully studies
the internal working and even the be-
havior of organisms he witnesses
processes so ordered in relation to
each other that the welfare of tne
particular organism is furthered or tne
survival of tiie species is aidea. This
internal economy by means of which
certain processes function in relation
to others as means to end may be called
empirical teleology. 5 ^
In so far as Sellars recognizes teleology in nature, even
if it be only an "empirical teleology" he is certainly in
far greater agreement with idealism than tne older forms
which tried to explain away the facts. Sellars even goes
so far as to say: "\ie wno have stressea tne objective
significance of organization do not think of the organism
57. Sellars, BN, 311.
58. Ibid.
,
315-317.
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as a product of purely random combinations . " he speaks of
there "being a "cumulative determinism. "6° By this he seems
to mean interaction and mutual correlation in an otherwise
pluralistic universe. But wny tnere is interaction and
correlation and unity on such a vast scale he does not
attempt to explain, except that "the evolutionary natural-
ist sees no need to postulate an elan vital creating organ
ization out of recalcitrant matter ,
”
6^ and that "to under-
estimate the physical world is a mistake." 62
In Gnapter I attention was called to the fact of Sellars
interest in values. Unlike the older materialists, Sellars
does not try to explain them away in terms of the hare
world of physics.
Y/e call acts good and had; pictures,
beautiful or ugly; things, useful or
harmful. We speak of the desirable and
the valuable. And all these statements
seem to us to be in some sense justified
To reject them is to talk nonsense. 63
Moreover values somehow fit into things:
It is obvious that I hold that value
judgements do and must fit into the
cosmos as this is revealed in knowledge.
Values concern man’s response to, and
estimation of things. They are always
guided by knowledge though they contain
other elements of a more effective and
volitional nature. 0^
Sellars, as was pointed out in Chapter I. ,in keeping with
6U. Sellars, EN,338.
61 . Ibid
. ,
334
•
62. Ibid., 338.
63. Sellars, PPR,444
64. Sellars, BN, 342.
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iiis naturalism does not conceive values as transcendent or
objective in the cosmic sense, however there are statements
in his Next Step in Democracy
,
where he speaks of justice
as a growth "which is continually being bettered as the
result of more knowledge and of finer sentiments,”^ and
(i r
of tne "vision of a justice beyond tne actual justice,"
which suggests the idea of an ideal of justice existing
objectively toward which man is striving and which he seexs
to realize mors and more perfectly. Sometimes when natural-
ists grapple earnestly with social problems as- Sellars does
in this interesting little book they are willing at times
to ascribe more objective reality to their ideals than when
they are theorizing about naturalistic metaphysics. At any
rate in recognizing tne unique status of values, in trying
to fit them into the world of nature as tne outgrowth or
flowering of the process of evolution, and in some measure
at least recognizing their objectivity, Sellars is in
harmony witn idealism, nowever idealism, at least of the
Platonic and personalistic types would go much further and
ascribe their objectivity to their origin and ground in a
transcendent spiritual world, or as personalists would put
it, in the mind of God.
4. Conclusion
The results of tnis brief investigation show that Sellars
65. Sellars, USD, 164. 66. Sellars, DSD, 162.
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is in harmony with idealism doth implicitly and explicitly
at many points. In his epistemological dualism he is in
agreement with personalists though in disagreement with all
idealistic epistemological monists such as the Berkeleian
mentalists and absolutists. The next chapter will deal with
his criticisms of these types. It must also he pointed out
again that Sellars' epistemology is not only in agreement
with the epistemology of a considerable number of idealists,
but that it has at least two implications which seem to
approach idealism. First, he assumes a correlation of
thought and thing which is at least consistent witn the
theistic and personali stic hypothesis, and, second, he
insists tnat things can never be directly intuited as
things but only in mental terras. If he is to avoid things-
in-themselves it seems that he might well adopt the person-
alistic view of things as the activity of objective hind.
Again, in so far as Sellars stresses the importance of
reason and synthesis in his method he is certainly approach-
ing idealistic method. Then, finally, in his metaphysics
certain very interesting idealistic elements were discovered.
In his interpretation of matter as active, in his stress
upon the uniqueness, the creativity of mind, in his recog-
nition of the facts and role of purpose and organization,
and in his emphasis upon values not only as unique and
irreducible, but also as in some sense objective, he
t.
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certainly approaches idealism.
But these factors do not make him an idealist parading
under another name. In spite of many likenesses there are
two great irreconciliable differences which must not be
forgotten. First, there is his insistence with all natural-
ists that nature is a self-sufficient system, independent
of all mind. And second, closely related to the first there
is Sellars 1 choice of matter as over against mind as the
ultimate principle of explanation. Sellars of course raises
it and endows it with attributes, as has been seen, which
go far beyond the concept of the physicist. But in spite
of these differences it cannot be denied that Sellars has
much in common with idealism, lerhaps not the least is his
glorified conception of matter wnich certainly seems to
point in the direction of a kind of pan-psychism.
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CHAPTER iV
CRITICISMS OP IDEALISTIC EPISTEMOLOGICAL
MONISM
1. Significance of Idealistic Epistemological Monism
In Chapters I and III it was made clear that Sellars is a
militant epistemological dualist. In this respect he agrees
with the personalists and also with Kant and Plato, it is
certain then that epistemological dualism does not settle
tne metaphysical question as to the nature of the object.
The epistemological dualist may be either a spiritualist or
a naturalist.
There are at least two schools of idealists who are e-
pistemological idealists, and since epistemological ideal-
ism involves an idealistic metaphysics they are idealists
both in the epistemological and in tne metaphysical sense.
They hold that in the act of Knowing idea and object are
not two
,
but that they are one as idea. Sellars sometimes
uses the broader term idealism when he really has episte-
mological idealism in mind. The root of the difficulty is
probably the following definition of idealism which is none
too clear: "When used as a technical term in epistemology,
idealism means that everything Known is mental and tnat
nothing exists which is not Known or experienced by some
mind . Again in his Problems 01 Philosophy he recognizes
only two types of philosophy, subjective and objective,
1. Sellars, EOP, 147
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Berkeleian mentalism and absolute idealism, 2 both of which
are idealistic in the epistemological sense, moreover he
goes on to say: "In all idealism the object of knowledge
is regarded as dependent on the Knowing of it."° It is
obvious that this statement is inaccurate. Pew, if any
idealists, as was shown in Chapter II, have ever been as
subjectivistic as the above statement seems to imply.
Certainly epistemological dualists such as the personalists
would revolt at the idea that "in all idealism the object
of knowledge is regarded as dependent on the knowing of it."
In the dissertation epistemological idealism snail be dis-
tinguished from all types which are idealistic in the
metaphysical sense only. In other v/oras the term epistemo-
logical idealism shall be applied only to those idealists
who are monistic in their epistemology, who insist, as has
been pointed out, that in the act of knowing idea and object
are one as idea.
how there are two schools of epistemological idealists,
the Berkeleian or mentalistic and the hegelian or absolu-
tistic. Along with Berkeley and hegel, Bradley must also
be mentioned, since Sellars centers some of nis attacns on
him. nowever Bradley is in reality a child of negel, though
one, as was seen in Chapter II, who introduced so novel, so
rigid and unique a system of his own that it is not always
2. Sellars, PPP
,
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easy to trace his lineage? But in the discussion which
follows Sellars' criticisms of Braaley snail he considered
along with his criticisms of Hegel, since both are abso-
lutists, and most of Sellars' criticisms will be seen to
apply to Bradley.
2. Criticisms of Berkeleian Mentalism
As far as the epistemological issue is concerned Sellars
finds his chief enemy to be Berkeley and centers most of
his attacks upon idealistic epistemological monism rightly
upon him. In an article written in 1927 he declares: "I had
pondered Berkeley long and carefully."4 And in Critical
Realism he goes so far as to say:
Bvery realist wno wishes to justify the
faitxi that is in him must meet the argu-
ments of Berkeley, not only his more
formal principle that to be for tne sensi-
ble world is to be perceived, but also
his argument from content tnat all objects
can be analyzed into sensations.
^
Sellars attacks Berkeley often and at many points but tne
chief points at which he attacks him are indicated in tne
above statement, namely the insistence of Berkeley tnat
tilings are mere presentations widen the Divine mind makes
to tne human, that "their esse is percipi , and tnat
"sensible things... are nothing else but so many sensible
qualities, or combinations of sensible qualities."^ Sellars
thinks that Berkeley's doctrine that " esse is percipi , " is
4. Sellars, Jour. Phil.,
24(1927) ,241.
5. Sellars, CR, v.
6. Berkeley, PBX, 259.
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nothing short of scandalous. "Being is not the same as be-
ing known. He accuses Berkeley of denying the existence
of a material world,
The cardinal principle of idealism is
tnat being is dependent upon knowing .
Berkeley stressed perception and formu-
lated this principle in corresponding-
terms as to be is to be perceived . . .Thus
his idealism is a denial of tne existence
of a material world and the assertion
that spirits and their icieas, alone exist.
^
Berkeley's basic error is a misunderstanding of the
complicated nature of perception. Perception is not a mere
effect--a mere reception of ideas but it involves a complex
act of response and interpretation. The doctrine that ideas
are only effects he calls "the treachery of the causal
approach.
The stress is laid upon mental states
or upon brain states as mere entities,
or events, having no capacity to look
beyond themselves. They are what they are,
just like other effects. The active,
interpretative side of perceiving is
lost sight of and an artifact put in its
place . *
Again he says: "Berkeley begins with the Lockian idea in
its' purely sensory meaning, ignores perceiving as an in-
terpretative reference, and directs nis deadly criticism
against inferential passage from ideas to things. In
other words deliars contends that tne stuff and substance
8. dellars
,
PPH, 185.
9. dollars, PPP
,
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of tilings is never given in perception, but that perception
instead of being an intuition of the essence of things is
but an interpretation of the characteristics in terms of
the medium of thought. Sellars is never tired of pointing-
out that Berkelej7 makes the mistake of confusing the object
of perception with the content of perception. Because things
are known by means of thought is no sign that they are
notning more than ideas. Thus the basic fallacy of idealism
turns out to be that of confusing "the content of perception"
with "the object of perception." ° It is not only false to
attempt to pass from tne fact that things are given in
thought to tne conclusion that things are merely ideas, but
this also contradicts one of man's most certain convictions,
one of man's basic conceptions, namely tne conception of
thingnood, of the object of thought L as existing in its own
right independent of our tninking it.
For Berkeley a tning is simply a complex
of sensations. A thing is an idea, a
collection of its apparent qualities.
The realistic meanings of tninghood are
largely belittled or ignored, ./e nave
argued that this thinness of his view
of perception was due largely to his
refusal to make tne distinction between
the content of perception and the object
of perception. 1^
' Berkeley's insistence that " esse is percipi " as far as
material things are concerned, and his reduction of things
to complexes of sensations leads Cellars even to charge
13. Sellars, BN, 46. 14. Ibid., 139.
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Berkeley with solipsism.
If we take the basic principle of sub-
jective idealism to be this, to be is to
be perceived
,
we find that it asserts an
internal relation between subject and
object. In ordinary language, this means
that we can know only the states of our
mind....The logical outcome is solipsism ,
that is, the position that an individual
can know only his own ideas and that he
has no logical reason to believe in
otner individuals. °
He makes the same charge in his Critical Realism : "In snort,
for idealism, the body, like any other physical thing, be-
comes my idea."
How in Chapter II it was made clear that any identifir
cation of idealism with solipsism on the part of natural-
ists rests on a mistaken notion of the real nature of
idealism. It was also shown that Berkeley believed in an
objective order back of the world of phenomena resting on
God who causes ideas to arise. Is Sellars so unfair to
Berkeley or else so unacquainted with his tnought that he
gives no consideration to it? No, not at all. he recognizes
that Berkeley attempts to secure objectivity for his system
by grounding it in God.
By destroying the organism, Berkeley
left the self a nomeless ghost, a mere
spiritual substance. And since the
physical world and sense-organs do not
exist Berkeley was forced to postulate
a supreme self to arouse ideas in us. '
In his Critical Realism as well as in later writings,
15. Sellars, PPP, 141. 17. Sellars, PPP, 142.
16. Sellars, OR, 180.
f.
Sellars recognizes that Berkeley tried to ground his episte
1 ft
mology in an objective order. ° But Sellars' makes two
attacks on this attempt and tries to prove that it did not
succeed. First there is the rather superficial attack in
his earlier writing, Critical Realism :
So far as the individual is concerned,
the outlook is decidedly realistic. But
this attempt to throw a sop to the
Cerbeus of realism is little more than
a confession of weakness; for ideas are
not and cannot he the same for distinct
individuals. Our study of tne advance
of tne Personal has surely demonstrated
this beyond possibility of doubt. Whose
idea shall we consider really existent?
The suggestion of the difficulty is
enough. y
It is doubtful whether Sellars can vanquish Berkeley in
this easy manner; for Berkeley would have no difficulty in
answering that while some ideas it is true are purely
individual, the ideas which tne thinker himself initiates,
yet when it comes to the passive ideas such are common to
all and must be accepted as such. ’Why are they common to
all? Simply because the individual must receive them as
given since tney constitute nothing other tnan the unchange
able order of nature which is grounded in the Hind and Will
•and Purpose of God. 20
But Sellars has anotner argument whereby he seeks to over
throw Berkeley's system, by depriving it of objectivity and
18. Sellars, CH, 177.
19. Ibid., 177.
20. Berkeley, PHK, 240-34B.
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thus driving the Berkeleian to tne edge of tne precipice of
solipsism. It is a revival of Hume's old argument against
the reality of the self on the one hand as the source of
productive and creative ideas and on the other as a true
unity. Hume contended in his famous Inquiry that though the
self receives ideas it connot produce them. "We only feel
tne event, namely the existence of an ide^ consequent to
a command of tne will."^ Since it is impossible for human
selves to discover any power by means of which it is possi-
ble to generate ideas within themselves it is illogical to
use the human self as an analogy of the Divine, or as a
means of proving tnat such a Divine Source of energy exists.
>ie have no sentiment or consciousness
of this power in ourselves. We nave no
idea of tne Supreme Being but what we
learn from reflection on our own facul-
ties. Were our ignorance, therefore, a
,
good reason for rejecting anytning, v/e
snould be led into tnat principle of
denying all energy in the Supreme Being
as much as in the grossest matter. We
surely comprehend as little the oper-
ations of one as of tne other....All
that we know is our profound ignorance
in both cases . %%
Thus Hume appeals to a keener analysis
of experience tnan Berkeley had made to
refute the latter's superficially per-
suasive argument. V/e are unacquainted
with anytning of the nature of pro-
ductive or creative, activity as much
in ourselves as in sensible nature.
. . .By means of this extension of analy-
sis, Hume snowed tnat Berkeley's argu-
ments against tne existence of a
21. Hume, ECHU, 70. 22. Ibid.
,
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physical world apply equally against the
existence. of a creative spiritual source
of ideas. 25
Then there is Hume's reduction of the self to a mere complex
of sensations:
V/hen I turn my reflexion on myself , X
never can perceive this self without
some one or more perceptions; nor can I
ever perceive any thing hut the per-
ceptions. 'Tis the composition of these,
therefore, which forms the self. 24
Sellars comments:
After Berkeley had rejected genuine
external things as objects of knowing,
hume went him one better and rejected
the knower. It seemed to him--and I
agree with him--that selves as knowers
have no better status than things. 25
The conclusion follows that if selves are no more than
ideas, that is complexes of sensations just as things are,
then selves are no more real than things and it is vain to
appeal to a Supreme Self as tne ground of pnenornena since
He too could be no more than merely a complex of sensations
without real unity, purpose, o.nd creative power. And if
Hume and Sellars are correct Berkeley's whole system falls
to the ground since it nas nothing to support it.
But this raises the question whether Hume was right in
his analysis of mind, and if his great weakness after all
was not his method, ilind cannot be comprehended
,
its true
nature remains hidden if one endeavors to catch it in the
22. Sellars, PPP, 88.
24:. nun e , RGHU , 261.
25. Sellars, PPR, 124.
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net of analysis. Only as analysis is supplemented by an
observation of the functioning of mind both from without
x and from within can its true nature be disclosed, Sellars,
in following hums, is altogether too exclusively analytic
when he attacks the problem of the self, the knower. After
all selves seem to have a unique status. They have ideas,
and a large measure of control over these ideas. And by
virtue of these ideas they are able to know- -a function
whicn cannot be predicated of things. Thus Berkeley seems
to be far nearer right and more empirical than hume and
Sellars.
A Spirit has been shown to be the only
substance or support wherein unthinking-
beings or ideas can exist; but that this
substance whicn supports or perceives
ideas should itself be an idea, or like
an idea is evidently absurd. ^6
Thus Seliars fails just as Hume before him failed in his
attempt to undermine the unique status of the self and be-
cause he fails in this attempt he also fails in his attempt
to prove that Berkeleian mentalists in the last analysis
are driven to solipsism--that the knower cannot get beyond
his own states. Sellars insists that idealists such as
Berkeley play "fast and loose" with their principles by
their "one sided application" of their theory of knowledge
in their endeavor to escape solipsism .
^
But if minds have
a unique status as being knowers as well as being known,
26. Berkeley, PHK, 834. £7. Sellars, OK, 203.
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whereas things are only iaiown but cannot know, are incapable
of having ideas, then pernaps the idealist is justified in
this so-called one-sided application.
Nevertheless, it must be admitted that many of Sellars’
criticisms of Berkeley are justified. His attack upon
Berkeley's proposition that "esse is percipi” that to be is
to be known, is well directed. Objects in the ways in which
they affect us seem to be more than mere presentations,
even if these presentations are those of the Divine Agent,
and they seem to be more than a mere complex of sensations.
Things, when not perceived, are still
said to exist, because of the belief
that, though not perceived, they are
in interaction with one another, mutual-
ly determining and determined. Heal
- things are distinguisned from things
having only conceptual existence by this
power and fact of action. When this is
omitted, txie things vanish into presen-
tations; and unpresented things are only
the ghosts of possible presentations.^^
It would have been better for Berkeley to have designated
things not as mere thin presentations, but as the Divine
energizing. Thus he might have been an epistemological
dualist viithout giving up his metaphysical idealism—
a
distinct gain. Among other things it would have saved him
from the all too frequent charge of solipsism, which though
false, as nas been shown, yet has a certain plausibility as
far as the rather unfortunate choice of certain terms is
£8. Bowile, MET., 16.

86
concerned
.
It must also be said tnat Sellars’ criticisms of Berkeley^
idea of perception are unusually keen and seemingly valid.
Even at the level of perception more is involved than a mere
givenness. Even the most elemental perception seems to in-
volve a measure of interpretation. Objects are not so much
given and intuited as thought. \ie live in essentially a
thought world. This is the weak point in the armor of the
epistemological idealist. The moment tnat he concedes that
perception involves interpretation he must also concede
the dualism of thought and thing in the act of knowing.
3. Criticisms of Absolute Idealism
Sellars, as has been seen recognizes only two types of
idealism, the subjective, Berkeleian mentalism which has
been discussed, and the objective, by which he means abso-
lute idealism in its various forms, how though Sellars
recognizes his chief enemy in Berkeleian mentalism, yet he
is no less set against all forms of absolute idealism, how-
ever he singles out two representatives of this movement
for special attack, namely kegel and Bradley. By virtue of
this fact and also because these bold thinkers seem to
represent the dominant tendencies of the movement the dis-
cussion shall center on Sellars' criticisms of these two
primarily.
As the basis of "subjective idealism" was found to be
•*
.
'
.
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"to be is to be perceived t so Sellars finds the "basic
r6Qthesis" of "objective idealism" "that tnougnt is reality ."^
He tninks tnat objective idealism was founded on two things,
namely, "Kant’s assumption of a universal consciousness,
and the inability to solve the problem of knowledge in a
truly realistic fashion, common to Kume and Kant."^
From tne standpoint of epistemology the
principles oi objective idealism to note
are (1) tne denial tnat it has any mean-
ing to try to transcend experience, (E)
the treatment of perception as essential-
ly a question of the interpretative
supplementation of a partial datum by
perceptual judgement until it fits in
v/ith a system of knowledge, and (3) the
doctrine of internal, or modifying re-
lations, which brings it about tnat the
part is transformed in the whole. Truth
and reality are identical, and anything
short of the whole truth is partially
error and illusion. In short ,. experience
is the ultimate term; and tne really
real is the absolute, or comprehensive,
experience
Sellars' basic criticism of absolute idealism that which
perhaps comprises all others is simply tnat absolute ideal-
ism is not empirical. Of the movement which Fichte,
Schelling and Hegel represented he says: "Unfortunately
there was not enough cooperation v/ith science in this ro-
mantic wave of speculation. Again, in Critical nealism
,
he states tnis criticism as follows:
It is too evidently unempirical and a
E9 • Sellars, PPP, 141.
30. Ibid., 143.
31. Ibid., 143
3E. Ibid., 143-144.
33. Ibid., 106.
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pis aller to awaken the allegiance of
tlie modern tMincer trained in science.
..moreover, it fails miserably whenever
it is ashed to solve a concrete problem
lixe that of the mind-body relation, it
moves too much in the region of ab-
stractions, such as ' experience-in-
general, ' to be able to appreciate and
to state in rugged and meaningful terms
a problem .which always threatens a
dualism. 04
It will be noted that trie absolutist's assumption of "ex-
perience-in-general," which is especially evident in
Bradley, is one of dollars
'
points of attacx. ne makes this
very relevant criticism: "Idealism nas only too often been
satisfied with the promotion of experience to the position
of an ultimate term without demanding whose experience is
in question. iloreover that the idealist is unempirical
is evident in his extreme rationalism.
Hegel was a rationalist and tries to
work out the inner lo^ic of an absolute
reason. All of them believed tnat in-
tense speculation could by itself lead
the thinker into the heart of reality.
Tney had gotten rid of an independent
physical world and were convinced that
reality was akin to that in themselves
which seemed to them central and im-
portant . °°
It will be noted that the last sentence makes it evident
that Sellars cnarges the absolutists no less than the
Berkeleians with trie denial of a physical world. Ultimately
tney reduce all of tne complexity and massiveness of the
34. Sellars, OR, 161.
35. Ibid., 161.
36. Sellars, PPP, 105-106.
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world of nature to thought or experience, to mental terms,
and hence deny its objectivity, according to Sellars.
Another very important point of attach is the coherence
theory of reality, tnat reality, the ultimate, is a con-
sistent logical unity of which the seeming diversity and
plurality of things is hut a mere appearance. This is to
some extent a criticism of Hegel in so far as he stressed
organic wholeness, hut it is primarily a criticism of
Bradley, who as was made evident in Chapter il out -Kegels
Kegel in his lack of regard for the significance oi the
concrete and in nis insistence that ultimate reality is one
consistent whole. The essence of Sellars' criticism of the
coherence theory of reality is the appeal to the facts of
experience. Sellars objects to the theory of internal re-
lations upon which the coherence theory of reality rests.
Bor the idealist no fact is complete
by itself. Hence, every fact leads to
every other fact, and so implies the
whole universe. Personally, X have
never been able to see this. As a real-
ist, I would rnaice a sharp distinction
between the relations of objects and
the logical relations of my propositions.
Thus the relations of objects seem to me
largely spatial, temporal and causal,
while the relations between my propo-
sitions are those of indifference
,
identity and contradiction. Bor instance,
the two propositions, ‘Charles i was
beheaded' and 'Washington was the leader
of tne American troops' seem to me to
have no logical relations.^ 7
37. cellars, PPP, 159.
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Finally Sellars makes the following interesting criticism
of absolute idealism in general and of Bradley in particu-
lar.
It is my opinion that idealism is akin
to illusionism. It is replete with the
tendency to cast aside the ordinary
categories, such as space and time, as
appearances . And appearance does not
mean here that which reveals the ex-
ternal world because it appears in the
data of our experience, but that which
is illusory and misleading. It is a
term of condemnation.^®
.
4. Conclusions
In the discussion of Sellars' criticisms of Berkeley the
conclusion was reached that at least two criticisms were
unsound, namely Sellars' endeavor as over against Berkeley
and in accordance with Hume to reduce knowers to trie same
status as things, and second, Sellars’ attempt to drive
Berkeley to solipsism. On the other hand two criticisms
seem entirely justified. ri’he first of these is the basic
criticism of the unhappy phrase, " esse is percipi . " There
is a stubbornness in things that seems to defy all attempts
to dissolve them into mere presentations to the mind. This
seems to justify the statement: "When we express what we
perceive in judgments, we deal with tilings and their quali-
ties and not with presentations."*^ Whatever the ontological
status of things yet from the standpoint of epistemology in
the act of knowing tilings seem to stand over against tne
3d. Sellars, PPR, 16. 39. Ibid. ,148. *o «
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knowing mind. Idealistic epistemological monism seems to do
violence to this basic stubborn fact of universal human
experience, fhis is the rock upon which the wave of ideal-
istic epistemological monism is destined to break. Again
Sellars' criticism of the Berkeleian idea of perception
appears to be valid, that is in so far as Berkeley insisted
tnat tne perception of things involves a mere giveness, and
in so far as he ignored the important factor of interpre-
tation which all perception worthy of the name seems to
involve
.
In view of the above estimate of Sellars 1 criticisms of
Berkeleian mentalism what can be said of his criticisms of
absolutism, that other type of epistemological idealism?
First, it can be justly said that his charge of ultra-
rationalism and lack of empiricism seems to be a relevant
criticism of absolute idealism. However Hegel is far less
deserving of this criticism than absolutists such as
Bradley. Hegel has a philosophy of history, and however
much at times he may appear to stretch tne facts upon tne
Procrustean bed of his dialectic, yet he cannot be accused
of giving no attention to tne facts. A careful reading of
his Philosophy of ni story is a revelation of now well he
did know the -facts as far as they.were known in his day,
and how he dia attempt to do justice to tnem. Hegel makes
no mere boast when in nis introduction to tne Philo sonny of
',
&
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History he states:
What, I have said thus provisionally,
and what I shall have further to say,
is, even in reference to our branch of
science, not to he regarded as hypo-
thetical, hut as a summary view of the
whole; the result of tne investigation
we are about to pursue; a result which
happens to be known to me, because I
have traversed the entire field.... We
must proceed historically--empirically . u
Bradley %as over against Hegel, has very little concern for
the concrete and must rightly bear tne brunt of Sellars'
criticism. This is also true, in tne second place, relative
to Sellars' just criticism of the .coherence theory of
reality resting upon the doctrine of internal relations,
and also of tne charge of illusionisrn which Sellars levels
directly at Bradley without mention of Hegel.^ Hegel's
great fault is not so much a false rationalism which has no
place for the empirical, but rather a certain ambiguity, a
use of expressions that may be understood in two ways. It
was tnis element in Hegel which gave rise to the various
schools of negelians with such diverse and varied views.
Perhaps no criticism made by Sellars is more justified
than his objection to tne term "experience," so much used
by both absolutists and pragmatists, the latter having-
borrowed it from the former. His question, "whose experi-
ence?", exposes the impossibility of this term as a desig-
nation of ultimate reality without further specification.
40. Hegel, POH, 36. 41. Sellars, PPR, 16.
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There is no experience apart from a self possessing the ex-
perience onsequently ix Bradley's ultimate is "Experience"
it seems logical that he ought to go all the way with
personal absolutists such as hocking and Boyce and aiso
assert that the Absolute is a Self. But, a naturalist sucn
as Sellars would not be interested in forcing Bradley to
sucn a personalistic conclusion, however Sellars has done
philosophy a real service in exposing the Shallow foundation
of a term which has been the occasion of much loose think-
ing in philosophy and a real hindrance in the pressing of
the metaphysical quest to its logical conclusion.
Host of Sellars' criticism of absolute idealism bears on
Bradley. But in justice to Bradley there is one criticism
which ought to be questioned. Be accuses Bradley of il-
lusionisrn. There seems to be more truth in this charge than
in charging Berkeley with solipsism, but it is not tne
whole truth. Bradley after all like Kant insisted that men
must take the world of ordinary experience as valid for the
practical affairs of life. Be also insisted that it had a
measure of reality and that in so far as it constituted a
phase or measure of reality it is not illusion. "Everything
is error, but everything is not ellusion."4^
Finally when Cellars criticizes absolute idealism for
taking reality to be of the nature of thought he is striking
42. Sellars, OH, 161. 43. Bradley, AAR, 549.
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at the "oasis not only of absolute idealism, but of all
idealism. But this fundamental issue cannot be decided
on the basis of epistemology alone, however epistemology
does give the idealist one of the major reasons for nis
conviction that reality is of the nature of thought, namely
the strange fact that since reality always reveals itself
in terms of thought it may well be that it is of the
nature of thought
.

CHAPTER V
CRITICISMS OP THE IDEALISTIC DOCTRINE OP THE CATEGORIES
1. The Nature and Significance of the Categories
Both idealists and naturalists have used the term cate-
gory, though they have been inclined to define it somewhat
differently. Thus Brightman, the personal idealist, defines
a category as '’something universal and necessary (or a
priori
,
as Hant put it) about the world that we experience.
And again, "a category, then, may be identified by the fact
that, if it be not true, a whole system of experience is
impossible."
2
Sellars, the naturalist on the other hand de-
fines the categories as "fundamental features of tne
world." 5 And again he says: "They are not forms to be de-
duced from the self in some peculiar fashion, they are
features to be discovered in objective knowledge, abstract-
ed and analyzed."^ Botn idealists and naturalists realize
the tremendous significance of the doctrine of the cate-
gories in any system of philosophy. Sellars in his basic
writings spends whole chapters in tneir interpretation and
explication, and Brightman goes so far as to say that the
nature of any philosopny whether it be materialistic,
agnostic, idealistic, realistic, theistic or atheistic
depends on its doctrine of tne categories. 5 With this state
1. Brightman, ITP, 95.
E.. Ibid., 97.
3.
Sellars, EOP, 195.
4. Sellars, EN, 50-51
5. Brightman, ITP, 96.
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ment naturalists even such as Dennes would agree:
How, then, are philosophical positions
(such as those called naturalistic,
idealistic, and so forth) distinguisned
from one another? .. .Many gifted philoso-
phers have lately converged upon one
sort of answer to these questions. They
have argued that philosophic positions
are distinguisned essentially hy the
different basic categoris which they
employ in interpretation, and hy conse-
quent differences in the interpretations
which they develop. An examination of
the relations that hold between the basic
categories employed in explanatory state-
ments and the content of these statements
is therefore important for the under-
standing, not only of naturalistic phi-
losophy, but of any pnilosophy
.
If philosophers, then, both idealistic and naturalistic
seem to be agreed as to the significance of the doctrine
of the categories tnen nothing can be more important in the
dissertation tnan to carefully distinguish between tne
fundamentally idealistic doctrine as held by idealists
generally, and tne naturalistic as held by cellars in
particular. This will be necessary before any attempt can
be made to designate and to describe and to evaluate
Sellars' basic criticisms. To tnis important subject con-
sideration must now be given.
2 . The Fundamental Difference
The definitions of the term category given in section I
of this dissertation really imply the fundamental difference
between the idealistic and the naturalistic doctrines of
6. Dennis, in Krikorian (ed.), NHS, 270.
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the categories. It will be noticed that whereas Brightman
emphasizes the mental by the use of tne word "experience,"
Sellars emphasizes tne non-mental-- "the fundamental features
of the world." In other words tne fundamental difference
between naturalism and idealism as far as tne categories
are concerned is simply tnis--that while the former looks
for the categories in the realm of mind or experience, tne
latter seeks for them in things. Thus for the great ideal-
ist, Leibniz "the soul contains within itself Being, Sub-
stance, Unity, Identity, Cause, Perception, Reasoning and
Quality," while for Sellars, as will be seen, the cate-
gories are primarily the characteristics of things as re-
flected in and by means of the medium of mind.
As a matter of fact, for idealism mind is not only tne
source of the other categories, but mind itself is also the
fundamental category. This is especially true of personal-
ism. "Mind, says Bowne, "is the only ontological reality." 8
Intelligence is and acts. Tnis is tne
deepest fact. It is not subject to any
laws beyond itself, nor to any abstract
principle within itself. Living, acting-
intelligence is the source of all truth
and reality, and is its own and only
standard. And all tne categories, as
abstract principles, instead of being
the components of tne mental life, are
simply shadows of that life, and find
in that life their only realization.
Immanuel Kant, thougn he did not go all tne wayf witn
7. Thilly, HOP, 078. 9. Ibid., 425.
8. Bowne, MET, 422.
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idealism, yet had a profound influence on its later davelop
ments, and certainly, in nis empnasis upon the mind as the
source of tne categories, ne was in accordance with ideal-
ism. "Kant," says Hoe rule', "gives positive character and
content to mind by making it the seat of tne categories in
knowledge, of tne moral law in conduct, of aesthetic
pleasure in contemplation. Bowne freely concedes nis
debt to Kant as well as to Berkeley, 1 ^ and as will be seen,
in nis criticisms of tne idealistic doctrine of tne cate-
gories Sellars concentrates so much of nis criticism on
Kant that a special division of this chapter has been deem-
ed necessary to deal with his criticisms of Kantianism. In
Kant Sellars recognizes tne father of the idealistic theory
of the categories at least in so far as he emphasized tne
creative role of mind as tne basic factor in knowledge. How
ever most idealists do not follow nim in nis subj activism--
that the categories of thought cannot reaen beyond tne
world of phenomena. They tend rather to hold with Leibniz
tnat eacn soul is in some sense "a living and perpetual
mirror of tne universe."^
Naturalists no more than idealists are in complete agree-
ment as to tne precise nature of the categories. It is
interesting to note tnat some naturalists of a pragmatic
and phenomenalistic trend such as Lennes even set aside tne
lu. Hoernle', IAP, £41. 12. Leibniz, Til, 248.
11. Bowne, MET., 423.
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older categories ''employed in naturalistic philosophy"--
"matter, motion, and energy." 2hey even reiuse to use such
terms as "substance and attribute" and speax rather of
"events, qualities, and relations (or process and cnaracter,
or essence or flux)" as the basic categories.-1- 0 And they
define categories as "all sets of occurrences which are
visible or audible or otherwise sensible and are used as
signs for entities (or sets of entities) different from
themselves."-1-^ But this appears rather thin philo sophy- -an
attempt to avoid the unavoidable ontological question as to
v/hat lies bach of experience. It seems a refusal to think,
to sound the depths, to explore the deeper meaning of ex-
perience. Instead it contents itself with the blanket-term
"experience"--a heritage from absolute idealism. It is re-
freshing to know that Sellars does not deal in such super-
ficialities and in such inadequacies, he is willing to
probe deeper than mere appearance in the belief that some-
thing lies beyond, he is not afraid to raise trie ontological
question. Having rejected mind as the fundamental category
and the source of all the other categories and refusing to
use the thin expression "experience" he designates "thing-
hood," ° as over against mind as tne fundamental category.
In his Principles and Problems of Pnilosopny he describes
the origin and nature of tiiis category as follows :
IB. Dennes, in Krikorian (ed.), 14. Ibid., 271-272.
JJHS, 270. 15. cellars, M, BO.
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On the known, or object pole of
consciousness there develops .. .the cate-
gory of thinghood . The essential mean-
ings, or elements, of this category are
not difficult to discover. A thing is a
continuant
,
something which endures auch
as we do and which is spatial and re-
sistant. It moves as a unit and can he
pointed at# °
This category is present in all of our experience of ex-
ternal things. "It is independent and enduring things which
we suppose ourselves to perceive, and not presentations
.
In his Philosophy of rhysical Realism Sellars describes
the category of "thinghood" further as follows:
The category of suhstance is hut an
explication of the category of thing-
hood which, in its turn, includes the
species of selfhood. It stands for
continuants wnich may cnange and enter
new relations with otner continuants.
It means that chronological time or, .as
it is usually phrased, the passage of
time has by itself no devouring effects • °
It is evident from the above quotation that the category of
substance and of thinghood are one and the same. Again it
is evident that tne category of thinghood or substance is
for Sellars synonymous with matter, for he says, "The
essential notes in tne category of substance are endurance
and being; and at the base of all tnings and as the cause
of all things there is matter conceived in terms of simple
organized systems out of which more complex systems arise.
^
19 . Ibid
. ,
276
.
20. Sellars, Pnil. Rev.,
55(1944), 580.
16. Sellars, PPP, 111.
17. Sellars, PPR, 146.
18. Ibid., 274.
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Thinghood or substance or, in the final analysis, master,
is Sellars’ fundamental category.
For Sellars, nov/ever, thinghood is no more the only cate-
gory than mind is the only category for idealists. Space
and time, and causality he calls "primary categories" along
with "thinghood. "21 Nevertheless it is evident that "thing-
hood" as representing matter or the physical world is funda-
mental. As for idealists space and time and causality to-
gether with the other categories are attributes of mind, so
for Sellars these are attributes of thinghood, of the
physical system whicn underlies all else. Thus space is not
a real existent in its own right. "Space is purely adjec-
tival. The physical world is dynamic and concrete." 22
"Physical space is, then, the physical world known as
spatial." 2 ^ The same thing is true of time. Time aoes not
exist as an entity any more than space. It nas no existence
except as the order of succession or change in nature.
"Instead of nature being in time, time (change) is in
nature." 2^ "Physical space and time are characteristics of
the pnysical v/orld." 2 ^ Moreover the two are closely related
as "characteristics of the physical world." "Instead of
nature being in time, time, that is events or changes, is in
nature. Je must thinx nature in iour dimensions and thus
21. Sellars, M, 80.
22. Sellars, PPR, 286.
23. Sellars, BN, 101.
24. Ibid., 121.
25. Sellars, PPP, 241.
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bring physical space and physical time together." 26
The category of causality is also an attribute of the
physical order, and related to space and time. "Tne cate-
gory of causality must be put in its ontological context,
which is that of a substantive being both endurant and
spatial." 2 ^ "It is important to connect causality with
substance in order to deepen tne latter by absorbing-
processes, activities, powers, and jjotentialities
.
Again he says: "Material systems are extended, structured,
massive, causally effective. It is in this fashion tnat we
29
must think them." In other words in the final analysis all
the categories are characteristics of the physical system,
of matter which constitutes tne fundamental category as
mind constitutes tne fundamental category for idealism.
One more thing needs to be said. In discussing tne ideal-
istic doctrine of the categories it was pointed out that
idealists, though freely acknowledging their indebtedness
to Kant, yet for the most part do not follow him in nis
subjectivism. They hold tnat tne categories are relevant
both to mind and the objective order, which is conceived
as the activity of objective mind, likewise Sellars, while
holding tnat the categories are primarily characteristics
of things, yet in so far as these characteristics are
26. Ibid., 240. 28. Ibid., 19.
27. Sellars, Phil. Rev., 29. Sellars, PPR, 286.
53(1943)
,
27.
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disclosed through tne medium of thought grants that they
are also attributes of thought or mind* "We thinx in the
world and tne world thinhs in us."^0 Tne categories "give,
as it were, the structure of nature as this is projected
into consciousness • He also speaks oi tne categories as
"intrinsic to consciousness , " and of his psychology as a
"thing-and-self psychology . In fact tne only v/ay tnat he
saves himself from idealism is by reducing mind itself to
the status of "a physical category. "The category of
substance is but an explication of tne category of tning-
hood whicn, in its turn, includes the species of self-
hood."*^ In other words it is matter or thinghood which
constitutes tne fundamental category which swallows up
everything else.
In the battle then between idealism and naturalism as far
as tne categories are concerned it is mind versus thing
-
hood. This of course raises tne final issue, is tne real of
the nature of mind and matter merely the activity of ob-
jective Mind, or is reality of tne nature of matter, and
mind merely a physical category, an aspect, an attribute of
matter? It is obvious tnat this question can only be answered
in txie next tnree chapters which concern Sellars' criticisms
of the idealistic philosophies of nature, of value, and most
30. Sellars, fPH, 214.
31. Sellars, EH, 80.
32. Sellars, Phil. Hev.,
53(1943), 7.
33. Sellars, EH, 300.
34. sellars, PPR, 274.
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fundamental of all of mind itself vifith these significant
facts in mind the discussion will proceed with Sellars'
criticisms, first of the doctrine of the categories as
conceived hy tne purer forms of idealism, and second with
his criticisms of the view of Kant. Kant, it will he re-
called did not claim to he an idealist, and definitely re-
jected idealistic epistemological monism, yet in Chapter II
certain definite features of nis system were disclosed
which mark him as an idealist in tne metaphysical sense.
Moreover he nas had such a profound influence on idealism
in general that special consideration must he given to
Sellars' criticisms of his system, particularly nis doctrine
of tne categories.
3. Criticisms of Idealism Proper
By idealism proper is meant those forms of idealism which
as over against Kantianism are relatively free from real-
istic elements. She chief types are rnentalism, absolutism
and personalism.
Sellars may he said to make two important criticisms of
the idealistic doctrine of the categories. The first is the
criticism that idealism is mistaken in thinking of the
categories as developing from tne mind or self. "The
conscious self does not spin tne categories from itself.
The mind does not produce "ideas of reason" out of itself.
^
35. Cellars, EiJ, 71. 36. Sellars, PPP, 103.

The mentalists, the absolutists and the personalists are
wrong, '.-/hy are they wrong? In what precisely does their
mistake lie? Sellars answer is that they are not empirical
enough. That if they were empirical enough they would see
for themselves that instead of rising out of the mind the
categories rise out of tne interaction of mind with tilings
witn its environment. It is thus that tne mind comes to a
realization of tne characteristics of things, hut the
idealist concentrating on introspection has failed to see
that the categories do not and cannot arise out of mind,
but only as it interacts with its environment, with the
physical order.
Categories and sensory presentations
and classificatory concepts grow up to-
gether. It is the task of tne genetic
psychologist to note tne growth of these
distinctions. Yet it is clear to me that
it is only as tne living organism is
thought of as reacting as a patterned
complex to its environment that we nave
ground for the understanding of what I
call trip natural basis of the cate-
gories . c '
Ae shall find tnat experience has a
pattern from tne beginning: and tnat, as
tne mind grows in response to tne world
and its problems, tnis pattern acquires
meanings ana passes to tne interpreted
thought of bodies in relation to one
anotner. In short, the categories are
implicit in perceptual experience and
are elicited and developed by tnought
rather then sepreted by a mysterious
internal self.^°
37. Sellars, PPH, 215-216. 38. Sellars, PPP, 102
V*
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With Hegel and Fichte and Schelling especially in mind,
Sellars says:
All of them "believed that intense
speculation could "by itself lead the
thinner into the heart of reality. They
nad gotten rid of an independent physi-
cal world and were convinced that reali-
ty was ahin to that in themselves which
seemed to them central and important.
Unfortunately there was not enough
cooperation with science in this ro-
mantic wave of speculation.
Again in criticism oi t^pes of idealism influenced by Aant
and Descartes and Leibniz ne says:
Instead of categories growing up in
experience under tne control of the
external world and therefore inevitably
significant for it, we have ideas of
reason produced by the mind out of itself
and not in cooperation with tne external
world to which they are to apply, ,/hat
wonder that their cognitive significance
must be a matter of preestablished
harmony, as it were
,
to be guaranteed by
God, or a mystery which we humbly accept
because God would surely not deceive us
and implant in us clear and distinct
ideas which are not truei It is obvious
that we are to-day largely free from
these sets of assumptions and approach
the problems of philosophy in a more
empirical and inductive spirit and in
the light of tne biological setting and
function of mind.
Sellars' criticism tnen is that idealists are not empirical
enough when they look to mind as the source of the cate-
gories. They do not give due consideration to tne facts of
objective reference, to tne fact of "thinghood
.
,T He also
39. Ibid.
,
106. 40. Sellars, PPP
,
103.
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criticizes idealists ior reducing space to a form of tne
mind
.
Space is a strategic category. Tne
physical realist is called upon to de-
fend its validity and self-consistency
against the attacks of idealists. 1
When the critical realist things of
space as a category, he does not .mean
that space is a physical reality, ue
means only that valid knowledge of physi-
cal reality contains elements which can
be universalized under such headings as
distance, position, size, etc. 2
The idealist does violence to one of the most obvious facts
of experience when he seeks to reduce space to mental
terms; for it appears in experience as a basic character-
istic of the physical order. "Space" is "a property con-
cept," "a term for the extensiveness of physical systems."
"The physical world is intrinsically spatial.
Moreover, Sellars, as has been pointed out, goes so far
as to insist that mind, the basic category of idealism is
itself but an aspect or an attribute of tne physical order.
If, then, we use mind as a physical
category, we should mean by it the
nervous processes which find expression
in intelligent conduct. The mind is the
brain as known in its functioning.
^
Due consideration will be given to the problem which this
raises in tne chapter on the mind-body problem.
The second imjjortant criticism which Sellars makes of the
41. Sellars, EU, 84. 48. Sellars, PPB, S17.
42. Ibid., 84. 44. Sellars, Elf, 300
.
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idealistic doctrine of tne categories is the criticism
which .terry also makes in his Present rnilosopnical
Tendencies The criticism is, briefly, that while ideal-
ism thinks that it is taking its categories from mind, it
is in reality deceiving itself. It is really taking them
from the object.
In its actual working, objective ideal-
ism- -whether neo -Kantian or hegelian--
has discovered the categories in tne
object of thought instead of in the
subject. V/hy? Because tnat is where they
develop . °
Sellars' two fundamental criticisms of idealism proper,
tnat is aside from Kantianism with its subjectivism as well
as with its realistic elements, are then, as nas been
shown, two fundamental ones. Birst, that idealism is mis-
taken in seeking tne categories in tne mind or self. And
second, as a matter of fact it actually discovers them not
in tne mind or self, but in the object of thought, .deserv-
ing tne necessary evaluation of tnese criticisms until
later Sellars' criticisms of Kant
,
to whom idealism owes
so much, must next be considered.
4. Criticisms of Kantian Subjectivism
Ifext to Berkeley there is no thinxer whom Sellars attacks
more constantly than Immanuel Kant . "Kantianism and critical
realism are incompatibles. The two nave entirely different
45. Perry, PPT
,
160.
46. Sellars, M, 75.
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4-7
notions of knowledge*’ For nant tne mind is the home of
tne categories. 4^ And only as it brings tne manifold of
experience under its categories is knowledge possible*
49Knowledge for Kant is always categorised experience. But
tne categories are relevant only as principles of thought,
not also as principles of reality. The categories are
relevant for the world of appearances but they do not apply
to what lies beyond, to tne world of things-in-thems elves
,
tnese are tninxable
,
hut not knowable.^O Knowledge then is
a very complex act for Kant. First of all there are tne
unknown things-in-themselves. The role tnat they play is
that of affecting the senses and thus giving rise to the
appearances. fhen
t
in the second place ,it is only as mind
takes these appearances and orders tnem according to its
categories that knowledge arises as a product. Thus know-
ledge for Kant is not an apprehension hut a construction.
Sellars maxes many criticisms of Kant. But in tnis
dissertation tne aim is to single out the basic criticism
or criticisms. These are two . First, he of course criti-
cises Kant along with idealists in general for making mind
the home of trie categories. "We have tried to snow tna.t tne
categories are not contributed by tne self in the Kantian
way. The second criticism attacks tne weak spot in
50. Kant, OPR, A42, B60,
A129-130.
51. Bellars, GR, 150.
47 . Ibid
. ,
50
.
48. Kant, GPR, A96-97.
49. Ibid., B137
,
B142.
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Kant's armor, nis subjectivism, his insistence tnat the
categories of thought are not valid for the world of
things-in-themselves . Sellars things that the second weak-
ness stems from the first--that since for Kant categories
spring from tne self or mind it is therefore natural to
suppose that they are valid only for mind.
Kant shuts himself into agnosticism.,
by nis very approach, ne taught that
the categories exist only in tne mind
ana nave significance only for phenomena
in experience. To refer tnem beyond
experience is to misuse them. ^
Kant, as has been pointed out, conceived knowledge as a
construction of mind. The mind does not conceive or
perceive things-in-themselves but they affect tne sensi-
bility giving rise to the appearances which in turn as they
are subjected to tne categories of the mind constitute tne
world of phenomena, tne world of ordinary experience.
Sellars objects to this subjective view of Kant. 'Tor Kant,
the phenomenal world, a world of construction, is tne
physical world--a view diametrically opposed to our own
outloox." 0 ^ He rejects Kant's view of "a spider-like ego"
weaving together the disconnected manifold into a connected
order of experience. An empirical investigation of experi-
ence as tnat undertaken by genetic logic and genetic
psychology in their study of tne complex of experience even
52. Sellars, PPP, 100-101.
53. Sellars, in .Drake and
Others hCR, 211.
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from its simplest stages find neither a disconnected mani-
fo Id
,
no r the s pi cer~l
'
1
:<e ego . " ^
Kant’s scnema suggests tne wording of a
machine into whicn raw material is fed
and there worked up. But is not the
analogy false? We have to do with an
organism with remarkable capacities
under complex stimulation.^"5
”
Sellars thinks that it is nothing short of scandalous to
assume as Kant seems to tnat "tne purely qualitative side
of nature" is "dependent on the arbitrary modeling of the
mind."^ his point is that there is an order in tnese
tilings which the mind discovers and to which it must con-
form if it is to play tne game.
To put sounds side by side in space and
to arrange colors in octaves would hardly
be a successful method of procedure;
yet, upon the Kantian basis, one would
be as easy as tne other. 0 '
Moreover it is impossible to account for tne "synthesis to
be found in knowledge," for tne "continuities and unities
which characterize experience as such or those powers of
analysis and of organization which render knowledge
possible" apart from tne existence of an objective oruer
to which mind must conform. "It is a mistake to regard
intelligence as creative apart from that which calls it
forth. It is a servant, not a despot. Sellars thinks
that the real basis of Kant’s trouble is his failure to rid
54. Sellars, SIT, 66. 57. Ibid., 147.
55. Ibid., 72. 58. Ibid., 149.
56. Sellars, CH, 147 59. Ibid., 149.
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himself completely of the old Wolffian rationalism. As a
result he was not empirical enough, lie failed to distinguish
"between the real employment of the intellect in knowing
existence and its logical employment." 60
As nearly as I can make out , Kant
learned from Leibniz that the intellect
is active, but, in accordance witn his
subjectivism, he interpreted this
activity as intrinsic in its reference
and performed. After all, Kant's
phenomenalism is akin to Leibniz ian
monadism. Trie windows of the monads
let in light for subjective dreams. ul
Kant's basic weakness tnen is his lack of a tnorougn-going
empiricism. If he nad been more empirical ne would nave seen
that the categories have their root not in the subjective
processes and forms of the mind, but in the objective order
of nature of which mind too is a part, and that they develop
in the interaction that goes on between mine and nature.
"The main point to be stressed in contrast with tne Kantian
logic which I have in mind is the control of constructive
thought by precepts and tnus, indirectly by the environ-
ment .
The empirical analysis of experience...
is wholly against tne Kantian separation
of form from matter. Instead, relations
and categories appear immersed in tne ob-
jective continum spread out before us and
are analyzed out and used by thought in
the solution of problems which concern
the interpretation of tne continum....
The point to grasp is the growtn of tne
60. Sellars
,
PPR, 214.
61. Ibid., 214.
62.
Sellars, Gil, .146.
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categories from immediate experience and
tne fact tnat tnis growth is immanently
controlled by experiences which lie
deeper tnan our caprice . oc
But Sellars’ most telling blow at Kant’s subjectivism is
one wnich most idealists also can appreciate, it is the
appeal from Kant ill-informed to Kant well-informed. "Bven
Kant," Sellars points out, "was forced to admit tnat
particular uniformities were given to tne mind rather than
laid down by it."°^ This is certainly implicit in Kant’s
interesting refutation of "idealism," that is, Berxeleian
mentalism . 00
iiuch more could be said relative to Sellars’ criticisms
of Kant, He particularly criticizes nis conception of space
and time as subjective. But nis basic criticisms which
involve all tne otners are his criticisms of Kant's con-
ception of tne mind as tne seat of tne categories and above
all else his subjectivism.
5. A Brief Criticism of tne Criticisms
Host tninxers would agree with Sellars' criticisms of
Kant's subjectivism. Host idealists hold tnat some of tne
categories at least are relevant to reality as well as to
mind. Again much of Sellars’ criticism based on the failure
of idealists to be empirical enough is valid. Often ideal-
ists, especially Hegelians, have sat in their ivory towers
60 . Sellars, CR, 148-149
64. Sellars, BN, £66 .
65. Kant, C?R, BE75-276.
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speculating when they should have "been doing some very much
needed investigation; for after all there are but two routes
to the truth, one is the rational and the other the empiri-
cal, and tnese two are one. The true philosopher will aim
at a combination of the rational and the empirical.
much of Sellars' criticism oi idealists based on tneir
tendency to be unempirical at times is perfectly fair, hut
when he seeks to use this as a lever to dislodge idealism's
basic doctrine, namely that mind is the basic c tegory,
and that all other categories are attributes of mind, then
it is time to call a halt; for it is doubtful whether this
argument proves his point. As a matter of fact all ideal-
ists are not unempirical. many of them in the most compre-
hensive sense may, in fact be called mors empirical than
many naturalists who tend to become rather analytical in
the narrow sense when it comes to the nature of mind, and
the case for mind as the fundamental category in terms of
which all other categories must be conceived. After all the
most fundamental fact of experience is simply this --that
all information about tne natural order, the physical uni-
verse comes in terms of mind, and in no other way. As was
pointed out in Chapter III in criticism ox cellars' theory
of knowledge, even he has to admit and manes much of the
fact that physical things cannot be directly intuited, but
that their very existence and character must be inferred
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from the processes whereby mind interprets reality. It
seems that his own epistemology should drive him in the
direction of idealism. And, as was pointed out in section
2 of this chapter the only way in which he saves himself
from idealism is by reducing mind itself to the status of
a ’’physical category." How far he is justified in so doing-
will be decided largely on how well he is able to provide
a solution to the mind-body problem where the final battle
between the claims of idealism and those Of naturalism
must be decided. As matters stand, however, it would seem
that idealists are just as empirical in regarding mind as
the basic category and the home and source of all the cate-
gories as naturalism is in regarding the physical order,
matter as the basic category, and the source and home of ail
the categories. In fact in view of what has been said it
may be that the idealist is more empirical; for the facts
of mind are known at first hand, matter always at second
hand, and matter always in terms of mind. And if this is
true then dollars' and ferry's contention that idealism
really obtains its categories from the object falls to the
ground, except of course in the sense that tne object it-
self is regarded as the activity and embodiment of objective
Hind. The truth in realism may lie just here- -that the
categories seem to be in things rather than in mind, be-
cause things as the activity of the Divine Mind nave an
,,
,
.
order and a reason which answers to tne order and reason
which finds its completest manifestation only in mind. As
a matter of fact justice can he done to all that tne ex-
perience of "thinghood" actually calls for, when nature is
tnus regarded as most idealists nave regarded it, not as
tne subjective dream of the individual thinker hut ratner
as the manifestation of tne activity of objective Mind.
More consideration will he given to this important question
in the next chapter on Criticisms of Idealistic Philosopnies
of Mature
•. v
.
CHAPTER VI
CRITICISMS OP IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHIES OP NATURE
1. The Two Basic Problems
In any discussion of the philosophy of nature two closely
related problems present themselves. The first of these
is the nature of things. Both idealists and naturalists
along with human beings generally are convinced that things
exist in some form or fashion. But this raises the question
as to their real nature. Are things mental or non-mental?
The crux of the problem is simply this--that while things
only and always manifest themselves in terms of subjective
mind, yet they also manifest an objectivity that refuses
to allow itself to be reduced to a mere phase of subjective
mind. Things then must be either the activity of Objective
Mind as idealism insists or else they must be essentially
non-mental and mind itself a phase of things, as Sellars
c la ims
.
And this leads to the second important problem relative
to the philosophy of nature. Things are not inclined to act
in isolation. Even the simplest change is far more complex
and involves far more factors acting in unity than is at
first apparent. The fact of unity, order, organization in
nature is evident to human experience everywhere, and it is
also the basic postulate of science. In short both iaeal-
and naturalists ar6 agreed that there is an order in nature
to which the human mind must conform. Naturalists such as
Sellars are even willing to grant a kind of "empirical

teleology" in nature.-1- Both idealists and naturalists such
as Sellars, then, are in agreement as to the empirical facts
of order and teleology. The basic difference is simply
this- -Is this order and seeming purpose in nature intrinsic
to nature, and is nature self-sufficient and independent or
is it dependent on Mind, is it the expression of Mind? Must
we then, with Sellars, accept nature as the ultimate fact
beyond which the mind cannot probe because there is no be-
yond or must the mind of the thinker, with Hocking, "pene-
trate through the blank otherness of Nature to the spirit
that is its support"? 2 Sellars states the crucial problem
well:
Naturalism s tand s for the self-sufficiency and
intelligibility of the world of space and time.
Supernaturalism maintains that this, realm is not
self-sufficient and that it can be understood
only as the field of operation of a spiritual
reality outside itself.
^
The phrase, "a spiritual reality outside itself" suggests
that Sellars ascribes dualism to all theistic idealists.
This suspicion is strengthened by what he has to say on page
15 of The Philosophy of Physical Realism . But he is certain-
ly mistaken, since theistic idealists put the space-time
order within God, not outside of Him.
1. Impersonal and Personal Idealistic Philosophies of
Nature
as was pointed out in Chapter II, all idealists have one
fundamental fact in common. They regard reality as of the
1. Sellars, EN, 337-338. 3. Sellars, EN, 2.
2. Hocking, LGHE
,
289.
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nature of mind. Impersonal idealists such as Bradley along
with many pragmatists think of reality in terms of ’’exper-
ience”. Personal idealists of all types prefer to think of
it as the manifestation of kind conceived as personal and
self-conscious. Hence nature for the impersonal absolutists
is essentially an aspect of the totality of experience— the
Absolute, but for all personal idealists it constitutes ’’the
activity of objective mind”.^ Perhaps then it is well to
divide idealistic philosophies into two groups, the imper-
sonal and the personal.
The great question relative to Hegel remains as it has
always been whether he was personalistic or impersonalistic
.
The evidence seems to incline toward the former, but at best
he was vague thus giving rise to two schools. But there is
no question relative to absolutists like Bradley. He redu-
ces the world of things, nature, to an aspect of the imper-
sonal Absolute conceived as the totality of experience. He
indeed speaks of ’’Reality” as spiritual as in the following
interesting passage with which he closes his great work,
Appearance and Reality :
We may fairly close this work then by insisting
that Reality is spiritual . There is a great say-
ing of Hegel's, a saying too well known, and one
which without some explanation I should not like
to endorse. But I will end with something not
very different, something perhaps more certainly
the essential message of Hegel. Outside of spirit
there cannot be any reality, and, the more that
anything is spiritual, so much the more is it
veritably real.
5
4. Brightman, Letter to
Sellars, Oct. 3, 1943.
3. Bradley, AAR, 552.
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But it is evident that by "spiritual” Bradley does not mean
personal. The Absolute within which all experience falls is
essentially impersonal.' 1 In contrast to the all-inclusive
Absolute, nature is mere appearance. And yet by virtue of
being an aspect of the Absolute it has a degree of reality;
it is not an illusion.^ But at the same time it does not
have the sam6 degree of reality that mind has. 0
Bradley, however, as was pointed out in Chapter II,
Section (2), rejects mind as the fundamental metaphysical
category. But in contrast all personal idealists accept
mind in terms of the self-conscious self as the fundamental
reality. There are three chief types of personal idealists.
First, there are the followers of Berkeley, the mentalists,
who have been sufficiently discussed for our purposes in
Chapter II and Chapter IV of this dissertation. .In brief,
Berkeley conceives nature as wholly dependent on the activity
of the Mind of God, and reduces matter to complexes of sen-
sations, mere presentations which the Divine Mind makes to
the human. It is no wonder, then, that Sellars attacks
Berkeley again and again; for the latter strikes at Sellars*
basic concept—matter.
Then there are the personalistic absolutists whose views
were briefly discussed in Chapter II. Royce and Hocking
were singled out as outstanding representatives of thie
group. Both of these great thinkers look upon Reality as an
6. Ibid., 531-532.
7. Ibid., 144.
8. Ibid., 530.
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all-inclusive Self of which all selves are parts. But this
Self is conceived as self-conscious and nature is a realm o.f
meaning dependent on the Supreme Self.
As simply as Nature presents itself as objective
just so simply and directly is the Other Mind pre-
sent to me in that objectivity, as its actual
meaning. I do not first know my physical world as
a world of objects and then as a world of shared
objects; it is through a prior recognition of the
presence of Other Mind that my physical experience
acquired objectivity at all.'
Closely related to both Royce and Hocking and also to
Berkeley is that group of personal idealists who call them-
selves personalists. This group was discussed at length in
Chapter II. However it is necessary at this juncture to
attempt a brief summary of their philosophy of nature. As
was made clear in Chapter II, there are two types of per-
sonalists. The first is the predominantly pluralistic type
of Leibniz who conceived the whole of reality inducing
nature as composed of psychical units, monads, souls under
the direction of a Supreme Monad, Cod. Leibniz displaces
the concept of matter with the concept of monad or soul.
Reality is a hierarchy of monads under a Supreme Monad. The
second is the Lotze-Bowne School who call themselves person-
alists by virtue of their emphasis upon the self-conscious
self as the key to reality. With Leibniz they hold that
nature is the expression of the Will of Cod and consequently
is more than just a system of meanings or of mere presenta-
9. Hocking, MCHE, 288.
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tions. Moreover human selves are not regarded as parts of
God, but by virtue of being created by God they are in a
large measure other and distinct from Him, as centers of
creativity. Personalism is on the one hand more pluralistic
than absolutism, but on the other more monistic than Leibniz.
To the personal ist nature has only phenomenal existence and
reality. It is not illusion but it is appearance; for it has
no existence in its ovn right, that is apart irom the Ji/ine
Energizing.
There is universal agreement among both
scientists and philosophers that a large part of
the sense-world has only phenomenal existence.
When we inquire into the causality and ontologi-
cal ground 'of that world, we are taken behind it
into a thought -w’or la
,
and are told that this is
the truly real . But at the same time the phen-
omenal world remains real in its way. It forms
the contents of our objective experience, and is
the field in which we all meet in mutual under-
standing. It expresses, then, a common element
to all, and is no private fiction of the indivi-
dual. Concerning it the proper question is not,
Is it real? but rather, What kind of reality does
it have?-^
Again Bowne says: "Thought is rapidly reducing th is world to
phenomenal existence, and making it the manifestation of an
energy not its own."^
It will be readily seen that all types of idealism regard
the world of nature as phenomenal, in the sense that it is
not complete in itself or self-existent, but rather a mani-
festation of something, deeper, of mind in some form or fashion.
10. Bowne, LET., 8-9.
11. Ibid., 64.
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3. A Brief Resume^ of Sellars’ Philosophy of Nature
Sellars’ philosophy of nature has been touched on again
and again. But no doubt a brief summary at this point will
be- of value. Sellars holds in the first place that nature
is self-sufficient and independent. It must be accepted as
existing in its own right. The explanation of the order,
organization, novelty, value he finds in nature itself.
These are intrinsic to nature. Emergent evolution is his
principle of explanation.
Moreover nature is more than mere appearance. At the base
of nature there is matter. Matter, he defines, as has been
seen, in terms of the simplest existing systems, as revealed
by the sciences; and out of these simple systems he insists
the more complex systems emerge. Thus he ascribes all the
complexity, the wonder and glory of the universe to matter.
One of his most interesting statements relative to matter
is the following:
Matter is now conceived as dynamic, organized,
socially inclined to new unions under favorable
energy-conditions. And this view expresses an
immense amount of active exploration based on
new methods in physics and chemistry made pos-
sible by radio-activity, X-rays, and the analysis
of spectra. Matter has been opened yp to the
human mind in a most wonderful way .^
Sellars thus holds that in the last analysis only material
things are real and enlarges his conception of the physical
to include the psychical. ”1 don’t believe in matter and
mind but in an evolutionary minded matter p--'
12. Sellars, RCA, 174.
13. Sellars, Letter to Brightman, Oct. 20, 1943.
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4. The Five Chief Criticisms
(1). Idealists Reduce Nature to the Phenomenal and
Even the Illusionary
In considering the various criticisms which Sellars
levels at idealistic philosophy, it is best to begin with
his most extreme--that idealists reduce nature to an illu-
sion. "It is my opinion," he says, "that idealism is akin
to illusionism.' 1 '* Of course he has Bradley chiefly in mind
as was made clear in the special consideration given to his
criticisms of idealistic epistemological monism in Chapter
IV of this dissertation. "We may say that Bradley was the
last great champion of Eleatic illusionism."^ But even
Bradley as was shown in Chapter IV of this dissertation
believed that nature had its degree of reality and conse-
quently he cannot be accused of holding that nature is
illusory. Sellars also brings the same charge against
Berkeley. "I would add that it is the belief of the critical
realist that Berkeley was within the tradition of illusionism
when he rejected the categories of substance and physical
thing. But this charge is even more unfair against Berkeley
than against Bradley. For Berkeley certainly believed, as was
made clear in Chapter II, in a fixed order of ideas, the order
of nature which rests back on God and which man must accept
and cannot change. One wonders if Berkeley does not have a
better basis for real objectivity than Sellars. For if back
14. Sellars, PPR, 16.
15. Ibid., 16.
16. Ibid., 17.
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of the order of nature is the purpose of God then that order
can be more trusted to continue than if it is grounded in un-
thinking matter. How can Sellars on the basis of his phil-
osophy be certain that nature may not change and change very
radically so that its order give way to utter chaos? After
all, for him evolution is a local affair. ’’The picture is
that of a qualitative rising and subsiding in quite plural
and local ways with a cosmic floor woven of particles in
their dynamic relations . ’’17
Sellars is on surer ground when he charges the idealists
with regarding nature as phenomenal. He quotes from
Brightman’s Philosophy of Ideals
,
criticizing it in the follow-
ing manner:
The point I wish to make is that physical real-
ism cannot cavalierly disregard the category of
stuff, or substance, as th6 idealist is persuaded
that he can. As an illustration of the latter, I
take the following from a recent book by Professor
Brightman: "For the reasons given, and for many
other reasons, the positivistic view of nature
seems preferable to the metaphysical. By nature,
as the object of the sciences, then, we mean
simply the fact and the laws of actual and ideally
possible experience." By nature, the critical
realist means a realm to be known in terms of fact
and law. Ana so we have here a basic divergence
.
All idealists look upon nature as phenomenal. By this they
do not mean that it is may
a
,
illusion, as some oriental
philosophies allege, but rather that it is not real in the
metaphysical sense, that it is not self-6xistent
,
self-
sufficient and self-explanatory— that it is the manifesta-
tion of something deeper, more basic ana fundamental. As
17. Sellars, Phil . Rev.
. 53 (1944),. 380.
18. Sellars, P?P
,
291. See Brightman, POI,55.

Brightman puts it:
Sensational istic positivism, if* taken as a com-
plete account of nature, is indeed solipsisi’.. ^ut
critical uositivism doe s not identify nature.with
the particular facts of my experience. For it
,
natur e is the whole system of the laws oi the actual
and ideally possible experiences of all human minds,
furthermore--and this is even more imp or t ant-
-
positivistic science does not pretend to reveal
the inner nature of reality or the power winch
produces it. On this view, then, physical nature
is as G. A. Wilson holds, the resultant ideal .
construction in conscious experience when mind is
stimulated in a certain way by the creative .powers
of the universe. 1 ^
Such views strike at the very basis of Sellars’ system;
for
it is built upon the basis of the self-sufficiency of natuie,
and upon matter as the ultimately real. But Sellars makes
certain criticisms of the idealistic doctrine of the phen-
omenalism of nature, which must now be considered more ade-
quately.
He especially objects to the idea expressed in the above
citation from Brightman that nature is a constructmn.
Idealism maintains, on the one hand, that physical
mature is a realm of causal determinism and _ so
contradicts man's freedom; on the other hand, tnat
nature is a construction and not an independent
reality. 0
Here his criticism is that to regard nature on the one hand
as a "realm of causal determinism" and on the other hand as
a construction constitutes a fundamental contradiction and
so the idealistic theory of nature must be rejected. But
many idealists do not regard nature as deterministic in an
absolute sense, and what is more when they speak of it as a
19. Brightman, PCI, 47
•
20. Sellars, EN, 4.
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construction they do not mean in an arbitrary personal sense,
subject to the caprice of the individual mind. It is the
Divine Lind which constructs both the order of nature and
the order of mind. Hence the individual, mind cannot con-
struct nature in any way that it fancies without courting
disaster. It must be true both to the subjective order
revealed in its own basic structure and also to the objective
order which two orders seem to correspond in every act of
rational thought thus furnishing the idealist with one of
his arguments for regarding nature as also an order of
thought. Thus it seems most logical to assume that the
thought and thing series can be brought together in the
knowledge relationship because the thing series is ’’cast in
the molds of thought.” 21 In short the same Power that made
the objective order, the idealist contends, also made the
subjective so that the interaction of the two constitutes
the experience of an orderly world. And he may also contend,
especially in the light of the most recent discoveries of
the sciences that nature is not nearly so deterministic as
was once thought, that its Author so ordered it as to leave
enough room for the creative role of mind. Conseauentlv
Sellars’ keen thrust fails of its objective. But this only
leads to his more fundamental criticisms which must be
considered next.
Sellars tries to overthrow the idealistic doctrine of
21. Bowne, TTK, 296.
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V
nature by an appeal to science which he conceives as having
ontological reach.
We have rejected phenomenalism by justifying
knowledge: and we have justified scientific
knowledge by showing the nature and reach of it.
Scientific knowledge, so interpreted, has ontolo-
gical reach even though it involves no apprehen-
sion, apelike, of the concygte in the Eddington-
ian sense of the concrete .
^
By scientific knowledge Sellars does not mean that science
can in any literal sense reveal the very stuff of nature,
that is literally reveal it as non-mental and thus confute
the idealist. This would involve a contradiction of Sellars’
epistemology; for he insists as was stated in Chapter III of
this dissertation that the mind cannot directly perceive the
stuff of being but can only represent its basic character-
istics in terms of the medium of thought.
Knowledge gives insight into the knowable char-
acteristics of bodies, their structure and behavior,
and does this metrically; but it does not involve
any literal participation in the being of the
object .
^
Knowledge is not an intuition of the very content
of external things nor a participation in their
being but rather a decipherment of their character-
istics as these are disclosed through sense-data
and concepts.' Given the otherness of the object
and the mediatory mechanism of knowing, ^the nature
of descriptive knowing becomes evident.
^
We must glean from knowledge of ourselves and from
knowledge of all sorts of physical things the
general nature of material things. And we find
that we think in terms of basic categories like
thinghood, causality, spatiality, properties,
organization, and change. 2 5
22. Sellars, PPR, 291.
23. Sellars, PPR, 293.
24- . Ibid., 294.
25. Sellars, PPR, 297.
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In other words, as was seen in Chapter V of this disserta-
tion, Sellars' fundamental category is "thinghood " which
finds confirmation doth in science and in all the ordinary
experience of nature. Nature is "fact" as well as "law."^0
And the factual element in nature is "thinghood" "substance"
or simply "matter". Sellars contends that ultimately science
in its analysis of nature comes to matter conceived as
composed of simple, indivisible patterned units.
But science finds that the complex is composed
of the simple. The double task ensues of under-
standing the emergence of the complex continuant
and thinking properly the simple. A correct
thinking of complex substances should at least
help us in thinking the simple, that is, that
which does not seem to be further decomposable.
We would expect it to be even more of a continuant
than the complex. In fact, we would expect it
to exist in its own right, in se_, in a more endur-
ing sense than the complex. That has always been
the logic of materialism. Matter has inevitably
been assumed to be eternal or enduring. The em-
pirical task of science was to find the units.
It is no part of the task of the nhilosopher to
anticipate science in its search.
So it turns out that scientific knowledge discloses nature
as composed of ultimate units which must be conceived as
existing realistically in their own right, and therefore
idealism is wrong in conceiving nature phenomenally. Be-
neath the appearances there lies matter as their foundation
and cause. "Matter" or "substance" is the solid foundation
upon which nature rests as over against the illusory basis
which idealism finds in Mind. In speaking of substance or
26. Ibid., 291.
27. Ibid., 297-298.

matter, Sellars says, ’’I have defended the term as standing
for being as against phenomenalism ". 20
It is exceedingly doubtful if the idealist will be thus
easily convinced. Hard as it sometimes seems to think of
nature with its vast forces and its seeming hardness and
massiveness as the manifestation of Lind, yet when all the
facts are considered the naturalist certainly has to exer-
cise far more faith than the idealist. Matter conceived in
terms of simple units or systems seems altogether too simple
an explanation. It takes a vast stretch of the imagination
to conceive the actual order, design, organization, and
unity, not to speak of mind ancl values, as emerging from a
matter that in its simplicity cannot exercise the forethought
and purpose which the facts seem to require. Matter seems
altogether too simple and poor a concept to contain such
riches. And these are not Sellars’ only difficulties. The
idealist might well remind him that the atom is conceived
today as a center of energies and that it looks more like an
expression of mind and will and fits in far more easily with
the theistic hypothesis than did the old hard atom. Science
which in its infancy seemed hostile to theism appears to be
far more favorable today than ever before.
There is another interesting point which must be considered
in Sellars’ criticisms of the idealistic theory of the phen-
omenalism of nature. It is contained in the following passage
28. Sellars, PPR, 297.
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from his Evolutionary I-latur alisra :
But the assumption which modern realism will not
admit is that nature is phenomenal. We know nature
through the data it controls in our minds. The
data, not nature, can be called appearance.^’
The idealist would agree with the second sentence, "We know
nature through the data it controls in our minds." As has
been emphasized before the idealist contends for an objective
order as much as the realist but conceives it in terms of the
manifestation of Objective Lind instead of in terms of the
appearances of matter as the naturalist does. The last
sentence of the citation from Sellars involves his epistem-
ology, namely that things cannot be directly intuited, but
can only be known at second hand as they disclose themselves
through the medium of mind. This view it was contended in
Chapter III appears to involve idealistic conclusions,
namely that if nature cannot be known save in terms of mind
that it may well be that it is of the nature of mind. In
fact in the final analysis, as was pointed out in Chapter V,
the only way he escapes idealism is by the drastic method of
reducing mind itself to the humble status of a physical
category. Whether such procedure is justified will be con-
sidered in the next chapter on the mind-body problem, around
which problem together with the problem of values must center
the final conflict between idealism and naturalism.
(2). Idealists are Unempirical
This fundamental criticism appears again and again,
29. Sellars, EN, 16.

and nay in fact be said to underlie most of Sellars' criti-
cisms of idealism. Idealists do not give due attention to
the concrete facts of experience and they tend to belittle
science while physical realism does justice both to the
facts of ordinary experience, that is to the common, persis-
tent, indubitable facts, and also to knowledge as disclosed
by science. Thus in Chapter TV his basic criticism of abso-
lute idealism was found to be the tendency to speculation
without a secure empirical grounding in the facts of scien-
tific knowledge. Again in Chapter V it was made evident that
Sellar's objection to the idealistic doctrine of the cate-
gories was finally based upon the contention that such a view
is not empirical. It does not pay enough attention to the
facts of ordinary experience on the one hand and to the facts
of science on the other, .is a result, idealists neglect the
important objective factor of "thinghood" to which both science
and ordinary experience give testimony. It will now be seen
that this same argument underlies much of Sellar's criticism
of the idealistic philosophies of nature.
As has been made evident before Sellars as over against
the idealists holds that science has metaphysical reach. In
fact in a sense science alone can speak the last word rela-
tive to the ultimate units of nature.
Hatter has inevitably been assumed to be eternal
or enduring. The empirical task of science was to
find the units. It is no part of the task of tl
philosopher to anticipate science in its search
30. Sellars, PFR, 298
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Consequently he criticizes the idealist, particularly the
religious idealist, the theist, with belittling science:
Religious idealism displays a disposition to
belittle science itself and to build upon the fact
that its tremendous tasks have not y6t been com-
pleted. But those who comfort themselves in this
way are like squatters who fear that. the. rightful
owner nmy at any time appear and claim his property.
Spiritualism has been avid to prove that science
deals only with phenomena. Granted this by be-
wildered science, it has gone on to argue that
orderliness and intelligibility of phenomenal
arrangements implied an orderer
.
Again relative especially to the general forms of idealism
prevailing during the latter part of the nineteenth century
and the first part of the twentieth he says: "It did not
face up to the facts discovered by the sciences, and seemed
to consider itself an escape from their pressure . "^3
No doubt, as was made evident in considering this criti-
cism in Chapter V, section 5, it is richly deserved by many
philosophers who fly the banner of idealism. Many of them,
following in the footsteps of Fichte and Schelling, have
spun out beautiful theories about nature without giving
enough attention to observation and especially to the results
of scientific investigation and experiment. But this hardly
applies to the outstanding idealists of our day who can hard-
ly be said to have neglected science. In fact the amazing
fact of our day is the number of scientists of the first
magnitude such as Eddington who on the basis of the newest
revelations of the sciences have turned toward idealism.
31. Sellars, EN, 15. 33. Sellars, in Schaub, (ed.),
32. Ibid., 15-16. FT, 21-22.
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Sellars himself admits this fact and also the further fact
today, even in science, once considered its impregnable
castle which no idealist could ever scale, the naturalist
is on the defensive.
Naturalism is being challenged to state and defend
its postulates. Theologically inclined physicists
have entered the lists; and, in the realm of teach-
nical philosophy, we find such distinguished think-
ers as Maritain, Gilson, Whitehead, Montague,
Parker, Northrop, and Hartshorne, standing for some
form or other of theism. 34
In Physical Realism it is interesting to note how much
space Sellars gives to criticisms of the scientist, Edding-
ton,^ and 0 f scientific philosopher, V/hitehead, ^ who has
been called, ’’the greatest philosopher of our day” .37 'white-
head is of course not a thorough-going idealist, but he is a
theist, and his philosophy contains many idealistic aspects
along with realistic elements. 38 In view of these interest-
ing developments it can hardly be said that idealism is unem-
pirical today. Moreover, as to the ontological reach of
science ,':he idealist can always answer that any ontology wor-
thy of the name must investigate the total field of human ex-
perience much of which, such as the realm of values, hardly
falls within the domain of science. The philosopher is de-
pendent upon the scientist for certain facts relative both
to physical nature and also to human nature; but if he builds
34. Sellars, Phil. Rev.,
53 (1944)T3ol.
35. Sellars, PPR, 41-44,
240 - 248 .
36. Ibid., 299-301.
37. Dr. E. S. Brightman, in a
course, ’’Twentieth Century
Philosophy”, Fall, 1944.
38. Whitehead, PAR, vii-viii,
68, 374, 377, 526.
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his system on science alone he builds as truly on foundations
of sand as if he neglec ted the facts of science. The phil-
osopher must be truly synoptic; he must take into serious
consideration all of the fundamental facts of human exper-
ience.
( 3) • Idealists Have Not Solved The Problem of The
Distinction Between Physical and Psychical
There is no doubt, Sellars argues, that there is a real
distinction between the physical and the psychical which
idealism ignores.
Real fire burns, mental fire does not. There can
be no doubt then, that there is ample empirical
foundation for the distinction between the physical
and the psychical .
^
The physical realm claims to be independent of
mind, and there are valid motives which differen-
tiate it from the psychical. These motives must
secure satisfaction in any adequate philosophy,
and idealism is unable to offer it. ^3
The reason why idealism finds itself in this difficulty is
simply that it has in the first place made the false infer-
ence that since things appear in mental and personal terms
exclusively they must therefore be mental.
Because appearances are personal and intervene be-
tween the individual percipient and the physical
thing, it does not follow" that we have any less
reason to believe in the existence of the physical
thing. An effect cannot be more real than the
cause. So long as we retain the contrast we must
remain realists.
Must not our conclusion be, that the facts do not
furnish a basis for the empirical principle of
39. Sellars, CR, 165 . 41. Ibid., $2 .
40. Ibid., 166.

idealism (that all objects of knowledge . are
mental)? .. .Knowledge as such makes no discrimina-
tion between the mental and the non-mental; this
distinction is one between the objects of know-
ledge.^-2
If the idealist objects that if things are not of the' nature
of mind then it is impossible for mind to know them Sellars
has his answer.
Some years ago I pointed out that the essential
fallacy in the principle, that the mental . cannot
know the non-mental, was the assumption that to
know a thing was somehow to be it.
Is this chain of reasoning conclusive against idealism?
At first sight it seems to be. It especially seems un-
reasonable to suppose that things are of the nature of mind.
’’Real fire burns, mental fire does not.’’ Here Sellars dis-
tinguishes between the concept, fire, which he admits is
purely mental, and the concrete experience of fire burning
which he somehow holds to be a substance and in nature dis-
tinctly non-mental. Now every idealist who is an epistemo-
r
logical dualist would grant the distinction between the con-
cept, fire, between the idea of fire and the concrete ex-
perience of burning sensation or the appearance of rapid
oxidation in nature which is known as fire. Fire is not
just the experience of the individual. There is something
going on out there in the objective order which is distinct
from my idea ana yet when I describe it, I find that I can
do so only in mental terms. Apart from a perceiving and
42. Ibid., 185.
43. Ibid.
,
186, note 1.
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interpreting mind, fire has no meaning. Its attributes in
terms of its coloi', th.6 sensation of heat, its consuming
power all have no meaning apart from a perceiving mind.
What fire-in-itself may be it is impossible to discover;
but our surest clue, since it reveals itself through mind
and in terms of mind, seems to be that it is the activity
of Objective Mind.
Of course Sellars objects that th.6 fact that a thing is
known by means of and through the mental or personal is no
proof that it is of the nature of mind. That is, it is no
absolute proof. This is what he should have said. And the
idealist unless he is a dogmatist would have to grant this.
But he could return the attack and insist that in the light
of the best knowledge that is possible to human beings it
seems more probable that things are of the nature of mind
than that they are essentially non-mental. How the atoms
can produce appearances is a rather knotty problem for the
*
materialist; and v/orse yet how they can produce mind which
even Sellars in this connection has to recognize as some-
thing different from things.
'
This leads up to Sellars’ final attack--that the idealist
in holding that things are of the nature of mind assumes
"that to know a thing" is "somehow to^be it". Of course
this holds true of the subjectivist, but objective ideal-
ists, as has been pointed out before, do not hold that things
are due to the activity of personal, subjective mind, but are
J.
t
.
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manifestations of Objective Mind, which controls both the
order of things and the order of subjective mind. For per-
sonal idealists, and especially for the type known as per-
sonalis ts, however, persons as centers of creativity and
freedom have a unique status which things do not have.
Hence the final struggle vould
,
it appears, take place be-
tween naturalists and personal idealists, especially per-
sonalists. .
In the light of all the facts then, it seems reasonable
to hold that idealism on the one hand has a better explana-
tion of the distinction between the mental and the physical.
The mental is distinct from the physical because it has
certain unique endowments such as consciousness, purpose,
memory which things do not possess, since things have not
been similarly endowed by the Creator but serve as mere means
for the achievement of His purposes. Things are not basically
as solid as they seem, for at the basis of things there is a
dynamic process--those primeval energies which have their
source in The Will and Power and Purpose of Cod. Hence things
too are of the nature of mind and will since they proceed
from the same source as these but there is not the same en-
dowment. Consequently things and minds constitute two orders
Vvith an entirely different status. But while on the one
hand the idealist car furnish the best explanation of the
distinctness of minds and things, he can on the other hand
also best explain their unity in interaction in that both
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orders fall within the province of Objective hind. Hence
the force of Bowne’s contention that things are "cast in the
molds of thought.^ This leads to Sellars’ next criticism,
one that is often brought against idealists in general, but
particularly against personalists
.
(4). Idealists Are Anthropomorphic
He insists that man has read his conscious purpose into
nature. "Han in his reflection upon the universe read this
human level of conscious purpose into nature at large by
means of the postulation of a G-od acting somewhat as man
does, planning and. contriving. "^5 He gives a number of
reasons why he considers this an illegitimate procedure.
First of all, because human categories are valid not for the
universe but only for human life.
The new cosmic perspective simply refuses to pro-
ject into the universe at large in a theologically
priori fashion a magnified group of social and
human categories like rulership, justice, plan,
purpose. These categories ar6 significant and
valid in their proper place, which is human life,
but they are not relevant to the universe at large.
Traditional religion tried to humanize the uni-
verse and got into all sorts of difficulties for
its pains.
Then in the second place he contends that the idea of per-
sonal agency in the universe is out of harmony with both
science and philosophy.
The old idea of a personal agent working in nature
but not of it fades and the attention is focussed
upon actual events and things. For modern science
and philosophy, nature seems self-sufficient and
vast .4-7
44. Bowne, TTH, 296
45. Sellars, RCA, 224.
46. Sellars, RCA, 154-155
47. Ibid., 160.
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The physicist thinks that matter is originat-
ing today out of positive and negative grains of
of electricity. Such creation is all the time
going on.4
In the third place there is no real evidence today for ’’super-
personal agency."
.7hat evidence have we , for superpersonal agency?
lias not such evidence dwindled and vanished up-
on scrutiny? Action in nature is one kind of a
thinly action into nature something quite differ-
ent .
In the fourth place, and more profoundly, personality is not
adequate as the category of reality. Here is where Sellars
comes to grips with the basic concept of personalism. Person-
ality, in the sense of the self-conscious self, he contends is
too "evanescent and passive, too little self-explanatory. ""It
is relative to an organism and that organismfcs activities." 50
"Are we so certain today that only mind can be active? Indeed,
is not the inclination the other way, so that consciousness is
51
often thought of as passive and ineffective?" lie also contends
that the interpretation of nature in terms of a particular
part is one-sided. Animism is interpreting the whole in terms
of a particular part.
It is the regarding as typical to nature what
we have reason to believe as not typical. From
an evolutionary standpoint, it is to level up
the whole nature of man. Furthermore, as man
himself has been studied, the not-self has en-
croached upon him. Nature has absorbed the
body. Sven the psychologist has become skept-
ical of spirits and souls as agents. They seem
to him round squares, wholes without parts,
creative energies which need no fuel, animism...
48. Ibid., 163-164.
49. Ibid., 147-148.
50. Sellars, EN, 316.
51. Sellars, HOP, 178.
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has been giving way to a naturalistic interpre-
tation of mind which cuts loose from the ghost-
soul . 52
In his Religion Coming of Age he even goes so far as to say:
"Man is no more real than a dog; he is simply different and
able to do things that a dog cannot do ." 55 And even in his
Philosophy of Physical Realism he goes so far as to say:
"Stars, plants, ants and human beings are equally real .
So far as existence is concerned, it is meaningless to
speak of higher and lower.
"
5^ Moreover it is not true
that the human will alone is active. There is no great
Will at work. in the world, but activity is native to nature.
Hence it is false to ascribe such to nature after the analogy
of the human will. This is anthropomorphism of the worst
kind. "The history of methaphysics is full of the easy
assumption that only the will is active and that nature must
be interpreted in analogy with the active and conscious
self ." 55
Finally Sellars criticizes the theistic arguments from
order and design. He contends that the facts of order in
the universe do not imply an orderer:
We are now prepared for our reply to the per-
ennial theistic argument. Order, it is said,
implies intelligence. An orderly world is a
rational world, and a rational world implies
reason. But do we not have here again one of
those double words? A rational world is a world
that reason can grasp; and, because of this, it
is associated in our minds with reason and
52. Sellars, EN, 323
53. Sellars, RCA, 13
54. Sellars, PPR, 6
55. Sellars, EN, 234
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thought of as akin to it. But, as a matter of
fact, the relation between intelligence and order
is just the reverse of the one the idealist
suggests. It is intelligence vh ich presupposes
order and not order which presupposes intelli-
gence. Without order in the world, the human
reason could neither have arisen nor could it
have got leverage upon the world. An orderly
world is rational only in the sense that it is
suited to reason. It is the kind of world in
which reason can arise end operate. 5°
The crux of his criticism of the argument from design is
the old contention that Darwin gave it the d6ath-blow.
It remained for Darwin to give the death- blow to
the hypothesis of design, whether external and
creative or internal and guiding. Cannot all
those admirable adaptations be explained as a
result of their survival value? 57
Darwin’s contribution was the idea of natural
selection, a mechanism, so to speak, which per-
mits us to think of nature as uncons<
As the last citation suggests, Cellars really thinks of
design as intrinsic to nature. "What I am arguing for is
a teleology of self-direction rather than a teleology of
finalism, a teleology intrinsic to an economy which is
say that there may be "a non-vital is tic elan vital ” in the
following interesting passage from his Evolutionary Natura
There may be many stages between random aggre-
gates and intelligent planning. There may be
creative adjustments in the germs which, while
not guided by ideas, are yet broadly coordinate.
If function helps to determine structure, it is
quite possible to conceive a non-vitalistic
elan vital
. The part played by organization in
selective and directive from behind
both spatial and temporal. ”59 He even goes so far as to
lisrn
56. Sellars, RCA, 220
57. Sellars, EOF, 272
58. Sellars, PFP, 273
59. Sellars, Phil . Rev . t
52 (1943)7%!

instinct and in intelligence may easily have its
counterpart in the more obscure processes which
geneticists study. To underestimate the physical
world is a mistake.
Likewise order and organization are intrinsic to nature.
The argument from design had more logical force
in the days before Newton, Laplace and Darwin.
These and those who come after them have succeed-
ed in showing that a certain measure of order
and organization is intrinsic to nature. Why
should it not be? But we must not exagerate the
amount of order in the world. There is devolu-
tion as well as evolution. The essential point
is that we now think of order in nature as a
growth and an adjustment rather than as something
made on purpose as a machine is made by an art isan
.
The older tradition seems to us very anthropomor-
phic ,°1
Nothing is more fundamental to Sellars’ system than the
ascription of order and organization to nature as intrinsic.
In the above passage he takes it for granted that Newton,
LaPlace and Darwin have proven this. But no idealist would
grant this. The ascription of order and organization to
nature is clearly an assumption, and one less conceivable
in the light of all the facts than the theistic hypothesis.
Though Sellars’ criticisms of idealism based upon its
anthropomorphism seem rather impressive when viewed as a
whole, yet analysis shows their essential weaknesses which
makes them far from conclusive. The first criticism namely
that human categories are valid only for human life, is
largely an assumption based upon too little evidence. It
is certainly valid against much crude anthropomorphism of
which theists have so often been guilty, but it can hardly
60. Sellars, 338
61. Sellars, PPP, 481

be said to be conclusive against theism at its best. If man
arises out of nature as a conscious rational being it seems
reasonable to suppose that there must be more to nature
ultimately than matter accounts for. Sellars himself makes
some rather interesting statements along this line. In his
Philosophy of Physical Realism he says: "I shall seek to
show how man is a part of the fabric of the world and that
his doing, his knowing and his valuing cannot be understood
apart from his status."^ Again he says:
If man is a genuine part of nature, nature must
be a much more complex, rich and profoundly real
thing than we have sometimes supposed. If man has
evolved from nature, his presence casts light back
upon it. It must be the sort of thing that could
produce him. It must be kin to him.°^
If nature is "kin" to man then it stands to reason that human
categories may be valid for nature, especially "if his pres-
ence casts light back upon it." This constitutes a real
concession to idealism. More to the point yet in his arti-
cle, "An Approach to the Mind-Body Problem", he goes so far
as to say speaking of the efficacy of consciousness: "Here
and here alone, are we present to some real in contrast to
phenomenal
,
causality
.
Ana again in the same article,
"The fact that consciousness is not alien to the physical
world at its highest level throws a light upon the stuff of
nature from the inside. "^5 And once more he says:
62. Sellars, PPR, 1.
63. Sellars, EOP, 222
64. Sellars, Phil. Rev.,
27 (1918), 158
65 . Ibid., 162. This idea of
knowing nature from the
?t inside" goes back to
Schopenhauer, the idealist.
See, WWI, Vol. I, 129.
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I have long maintained that, in consciousness
—
and there alone—we are on the inside of nature,
that is of a highly organized system, the human
brain. The situation is unique, and it no
wonder that it puzzles the psychologist. 00
If in consciousness— "and there alone—we are on the inside
of nature" then nature may well be of the nature of conscious-
ness and human categories not so irrevelant after all. It
is statements such as those quoted above which lead Maurice
Picard. to say in criticism of Sellars’ Evolutionary Natural -
ism
,
"If, as the author himself avers, in conscious activity
alone we are *on the inside’, evolutionary naturalism might
lead more readily in the direction of pan-psych ism or
Haeckel’s monism. "67 At any rate such statements consider-
ably weaken whatever criticisms Sellars makes of the anthrop-
omorphism of the idealists based on the idea that human cate-
gories are alien to nature. In the final analysis much as
he seeks to reduce mind to a merely physical category, yet
when he considers the facts of consciousness he must at
times admit that it reveals the nature of the real. From
this it is but a step to the admission that personality as
the highest development which nature manifests, as nature’s
highest product it may well disclose the heart of nature as
personal. Much was said in the chapter on the categories
on the status of mind as the fundamental category of reality.
More will be said in the next chapter on the mind-body prob-
lem.
66. Sellars. Phil. Rev.,
47 (1938)7T53
67. Piearci, Jour. Phil.,
19 (1922TTT87.
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Sellars' argement that the idea of a personal agency in
nature is out of harmony with both science and philosophy
will not b6 taken seriously by idealists these days when
there is a definite trend even among scientists in the dir-
ection of theism, and when the electro-magnetic theory of
natter has made it far easier to conceive matter in terms
of energy, as the activity of the Divine Will whose ways of
acting constitute the laws of nature, ^gain confronted both
by the facts of mysticism and the facts of order and design
the theist will not give up in despair to Sellars' insistence
in his earlier popular writings that there is no real evi-
dence for a "superpersonal agency.?-." What he should have
said is that it is not possible to demonstrate the existence
of God logically, nor does He manifest Himself in a physically
visible fashion. Only to the eye of reason and of faith is
God manifest. This is what theism at its best has always
held. Sellars’ chief difficulty seems to arise from con-
ceiving the God of theism in far too anthropomorphic and
external a way. And after all if human persons are agents
in nature, a superhuman person might also be such an agent.
Neither need He be conceived as operating in a crudely ex-
ternal and anthropomorphic fashion.
Finally Sellars' critique of the arguments from order and
design have nothing especially new. As a matter of fact in
trying to show that order is native to the world as a necess-
ary presupposition of the growth of reason he fails to see
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how the presence of an order on the one hand under which
reason can develop and the development of reason on the
other can b6 shown to imply. an Orderer. If th ere were no
Crderer whence this strange correlation which seems to imply
a purposive arrangement?
Why, man, if the whole path and movement of
heaven and all its contents are of like nature
with the motion, revolution, and calculations of
wisdom, and proceed after that kind, plainly we
must say it is the supremely good soul that takes
forethought for the universe and guides it along
that path. 68
Thus Sellars plays into th e hands of the theists. It is easy
for them to turn his argument against his own system.
Moreover, it is very highly questionable if Darwin gave
the teleological argument its "death-blow"
.
Natural selec-
tion is not creative. As Bowne puts it:
When the unfit is defined as unable to survive,
we can readily see that it cannot survive; but the
arrival of the fit, and its arrival in so many
forms, are left quite unaccounted for by the great
principle of natural selection. Yet these arrivals
contain the knot of the problem. A few cases of
arrival and survival may make no impression of pur-
pose, but when the sum of arrivals and survivals is
the orderly system of living. things the case is
different ,o9
(5). Idealists Cannot Explain the Dysteleological Facts
The discussion of the teleological argument always brings
to mind the dysteleological facts along with the teleological.
No idealist can deny that Sellars is right when he says that
there has been and is "devolution as well as evolution’.’
Theists have been more puzzled by the fact of evil than by
anything else. It is a fact which at times leaves even the
68. Plato, Laws, Book X, 9033. 69 . Bowne, MET, 28C
.
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wisest of them dumbfounded. Even Bowne, dogmatist that he
was at times, is humbl6 in the face of the problem of evil:
And here all human wisdom is at an end. The
problem of evil to which these questions belong
admits of no speculative solution at present. We
cannot give up our affirmation of pur-pose, but we
must admit that the purposes of the system are
mostly inscrutable .70
Perhaps the most unusual fact about Sellars’ criticisms
of idealism is that he has so little to say about the problem
of evil—the greatest obstacle to theism. And what Sellars
does say is found almost altogether in his lesser and more
popular writings. In his Next Step in Religion
,
Sellars
insists that the facts of life do not harmonize v/ith the
religious view of the world and of God. ”1 am free to con-
fess that tlieodicies of all sorts strike me as proofs of the
71inapplicability of the religious view of the world.”' And
again he says:
Christianity is on the horns of a terrible dilemma..
God must be totally responsible for all physical
evils, at least; or else he must be thwarted by
something independent of himself, whether this be
an evil spirit or matter Science has helped to
do away with the devil; but in so doing, has it not
also undermined the idea of Providence? Must not
the same arrow transfix an effective God that does
away with an effective Devil?'^
It is interesting to note that Sellars confesses that he
would have ’’less difficulty in believing in a deity” if he
could believe in immortality.^ He also mentions the idea
of a Finite God as a possible wolution which has at times
been suggested, but he does not give it much consideration.^
70. Bowne, MET., 296. 73. Sellars, RCA, 201.
71. Sellars, NSR, 160
.
74. Sellars, NSR, 162-164.
72. Ibid., 159-160.

Many theistic philosophers today are finding an answer to
the problem of evil in the idea of a Finite God.?5
5. Conclusion and Summary
.as was pointed out at the beginning, of the chapter the
struggle between idealistic and naturalistic philosophies
of nature centers about two great central problems, the
nature of things, and the nature of the order which under-
lies the world of things. The naturalist holds that things
are basically non-mental while the idealist contends that
they are of the nature of mind. Again while the naturalist
holds to the independence and self-sufficiency of nature, the
idealist holds that it is dependent upon Objective i. ind.
From a consideration of Sellars’ philosophy of nature as
over against that of the idealists, especially the personal-
istic, and from a consideration of his criticisms two conclu-
sions emerge. First, today as in times past naturalism appears
wholly inadequate as a comprehensive explanation of nature.
Difficult as theism may at times appear, yet one turns back
to it hopefully when it is a matter of choosing between it
and naturalism. Second, idealism can endure criticism and
prosper. For when the most comprehensive and coherent view
of all the facts is taken, the case for idealism far out-
weighs that for naturalism. Mind can explain more facts than
matter. The discussion must now proceed to the important
mind-body problem with which the next chapter will deal.
75. See Brightman, POR, 336-341.
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CHAPTER VII
CRITICISMS OP IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHIES
OF MIND
1. Significance of the Problem
Throughout the dissertation it has been assumed that the
final issue between idealism and naturalism is the mind-
body problem. In the chapter on the categories it was seen
that while mind is the hey category for personal idealism,
the concept of "thinghood" is the chief, the ultimate
category for Sellars’ naturalism. The two concepts of mind
and thing as ultimate stand over against each other in
snarp contrast. In the final analysis one or the other
must be most relevant as tne clue to reality. And if is
in the mind-body relation that the two come into tne most
intimate relationship for the purpose of philosophical
investigation.
Sellars everywhere recognizes the importance of tne mind-
body problem. In Evolutionary Naturalism he says that tne
naturalist feels himself "on his mettle" when he approaches
this problem. 1 "My thinking," he confesses in Critical
Realism, "has, from tne first, been very much influenced by
the mind-body problem. I have always thought that this age-
old problem would be the crucial test of any philosophical
system." 2 Again he s .ys : "It is still—as it always has
been—my opinion that the adequate handling of tne mind-
1. Sellars, EN, 286. 2. Sellars, OR, vii.
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body problem represents tne synthetic stage of any phi-
losophy and is at t;;e same time a supreme test and indi-
cation of its power. In another article he speaks oi it
as the most crucial problem for both science and philoso-
phy. "Here the physical world and mind somehow come to-
gether."^ Finally in ms most important book, '.hie Phi -
losophy of Physical Realism he says, in the very first
sentence of Chapter XV'I, "Consciousness and the Brain-
Mind:" "The questions to be discussed in this chapter are
crucial for naturalism." 0
2.
The Crucial Issue
The crucial issue involved in this most significant of
problems is well stated in the first two sentences of
Chapter XVI of Sellars' Phiiosopny of Physical Realism.
"The questions to be discussed in this chapter are crucial
for naturalism. They sum up to this one, how precisely are
we to tnink of consciousness as in the brain?" 0 With
Sellars' excellent statement of tne crucial issue before us
brief summaries are now in order botn of Sellars' conception
of mind, and also oi those of his chief opponents, tne
personal idealists.
How it was made clear in Chapter III of this dissertation
that Sellars definitely rejects behavioffism. He also
3. Sellars, Phil. Rev.,
47(1938), 461.
4. Sellars, Phil. Rev.
,
27(1918)
,
150.
5. Sellars, PPR, 406.
6. Ibid.
,
406.
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7
rejects parallelism, and interactioxusm. ne makes mind a
physical category, "One 1 under- the -hat 1 theory of mind, as
if is derisively called by both idealists and Cartesian
dualists, makes mind local, emergent, physical ana
p 1 . .
conscious." 0 What then is the significance of consciousness.''
In the first place it does not constitute tne whole of mind
but only a part of it.
Our conclusion is that consciousness is
a feature of mind but by no means tne
whole of mind. It is too evanescent and
passive, too little self-explanatory
,
to
be so considered. It is relative to an
organism and to that organism’s activi-
In the second place consciousness is not a "stuff" nor a
form of energy nor a form of motion but an "event" resting
upon "mind-brain" activity. 1,1 Liore precisely, he states:
"Consciousness is a qualitative dimension of cerebal ac-
tivity."11 In the third place, consciousness is "a denota-
tive term for trie total field of a person’s experiencing
as it snifts and changes." 12 "In consciousness
,
we partici-
pate in the activity of the brain. n1 ^ As such consciousness
is unique because here and here alone the individual is "on
the inside of nature."1^ He knows nature at second hand but
consciousness is sometning that he experiences at first
7. Sellars, PPP, 326-333. 11. Sellars, PPR, 424.
8. Sellars, PPR, 411. 12. Ibid., 406-407.
9. Sellars, EN, 016. 10. ibid., 421.
10. Sellars, PPR, 408, 422, 14. Ibid., 412.
also Phil . Rev
.
,
47 ( 1938) ,484
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hand. In the fourth place consciousness "is not an in-
dependent event hut a feature of a physical event. Ihe
conscious hind of drain event is invariably conscious." 1 ^
Since it is "but a feature of a physical event" conscious-
ness is basically dependent upon brain changes. Sellars has
no place in his system for a consciousness which shows any
independence of the brain, that is, independent in the
sense oi being an entity of a different order acting upon
the brain. In the fifth place Sellars insists that con-
sciousness is efficacious. "Tne conscious self sits in me
watch-tower of tne brain to guide tne organism's behavior."^
This guidance is not from an entity acting externally upon
the brain, but rather acting from witnin as a part of brain
process, a certain aspect of brain process directing tne
rest. This is how he seeks to escape determinism by ground-
ing freedom as it is experienced within the brain itself.
We are led to reject the dualist's
notion that consciousness is something
which is forced to insert itself causal-
ly from tne outside into the brain in a
transeunt fashion, llo; we have here to
do with immanent causality, with
functioning. '
Consciousness by itself has no efficacy. It never occurs
merely by itself. It always occurs in relation to something
else. And for Sellars this something else is always tne
non-mental physical brain 'process of which consciousness
16. oellars, PER, 424. 17. Cellars, Phil. Rev.,
16. Sellars
,
EN, 218. 47(1928), 482.
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is an aspect. "It is obvious that we can not assign efficacy
to consciousness by itself, since it is merely a feature
of the cortical event. The causal reality is the conscious
physiological process."18 "By itself, no feature of
consciousness has efficacy, for it is an abstraction." 1 ^
Consequently , in the sixth place
#
consciousness is regarded
as intrinsic to tne physical system, the brain. "In snort,
make consciousness intrinsic to tne brain event, and its
efficacy cannot conflict with tne facts of physiology and
behaviourism." 88 This of course raises the question if
consciousness is intrinsic to the brain, and but a feature
of a brain event why is this not evident in our experience?
For as a matter of fact one never experiences a brain move-
ment, but a thought or feeling something altogether different
from a brain movement. Sellars attempts to explain tnis
strange fact in terms of his "double-knowledge" theory. Man
knows consciousness and tne facts of conscious experience
at first nand, an absolutely unique thing occurring nowhere
else in the whole realm of nature. But he knows tne brain
and all physical facts only at second hand. Hence ne cannot
possibly discern the ontological linkage of the "brain-
mind." "We are precluded from witnessing tne ontological
linkage of consciousness in the brain." 81
18. Sellars
,
Phil. Rev.
,
20. Sellars
,
rPP, 382.
47 ( 1958
)
,
483. 21. Sellars Phil. Rev.
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19. Sellars rPR, 439. 27(1918)
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We have knowledge of the “brain but no
intuition of the stuff of the brain, tnat
is, no vision of what physically is .
Consciousness, on the one nand, is a
term for data open to inspection and
analysis. Of it, alone, do we have
acquaintance. It follows tnat the setting
of consciousness in the brain cannot be
given in tne same way that the psychical
is given. In other words by tne very
nature of the case we are precluded from
witnessing the ontological linkage of
consciousness with tne being oi the
cerebral process. The situation is
unique. Only in consciousness does nature
know itself. Tne world as idea is in the
brain.
But one of the most interesting ideas of dellars is nis
contention that consciousness is extended and as such
spatial
.
I would assert, then, tnat the extensity
of sense-data and of spatial experience
in general is grounded in the extensity
of tne cerebral patterns to whicn they
are intrinsic. They are participatively
as extended ontologically as the patterns
of which they are features. ^
I hold that the psychical can be
extended ontologically in the same sense
that an activity or an event can be.
That is, it can permeate, and be integral
to, a process which is as extended as
tne physical system which is its locus.
^
Again he says in Critical Realism :
Consciousness is in the brain in the
sense that iu is part of the nature of
tne brain when it is functioning; it is
what we have called a functional variant
oi tne cortex. As such, there is no
valid reason to deny tnat consciousness
22. dellars, EIJ, 210.
22. dellars, PPR, 427.
24 . Ibid
. ,
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is an extended manifold. It arises in
and is effective in tne pnysical world.
Its unity is that of the integrative
activity of tne drain which it helps to
direct, hence, it is as extended as the
drain is. 0
Sellars thinks that by ueans of this peculiar theory of
the extensidleness of consciousness that he can save him-
self from dualism. "Consciousness is extended after its
kind... This implication of our analysis enables us to breax
with the Cartesian contrast detween tne extended and tne
unextended . Sellars then regards mind as physical and
consciousness as an aspect of mind and as sucn an event in
a physical system. Consciousness is wholly grounded in and
at the mercy of the physical and beyond the physical, be-
yond matter there is nothing. Consciousness is nothing but
a quality of matter which emerges under certain favorable
conditions when a certain type of organization has been
effected
.
The best our reason can do--it seems to
me--is to ground consciousness in this
basic qualitativeness of all substance,
r-ere is its emergent potentiality, we
cannot inspectively trace it in a genetic
way, for tne last term alone is open to
inspection. But I can see no reason to
assume a complete discontinuity. Consciousr
ness, as I see it, is adjectival, ex-
pressive, intrinsic to functional activi-
ty. If emergent causality signifies tne
generation of high-order substances we
must expect basic novelties. ^
25. Bellars, OH, 247.
26. Bellars, Phil . Hev.,
47(1938), 477.
27.
Bellars, mil . Hev.
,
vj <3 -i- J. Cf J- O y n. J.1X -i. • XV
52(1943), 25-267
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Personal ide .lists, both of the ahsolutistic and of the
non-absolutistie types, differ from cellars in two respects.
First, they regard consciousness not as one aspect of mind
but as of the very essence of mind. "The essence of mind,”
says Hocking, "is thinking." 2® Obviously this definition of
mind as given by nocking is too narrov/ly intellectualistic
,
yet it stands in sharp contrast to tnat of oellars, for
thinking along with memory is conscious process. Brigntman
defines mind or self as "any conscious experience or process
taken as a whole and as experiencing itself." 29 And again
he says: "The self is indeed confined to conscious ex-
perience; it is no unconscious entity or mere capacity."®0
Finally he says: "Hind is consciousness. All experience,
from the rawest sensation to the most intellectual reason-
ing, is the realm of mind."®-** It is evident that Brightmads
definition is more adequate because it covers not only
thinking but all other aspects of mind such as perception,
memory, and willing. And this leads to the second great
difference between Sellars' conception and that of the
personal idealists. Instead of reducing mind to a physical
category, a mere aspect of things idealists regard things
as an aspect of mind
,
and botn mind and tilings as two
orders resting ultimately upon the activity of Objective
Hind which creates and imparts to both tneir distinctive
28. Hocking, TOP, 97. 00. Ibid., 192.
29. Brigntman, ITP, 191. 31. Brightman, POI
,
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natures.. In the words of Hocking: "God tnen is immediately
known, and permanently known, as the Other Mind which in
creating Nature is also creating me."^
The personalists as over against the personali stic
absolutists lay more stress upon trie uniqueness of the
individual consciousness as in a real sense separate from
its Creator wnile of course ultimately dependent upon Him.
They also tend to set mind or consciousness in sharper
contrast to nature and to tnat part of nature whicn exists
as the immediate environment of mind, namely the body and
its brain. Consequently, as over against the absolutists,
they incline toward a relative dualism. Mind and body are
two definitely distinct orders, absolutely irreducible to
each other, yet so formed as to be capable of interaction.
Hence personalists for the most part are definitely inter-
actionists. After dismissing various other theories,
Brightman says
:
Interactionism is tne only other theory
tnat nas been proposed. It is the belief
tnat mind and body act on each other;
that sometimes tne initiative comes from
one side, and sometimes from the other. This
is what the common man takes for granted;
and for once he may be right'. 30
Similarly Bowne points out:
The physical and mental series are
separate and incommensurable; it is
conceivable, however, that there should
be a correspondence between them, such
32. mocking, HGHE, 297. 33. Brightman, ITP, 204.
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that a given state of the one should
always attend a given state of the other.
^
Hocking criticizes interactionism as out of accord with ex-
perience, the experience 01 the felt unity of mind and body,
and hence adopts a monism whicn is in accord with his
absolutism . 00 Brightman, on the other nano, contends that
interactionism is in accord with experience.
Experience speaks in favor of inter-
actionism. If tne word cause has any
meaning, it is just as true that we
observe causal relations between mental
and physical states as that we observe
tnem within tne physical series. °°
At this juncture it will be well to consider an interest-
ing solution of the mind-body problem suggested by L. Harold
De./olf in an article in f_ne Philosophical lorum
,
entitled,
"Toward a Conciliation of ^ersonalism and Behaviorism."
First of all, he makes it clear tnat ne is in no sense to
be considered a behaviorist, as far as the metaphysical
issue is concerned.
To reconcile personalism with all the
doctrines commonly taught by behaviorists
is obviously impossible. The personalists
are agreed in stressing the reality of
purpose and the validity of moral obli-
gation. Sucu teachings are incompatible
with tne behaviorists' assertion tnat
every bit of human behavior is completely
determined bj causal laws. Moreover, tne
\ personalists insist on the reality of
consciousness as observed by intro-
spection, while John ,/atson and tue.more
34. Bowne, MET,, 370.
35. nocxing, TOP, 233-236
56. Brigntraan, ITP, 205
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radical of nis disciples flatly deny
that consciousness is real. 0 '
The essence of hr. De./olfs view is this- -that even as
personalises do not object to describing the Divine Activi-
ty in nature in terms of physical process, without reducing
the Divine to physical process, so they should not object
to describing the human mind likewise, in so far as it is
externally observable, in terms of bodily process.
/
It is difficult to see why personalists
have not anticipated the behaviorist
doctrine that a man’s mind can be described
in terms of physical categories, it
would seem an almost necessary element
in their own theory. lor they contend
that God and man are both minds, each
appearing to himself as a stream of
consciousness. But then they say that
in man's sense experience the very mind
of God appears as the spatially ordered
events which we call the physical world,
how if this is true, is it not probable
that man's mind, too, will appear to the
senses of otner men as a form oi physical
activity?
It seems strange that any idealist
should believe that God's active
consciousness strikes human beings as
a system of physical events, and yet
should view with horror the thought that
human consciousness strimes other human
beings as a system ox physical events.
A double-aspect theory oi od, such as
\ personalists hold, would seem to suggests
strongly a double-aspect theory of man. 00
However much personalists may vary from personalistic
absolutists, and however much personalists may vary among
-themselves as far as individual interpretations of the
27. DeWolf, Phil, for., 38. Ibid., 4.
£(1944)
,
2.

difficult mind-body relation are concerned, yet as over
against naturalists such as Cellars they all hold in common
that mind is the fundamental category. They nold that nature
must be interpreted in terms of mind, not mind in terms of
nature, noth nature and mind are of course basically mental
as proceeding from a common source, but txiey have a
different status, mind, by virtue of its attributes,
affords the best and most adequate principle of ultimate
explanation. As Hocking puts it: "Tne idealist believes
that our alternatives are really but two; we must ei trier
explain mind by physical nature, or we must explain physi -
cal nature by mind . And since we nave found tne former
impossible .. .we must adopt the latter."*^ "Materialism,"
says Brightman, "models its universe on physical tnings;
tne new realism on universals; idealism on consciousness."^
And again he says: "Idealism is the belief that mind or
consciousness is the truly real, and tnat everything exists
only in relation to mind."4^ The crucial question then is,
as was stated at the beginning of this section, »/nat is tne
natqre of consciousness? Is it but an aspect of a pnysical
system, the brain, or is it sometning other and greater--
tne clue to the nature of tnings? Sellars insists tnat it is
but an aspect of the brain, of a physical system while all
personal idealists insist tnat it is of such a nature as to
29. Hocking, TOP, 247-248. 41. Ibid., 226.
4J. Brightman, ITP
,
226.
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furnish man’s best clue to reality. rfith this basic
difference before us a discussion of Sellars' specific
criticisms of idealistic philosophies of mind is now in
order
.
One further word, however, is in order before Sellars'
specific criticisms are considered. Tne dissertation
concerns itself primarily with Sellars' criticisms of
personal idealism, because relative to the mind-body problem
the crucial issue lies between his naturalism and personal
idealism. Impersonal idealists such as Bradley are even
more radical in their criticisms of mind than oellars. As
far as tne mind-body problem is concerned then, the issue
seems to lie not only between naturalists and personal
idealists, as was stated above, but equally between personal
idealists and all irapersonalists
.
3. Sellars' Criticisms of Interactionism
Most of Sellars' criticisms of idealistic conceptions of
mind are directed against interactionism, though all ideal-
istp are not necessarily int eractionists in tne strict sense
of tne word. nocAin- criticizes interactionism as has been
seen, and DeVitoIf does not draw tne distinction between
mind and body nearly as sharply as do interactionists such
as Brightman and Bowne.
Scattered throughout Sellars' many writings one finds not
less than seven criticisms of interactionism. Ihe first of
f.
.
c
,
•
_
•
.
-
•
•
•
these is the usual argument employ eu hy impersonalists
based upon trie fragmentary nature of consciousness ana tne
instability of tne self. The gist of tne argument is simply
that tne self or consciousness cannot be an order in any
sense distinct from the physical series ana coxiceived as
interacting with it because consciousness is too easily
affected by the least cnange in conditions. _his Cellars
would say, is a matter of indubitable fact ana is ratal to
interactionism, and in fact not only to interactionism but
to the total idealistic viewpoint as well.
Consciousness , is so evanescent, seeming-
ly so little conserved, that it scarcely
strikes our reflection as being tne
foundation of the gigantic processes of
the paysi cal world, Prevent oxygen from
being conveyed to tne brain, and we
faint and lose consciousness. It is
something unsubstantial, something
qualitative rather than quantitative. 4^
Again relative to trie instability of the self he says: "The
’I’ is, however, not a stable entity. It enlarges itself
at times with trie full content of trie 'me,' and at other
times diminished to not much more than tne felt bodily
presence.
"
43 Again he says: "In truth, it is very probable
that the assurance of personal identity depends in a large
measure upon the sameness of tne objects with which we
deal."44
A second criticism is that interactionism rests on out-
42. deliars, PIP, 335-336.
45. Sellars, Cii, 97.
44. Ibid., 93.
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grown traditional assumptions. There are three of these,
first, '’the acceptance of a dead-level, unevolutionary view
of the physical world” which made it impossible to conceive
the physical as the source of the mental
,
second, dualistic
animism coming down through man's religious heritage from
the savage, and third Cartesian dualism as the philosophic
expression of the first two assumptions.^ "Evolutionary
naturalism does not believe that the higher levels of nature
are purely mechanical; it accepts critical points with
resultant new properties. I1he struggle between animism and
naturalism centers here."4 ^ Again he says in criticism of
Cartesian dualism:
Thus my position differs from Descartes,
first, in the enlargement of the concept
of the physical world as regards texture
and content, and, second, in consequent
ability to locate consciousness in it.
From these differences it follows that
the Cartesian motives for an immaterial
soul no longer are valid. 4 '
Closely related to the criticism that interactionism
rests on traditional assumptions which have been outgrown
is the contention that tnere are four motives which lead
to interactionism. The first, the "epistemological , "express-
es itself in the assumption that the physical world "is
exhaustively revealed in the knowledge gained by tne
sciences." Since tne physical world is therefore regarded
as mechanical and quantitative there is obviously no place
45. sellars, Phil, Rev.,
27(1918), 151-152.
46. cellars, M, 292.
47. Sellars
,
PPR, 429.

for mind in it. nonce a "separate realm" must be found for
mind, and the result is the dualism whicn interac tionism
assumes. The second is the "categorical" which expresses
itself in the disparity between the content of the .know-
ledge gained by the physical sciences, mass, energy, space,
size, shape, behavior, and the categories of introspective
psychology, content, fusion, association, recall, attention
Faced with this disparity the mind naturally turns to dual-
ism. The third, the "methodological," reflects the methods
and interests of the pnysical sciences in contrast with
introspective psychology and thus continues the categorical
motive. The fourth, "the theological
t
"has been influential
since the beginning of 'philosophy and has suggested the
notion of spiritual substance "co-equal with matter and
having consciousness as its attribute." Sellars tninks that
these jmotives can be "turned aside" by his "double .knowledge
approach to which consideration has already been given.
uy argument is, that two xinds and
directions of knowledge separate for
tne knower tne indissolubly connected,
let me put tne situation as I under-
stand. Suppose consciousness were in
the brain as a changing flow of quale
s
,
and that, in it ana by it, the individual
had knowledge about tne brain, on tne
one hand, and of it, on tne otner; would
not the situation be exactly that
indicate- by tne above motives? We
should expect the categories of two kinds
of knowledge to differ fundamentally and,
if tne first kind of knowledge were
regarded as entirely penetrative, we

should he lea into dualism. 48
* A third criticism of Sellars is his contention tnat for
interactionism consciousness exists as sometning apart from
and external to the organism, this assumption Sellars
insists is absurd, for consciousness apart from an organ-
ism is an abstraction. 48 But personalists would not take
this argument seriously, because they do not think of
consciousness as existing without relationsnip to an
organism, an "environment.” 88 "The personalist believes
that tne organism is to the human individual an order of
experience, and in itself an activity of God." And it is
conceivable that even after death that tne mind may still
exist in relationship to an organism, in the sense of a
different order of experience than the present order which
is called matter. 8^
A fourth criticism is the contention that to regard
consciousness as distinct from the physical brain-processes
is to do violence to the essential unity of tne functioning
organism. Sellars charges that tne int eractionist makes of
consciousness a self-existent substance which acts u'pon
the neural processes externally and mechanically. 82 But, as
a matter of fact, he insists, the organism is not a duality
but an indissoluble unity. 88 Above all else cellars se.eks
43. Sellars, Arist. Soc. 51. DeWolf
,
Phil. Por.
Proc
.
,
22(1922)
,
58. 2(1944), 6.
49. Sellars, PPR, 489, 440. 52. Sellars, GR
,
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to avoid a dualism as far as the mind-body problem is
ooncerned. In his Critical Realism in describing the de-
velopment of his thinking in the direction of realism, with
the mind-body problem in mind he admits
:
There can be no doubt that constant
brooding over this tantalizing question
exerted a pressure on me in the direction
of realism and, at the same time,
controlled my thinking. How could 1
obtain a realism without a dualism?
°
4
This was his problem, and he solved it by making conscious-
ness simply an aspect, a qualitative aspect, of the funda-
mental underlying physical processes of the brain. Inter-
actionists think that he achieved his end at tne cost of
doing violence to tne facts, some of which will be con-
sidered in the criticism at tne end of the chapter, more-
over except for tne Cartesians Sellars' argument, tnat
int eradtionists do violence to the essential fact of tne
unity of the organism, is not of necessity valid. Liodern
interactioni sts do not regard the mind as something external
to the body, but as essentially correlated witn it by tne
plan and purpose of the Creator, and as proof of inter-
actioni sm they appeal to experience wnicn every conscious
moment adds additional evidence.^ ..xoreover interactionists
of the personalistic type reject tne idea of the soul as
a self-existent substance. Tney tnink of it rather as the
conscious self which every moment of consciousness is in
54. Sellars, CR, vii . 55. Brigntman, ITP, 201-207.

direct relationship with the body, its medium or instru-
ment. And the self is not conceived as owing its being to
a mysterious substratum in which it inheres, but rather as
directly dependent upon God who is the Author of both mind
and body.^ 6 This view it would seem provides for the unity
which Sellars wants to perserve without doing violence to
mind by reducing it to the status of a mere aspect of
things
.
In the fifth place, Sellars contends tnat interactionism
is unempirical. Three criticisms may conveniently be
considered under tnis general neading. First, in both nis
Evolutionary naturalism written in 1922, and in Principles
and Problems of philosophy written in 1926 he uses the old
argument from the conservation of energy. "The brain-event
acts upon tne soul, and tne soul reacts; and so the physi-
cal system ceases to be self-contained.
The objection which science has
usually advanced concerns tne conser-
vation of energy. For modern science,
energy is neither lost nor gained but
merely transformed. Yet here is tne
hypothesis; the brain-event acts upon
the soul and so energy disappears from
the physical world into an immaterial
world. And, in volition, just the re-
verse happens. But such an open boundary
of a physical system is auite opposed
to tne ideas of science . °°
But wnile malting use of this argument in the two booics
56. Bowne, MET., 339, 379.
57. Sellars, BIT, 291.
58. Sellars, PPP, 329.
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mentioned above it is interesting to note that in his
earlier booh, Critical Realism, he admits that this argu-
ment is far from conclusive and in fact goes so far as to
say:
We shall not lay stress on the hackneyed
argument against interactionism based on
the principle of the conservation of
energy. Were this principle all that
stood in the way, it could not be ad-
judged a sufficient obstacle. The real
obstacle which interactionism must meet
is the justification of a soul.° 9
This leads to the second criticism namely tnat as far as
the empirical evidence is concerned the thinxer has no
right to assume the existence of a soul that the brain is
not adequate to perform all tnat the soul is supposed to.
In his Evolutionary naturalism he asks wnat right the
thinker has to suppose that the brain cannot periorm these
functions. And in Critical Realism he challenges the
whole idea of the existence of tne soul on empirical
grounds
.
The real obstacle which interactionism
must meet is the justification of a
soul. We know nothing of a mind or soul
substance coordinate with the physical
world. Experience indicates conscious-
ness » the mind and tne pnysical* The
question is: How are they related? Until
it is proved that they cannot be united
without a dualism, theories, line iDarallelrs
ism and interactionism, are out of order.®1
Here it is obvious again tnat when Sellars speaks of tne
59. Sellars, CR, 229. 61. Sellars, OR, 229.
60. Sellars, EH, 292.
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soul he means the old substantial soul wnich personalists
would freely grant him cannot be found. The only soul, as
has been pointed out before, that personalism recognizes
is the conscious self. "This soul," says Bowne, "is neither
in the heights nor in the depths; it is very nigh indeed,
for it is simply the living self."^ It is this soul, the
personalist would insist, vhich carries out the functions
whicn deliars assigns to the brain. And tne fundamental
reason for affirming its existence as sometning other tnan
the brain is simply that every moment of conscious existence
cries out against Sellars' conclusion that the brain a
physical object and organ can perform functions sucn as
thinhing and willing and remembering which seem clearly to
belong to a different order of beings "That brain and
\
nervous system are environment and not mind itself is
evident from the fact that most of the time tne mind is not
even conscious of having a brain and nervous system. gut
Montague has given the best answer to Sellars. Pirst of all
he explores tne brain with the "untutored eye" and finds
it "a slippery and complicated object with strange convo-
lutions on the outside and queer caverns within" and with
strange connections with all parts of the body, next he
explores it with the trained anatomist and physiologist and
finds it an organ of undreamed-of complexity with "its
62 . Bowne
,
MET
,
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65. Brightman, POI
,
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millions oi interconnected neuronic elements” organized in
hierarchies of sensori-raotor arcs,” "the more or less well
marked levels of these hierarcnies” corresponding "most
instructively to the successive levels oi cerebral develop
ment displayed by the species in their evolutionary ascent
But in order to get closer yet he next views the brain
through the eyes of the cnemist.
Viewed through the eyes of the cnemist
the cerebral landscape undergoes a
rather curious change. In place of organ-
ized hierarchies involving tne whole
organism or large tracts of it, we get
multitudes of narrowly localized chemical
reactions. The atoms in the complex
organic molecules are continually dis-
solving their associations and forming
new ones....lor tne cnemist, tne nervous
system and the rest of tne body is a
vast conglomerate ox comparatively
independent and separate processes, in
^perpetual interaction with one another,
to be sure, but lacking the benefit of
any presiding genius or controlling
organic structure. 00
Finally in his search for the ultimate structure of tne
brain he views it through the eyes of the physicist.
For us it is sufficient to view the
brain as a swarm of cjuintillions ox tiny
particles, pushing and pulling each other
about and continously moving with in-
credible velocities in all directions.
This is the physicist’s picture of the
brain . 00
Montague rightly asks the naturalist the embarassing
question
:
64. Montague, G8D, 40-42. 66. Ibid., 45.
65. Ibid.
,
42-45.
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Where in this picture can we find the
Gestalt
,
the ground for the self-regulat-
ing and self-perpetuating unity of
pattern that aoes so surely pervade the
nervous system as a whole? And where
indeed can we find in these scudding
clouds of spatially separate particles,
with their motions governed by the
beautifully simple laws of attraction
and repulsion, any basis or grohnd for
explaining the thing called mind--the
hidden thing, stored with rich and
cummulative memories of events txiat no
longer exist, and capable of purposeful
actions directed to what does not yet
exist
'
Montague rightly concludes: "Surely in tne light oi this
intimate 'close-up 1 oi the brain the chance of reducing the
mind to a bodily adjective seems rather remote. Sellars
of course would reply that the reason that the brain is
capable of all the functions which idealists attribute to
mind is because of the marvelous organization of tne brain.
To this tne idealist may well reply that this very organi-
zation itself cannot be explained by naturalists, that
organization on such a vast scale and in such a delicate
and marvelous manner as one finds in the brain can only be
explained in terms of tne plan and purpose of Objective
Mind. Moreover that organization of itself cannot be con-
ceived of as creating thought, that tne organization of the
brain rather looks like a marvelous instrument made for the
use of mind. Montague compares tne body and its brain to a
67. Montague, OSD, 46. 63. I Did .
,
46.
--
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delicate musical instrument made ior tne use of mind. 69
Sellars' third criticism on emijirical and scientific
grounds is tne contention that tne mind is wholly dependent
upon the organism. In his Philosophy of Physical Realism in
speaking of mind he says : "It has become attached to tne
organism, absorbed by it, in some sense spatial." w And
again he says: "The emergent evolutionist with nis belief
in the significance of organization regards thinking as a
nervous operation." Similarly in Evolutionary Naturali sm
he contends:
Is it not truer to tne empirical facts,
and simpler, to say that in instances of
intelligent behavior we know now the
organism behaves and that, until tne
contrary is proved, the conditions of
this behavior must be asigned to tne
organism? Is there anything in the facts
which demands tne assumption of two
objects of knowledge? My conclusion is
that knowledge of what mind does is
really knowledge about the organism.
T-he burden of proof rests on dualism. ^
Referring Sellars back to ...ontague's interesting analysis
the personalist would insist tnat mind cannot be reduced
to a mere aspect of physical process, that tne organism
consisting ultimately of particles of matter in motion
offers no satisfactory explanation for tne facts of mind.
Moreover he would also remind Sellars tnat tne idealist is
really tne most empirical, for as Sellars himself admits
69. montague
,
OSD, 26-28.
70. Sellars, PPR, 411.
71. Ibid., 429.
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mind is always known at first hand, train and organism at
second hand, and these latter always and only in terms of
the former. This seems to indicate the greater reality of
the former.
A sixth criticism which Sellars makes is closely related
to the charge that interactionism is unempirical, the argu-
ment just discussed in its three aspects. The sixtn criti-
cism is tne use of ’'Occam's Hazor"-- ,TWhy multiply entities?
Why multiply entities if tne drain and
the self have analogous abilities and if
epistemology indicates simply two kinds
of knowing having in all likahood, the
same ultimate objective?'^
Though the idealist might freely admit that as far as
_
external appearances are concerned it does seem that tne
operations of mind are merely bodily and physical, yet he
need not admit that this is the whole story. The facts of
introspection are against such a superficial interpretation
Sellars himself in his "double knowledge" theory admits
that knowledge of consciousness is knowledge at first hand,
wnile knowledge of the brain and body and all physical
systems is knowledge at second hand. In justice to him it
must be said that he speaks of knowledge of participating
in brain process as being knowledge at first hand.. "In my
consciousness, I am literally a participant in that brain
which physical science can know only by a descriptive
73. cellars, rhil. Rev.,
47(1938)
,
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translation."^4 "If ray theory is correct we are, in
consciousness, in some measure participants in -tne actual
75process of the brain-mind." But as a matter of fact in
consciousness one is aware only of consciousness as it-
self efficacious, not as a mere function of brain. "That
brain and nervous system are environment and not mind it-
self is evident from the fact that most of the time the
mind is not even conscious of having a brain and nervous
system." The deepest truth seems to be that mind is
itself directly experienced as mind, as something other
than body and brain and yet in vital relationship to these.
The external appearances indeed would maXe it appear that
the functions of the hidden mind are merely bodily simply
because the body is the medium or organ through which mind
must express itself. This view can be said to be superior
because it explains both the facts of introspection to
which Sellars' view does not do full .justice, and also the
facts of external observation, hence tne interactionist
could well answer Cellars 1 question, "Why multiply entities
by reminding him that on the other nand one must not be
sparing in nis principles or entities if tne facts demand
it. The chiei difficulty with naturalism is that it does
not give due consideration to all the facts, especially tne
facts of introspection which are more direct, immediate and
74. Sellars, Proc. Arist. 75. Ibid., 70.
Son
. ,
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evident than the facts of external observation.
Finally Sellars insists that interactionism is incon-
ceivable. He is concerned about such questions as whence
the soul and how does it know when and where to act upon
7 7the brain to produce tne desired results.
'
V/e seem to ourselves to have gained
some measure of insight into physical
processes, but we are nonplussed in any
attempt to understand how a soul can
regulate physical processes from out-
side. The contact of tne two is like
the thought of a round square. The idea,
itself, is not self-contradictory; it is
just vague and puzzling.
The idealist would first of all insist again that he does
not conceive the soul as something mysterious operating
from the outside, but simply as tne conscious self inter-
acting with the physical system to which it is related;
and he would further insist that wonderful and mysterious
and puzzling as tne interaction of mind with body may seem
yet it is less puzzling than to conceive simple systems
like whirling atoms as tne cause of mind.
Finally, interactionism, like vitalism,
must postulate an agency peculiarly well
informed about tne brain and its paths.
This agency must know what nerve to
quiet and what nerve to excite. It must
be like a pilot or a pianist in this
respect. The empirical self does not
have this knowl edg
e
.
The idealist would quite agree that ’’the empirical self
77. Sellars, BN, 291.
78. Sellars, PPP, 320.
79.
Sellars, rPP, 230.

does not have this knowledge."
This is a real difficulty so long as
mind and body are regarded as belonging
to utterly different orders of being.
But if we... regard body itself as the
expression of a Supreme -and
,
the
difficulty vanishes; for the problem
of interaction between mind and body
becomes the problem of the interaction
between human minds and the Supreme
mind, and nature is, as Berkeley says,
tne divine language.
'u
Sellars' chief difficulty seems to be that he conceives
modern int eractionists as holding with Descartes tnat mind
and matter are entirely different from one another, tnat
mind is something mysterious and foreign and external some-
how projecting itself into the brain and causing all of its
movements in some strange way to correspond with its
desires and purposes. But this is to misunderstand the
modern idealistic interactionist . -.e conceives both orders
as distinct as hand and glove and yet so fitted together
/
by the Supreme Hind upon which both orders rest, as to be
capable of making all tne necessary adjustments whicn
interaction demands. The idealist holds that mysterious as
this is, still it is far less mysterious than to conceive
mind as but an aspect of matter; and that when one is
confronted witn two mysteries a greater and a lesser he had
better take the lesser. .
4. Sellars' Critique of hocxcing
8u. Brigntman, ITP, 205.

In his Philosophy of Physical Realism (pp. 443-426)
Sellars subjects Hocking' s conception ox rnina as found in
his Types of fnilo sophy (pp. 98-100) to an interesting
series of criticisms. Sellars first states each proposition
as made hy rocking and then proceeds to criticize each in
its turn. In the dissertation Sellars 1 procedure will be
followed.
"(l)
.
The mind observes itself; the brain does not. Hence
the superiority of the mind over any merely physical
on
thing.” 0 his criticism of Hocking is simply that the
latter ''substantializes tne mind apart from the brain” in
speaking of "the 'mind' as observing itself."^ 2 In so doing
Hocking involves nimself in an unnecessary dualism, a dual-
ism vmich Sellars thinks he happily escapes by means of his
"double-knowledge" approach. The mind is known at first
hand as a series which is seemingly unique, and the brain
is known at second hand, and tnus a dualism is set up.
"Philosophy must press deeper and grasp the brain as active
O rz
directional and conscious ."00 In other words to excape
dualism the thinker must go deeper than the direct experi-
ence of mind and this indirect second-hand knowledge of the
brain and in so doing it will be readily seen that after
all it is only tne brain that is conscious. But it is
extremely doubtful whether Sellars is justified in so doing-
81. Sellars, PPR, 423. See also 82. Sellars, PPR, 433.
Hocking, TOP, 98. 82. Ibid., 434.
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for there does not seem to be anything beyond consciousness
,
no deeper fact, and everything seems to be given in terms
of consciousness. It seems as though the idealist is more
logical in assuming the relative duality of thought and
tning but finding their ultimate ground in unity in the
Supreme Consciousness • Naturalists try to find unity too
near the surface. They do not press deep enough.
"(2). The brain is in space; the mind is not. If it were,
where could it be? Is the mind in the head? Is the thought
of a cube a cubic thought?"^ Sellars tries to answer
Hocking by asserting his theory of tne identity of mind and
brain and tne resulting spatiality of mind. "The mind as a
continuant is the brain and tne brain is spatial and in
space relations with other systems." What is involved here
is a different definition of mind. ITor Hocking as was noted
earlier in this chapter "the essence of mind is thinking,"
and thought as such can hardly be called spatial. A thought
cannot be measured, cut to pieces., perceived with the
physical eye as a brain cell can. However if the whole
mental process is reduced to an aspect of brain movement
it follows logically that tne mind is extended and spatial.
But Sellars v/ill still have consciousness on his nands
which stubbornly refuses to allow itself to be reduced xo
physical terms as Hocking contends.
84. Sellars, PPH, 404. See also
Hocking, TOP, 98.

"(3). The brain is in the present only, tne mind is
extended in time to the past and the future. Uothing can
locate an image in the past except a mind which holds tns
past before it."30 Sellars is justified in the following-
criticism of hocking’ s careless use of terms:
To say that mind is extended in time to
the past and the future is a careless way
of saying that a present act of knowing-
claims to know what may happen in the
future or what has happened in tne past.
. . .The mind does not literally extend
to the future and the past. It thinks
the future and the past.... I would say
that Hocking is talxing nonsense if he
suggests that we literally locate an
image in the past. 00
What Hocking should nave aone is to point to the power of
mind to think the past and to explore tne future and tnus
to link past, present and future together in one flash of
thought. he might also have pointed to the power of mind to
perserve its unity amid change and thus in a little way at
least transcend time.
"(4). The brain is a set of facts; tne mind is a set of
facts and tneir meanings » In tne brain there are facts but
no meanings
.
,/e need not linger upon this objection
since it merely rests on the assumption
that consciousness is not intrinsic to
the brain, nocking admits that connections,
redintegrations
,
conditionings are de-
veloped by the brain, but affirms that
85. Sellars, PPH, 454. See
also Hocking, TOP, 99.
86. Sellars, PPH, 434-455.
87. Sellars, PPH, 435. See
also Hocking, TOP, 99.
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these are not meanings. In otner words,
be desires to limit meaning to the inner
experience which comprehends together,
in the way of sign and that signified,
objects of thought....! am persuaded
that this hind of meaning connection in
my thought is founded on mental oper-
ations of an integrative sort. There is
a brain-raina organization bach of
meaning-experiences. ^
Thus Sellars in endeavoring to answer Hocking re-affirms
his naturalistic creed that the mental is an aspect of the
physical. But the differences between the two -which hocking
points out still remain--the chasm which no naturalist can
bridge. There is a vast difference between the mind’s idea
of the brain, and the brain. The brain is of the order of
facts only whose changes mind can study, but mind is also
of the order of meanings--it is capable both of knowing
and of being known. The great truth in Sellars’ view seems
to be that mind as such is not independent and self-
sufficient but that it rests and has its basis in some-
thing beyond itself, sometning more abiding than the
flickering candle of human consciousness. Sellars' basic
fallacy seems to be that of making matter, the basis of
mind and all trie order and organization and glory of the
universe
.
5. Conclusion
In conclusion it may be well to point out that cella-rs'
endeavor to reduce mind to the level of a physical category.
88. Sellars, PPH, 485.
. ^
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to a mere aspect of matter lias .iOt succeeded., especially
in tiie light of llontague's damaging analysis of the brain.
It seems impossible that whirling atoms could ever of
themselves have given birth to mind. It may be well to
point out some of these aspects of mind to which Sellars
does not do full justice.
first, he does not do full justice to the fact of the
uniqueness of mind as imower . The thought series stands
out in experience over against the thing series, mind can
loiow things, things cannot comprenend mind. *..oreover things
come in terms of thought, not thought in terms of things.
Thought is primary, as Cellars himself admits, things
secondary. Thought and things are related it cannot be
denied. Tilings to a remarkable degree condition thought,
but thought also affects and uses things. And since tnings
can be conceived only in terms of thought, and sinae by
virtue of this fact as well as by virtue of the organi-
zation and order which tuey display they seem to be
products of ilind--then the fact of the human mind's de-
pendence urion things may have a deeper meaning. It may
mean only that in the final analysis mind is not dependent
upon things conceived as substantial and non-mental, but
upon an Order that sustains both minds and things. If this
is true, as it seems to be when all the facts are con-
sidered, then tne materialist's contention that minds,

xnowers are but aspects of
tilings is underlined.
Then in the second place
the non-spatial aspects of
things and at the mercy of
Sellars does not do justice to
mind, how it may well he that
mind is as extended as the organisms through which it
functions. Materialists are not the only ones who hold this
view. This seems to he the implication of DelVolf 1 a inter-
esting conception of body "as a system of physical events"
through which mind expresses itself and maxes contact with
other bodies and with the physical order. Similarly
Montague insists that mind is extended, and as a matter of
fact is partially physical.
Suppose, however, that res cogitans
,
instead of being hopelessly alien to
the material world, were what I believe
it to be--a field of potential energies
within the world? Then, no matter how
faint or attentuated such a field might
be, it would be not only possible but
necessary that any and all energies
traversing it should be in some degree
causally modified by it.... Though physi-
cal in its constitution, it would function
as a spiritual substance--a veritable
res cogitans within the larger re
extensa. 90
The mind is a very complicated and
special hind of physical field . The mind
is an organism within an organism. It is
attached to the brain and pervades it,
and if it is a field, it is not one whose
primary function is tne direct forming of
material structures ... .Its stuff is the
stuff of memory, tne accunulateu traces
89. DeV/olf, Phil, lor.,
£(1944)
,
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of sensations; and such, field-like ac-
tivity as it may possess seems concerned
(1) with imposing patterns of self-
transcending meaning upon the sensory
contents, and (2) with imposing patterns
of purposeful action upon the intercourse
"between the body and the environment . 1
Likewise nocking speaks of the self as "a system of
QO
purposive behavior ". And relative to the mind-body re-
lationship he goes on to say:
./e conclude that the self cannot be
itself without its body, he must regard
the body not as an appendage of the mind
nor as a detachable instrument, but as
an inseparable organ. The self is a
system of meanings, but not of meanings
without facts....All the categories of
the body are required in the structure
of the self. ^
All of these thinkers think of the self as in some respect
extended by virtue of possessing a body, but not one of
these tnree tninkers draws the materialistic conclusion.
They do not reduce the self to a physical category and no
more, fney do not make it a mere aspect of matter as cellars
does. They give due need to the non-spatial aspects of
minds as well as its spatial aspects. And all three believe
in immortality. Sellars of course tries desperately hard to
do justice to the facts of mind within the narrow framework
of naturalism, ns can be said, as has been said before, to
do more justice to the facts of mind than an impersonal
idealist like Bradley. But ultimately he reduces it to a
91. Uontague
,
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physical category. It is spatial in the sense of being
merely adjectival to physical process. If mind be spatial
by virtue of being attacned to a physical body which it
uses as its instrument of expression, yet it is not its
spatiality which maxes it most significant. It is conscious-
ness--this persistent non-spatial factor which really maxes
mind the significant thing that it is. And consciousness
can nardly be said to be spatial, brain patterns are no
doubt related to thought, but thought seems to be something
altogetner different. Thought cannot be weighed, measured
or cut to pieces as brain cells can. "Body and mind," says
Hocxing, "are different: we have no intention of denying
this proposition ." 94
In the third place Sellars does not do justice to the
time transcending capacities of mind. This is one of the
unique aspects of mind.
Self-experience is not confined to the
present moment; it is time -transcending.
...The fact ox personal identity thus
abides tnrougn changing processes, and
even crosses chasms of intervening
unconsciousness
,
or abnormal conscious-
ness, to assert, I ami the same I that
was before, ilo theory can be adequate
that fails to recognize this time-
transc ending aspect of tne self . 90
One of the weaXnesses of Cellars 1 theory of mind is his
neglect of giving due consideration to this significant
aspect of mind. It is indeed surprising how little he nas
94. hocking, SBP, 101. 95. Brightman, ITP, 19E-195.
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to say in his writings on memory, which is considered hy
many as one of the most important aspects of mind; for in
memory past and present are linked together in a strange
bond of unity and meaning, 'inis is a very important aspect
of mind which distinguishes it from things. Closely re-
lated to this is the wonderful capacity and power which
mind alone possesses of being able to a remarkable degree
to perserve its unity and identity amid a storm of states.
Things cannot do tnis. They change amid their changing
states, rerhaps the best reason for regarding mind as the
key to reality is because here and here alone in nature do
we find unity amid diversity, and diversity amid unity.
All impersonal devices are failures.
Thought remains in deadlock here until
we carry the problem up to tne plane of
free intelligence, and find in thought
the source of both change and identity,
of unity and plurality, ana of all outgo
whatsoever . ^
Naturalists even sucn as Cellars with all of their good
intentions to overcome tne faults and inadequacies on tne
old naturalism yet in the end fail to do justice to some of
the highest capacities of mind.
In the fourth place Cellars is not clear as to tne
efficacy of consciousness. At times he affirms the efficacy
ox mind in terms that almost provoke one to ask, Is Sellars
also among tne personalists? For example ne says: "Intelli-
96. Lowne, LET, 427-428.
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gent integrations of the brain need consciousness to guide
them."^ "Human behavior is conscious behaviour. We look
before and after. Our responses are guided by experience."^
Evolutionary naturalism holds to the "creative power of
intelligence /itn pragmatism's rejection of epiphenome-
nalism I whole-heartedly agree. "The conscious self sits
in tne watch-tower of the brain to guide trie organism's
behavior . But these passages and many others like them
are off set by the many passages such as were noted in
Chapter X in which he makes consciousness so utterly a
phase of the activity of the brain as to approach determin-
ism. This as has been pointed out before gives force to
Pratt's criticism, that Cellars has done nothing "to help
Materialism out or its old dilemma of being forced either
to identify consciousness with tne brain or to deny its
101
efficacy*"
.
Pratt goes so far as to say that "Professor
Sellars is unwilling to commit himself to either of these
102difficulties; and ends by falling a victim of both."
Perhaps this is a bit extreme yet there is truth in it. 0$.
the one hand in so far as Sellars identifies tne mind with
tne processes of the brain, and tne laws which govern these
processes he does not do justice to the capacity or the
human mind for freedom.
97. Sellars, XU
,
313.
98 . Ibid
. ,
313
•
99. Ibid.
,
313.
100. Ibid., 317-318.
101. Prato, j..iiis
,
do
.
102. Ibid., 46.
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Let matter be as highly evolved as you
like; if its processes completely
determine action, the efficiency of
consciousness goes by the board, do
seek to dodge this uncomfortable fact
by glowing accounts of the subtlety and
fineness ox modern matter on ’its higher
levels' is like trying to console tne
condemned criminal on his way to tne
gallows by assuring him that tne rope
with which he is to be hung is not made
of common hemp but of tne finest and
strongest silk. 1J^
In so far then as Sellars identifies the mind with brain
processes he seems to deny the efficacy of consciousness.
But on the other hand in so far as he affirms the efficacy
of consciousness he tends away from naturalism in tne
direction of idealism or some form of dualism.
Sellars tnen not only does not vanquish idealism as far
as his specific criticisms are concerned, but he fails to
establish nis own theory of mind as a physical category,
an aspect of matter, he fails to do justice to the unique
status of mind as knower, he fails to do justice to the
non-spatial aspects of mind, he fails to do justice to the
time transcending factors of mind, and finally he fails to
do full justice to the efficacy of mind. I1he truth in
Sellars view of mind seems to be that mind as such is not
independent ana self-sufficient but that it rests and has
its basis in something beyond itself, something more abid-
ing than its flickering candle. Sellars' basic fallacy
103. iratt, LIAS
,
45

seems to "be that of making matter, the whirling atoms, in
the last analysis tne basis of mind as well as of the
order and organization and glory of the universe. The
deepest truth seems to be that both mind and matter as
observed are dependent on a third order which causes both
of them and also makes possible their interaction.
>.
I sf
190
CHAPTER VIII
CRITICISMS OP IDEALISTIC PHILOSOPHIES OP VALUE
1.
The Meaning and Significance of Value
Sellars and modern idealists are agreed as to the general
meaning of the term value. For both it signifies anything
man desires or cherishes. Sellars defines it as "anything
which we desire, need, want enjoy either for its own sake
or as a means. "By a value (or worth, or good) , " says
Brightman, "is meant whatever is desired, or enjoyeu, or
pprized, or approved, or preferred." Similarly the ideal-
ist Mackenzie says: "V/hen we value anything, we generally
lixe it: we are pleased by its presence and more or less
pained by its absence."^ Likewise Hocking defines values in
terras of interests: "Our actions drive incessantly to their
ends, and tnese ends we call values."^ Sellars and the
idealists too are agreea that there are lower and higher
values. Thus Sellars begins witn bodily values as lowest
and lists religious, moral and intellectual values as the
highest, giving the last names the very highest place
following in the tradition of Aristotle. 0 Brightman' s list
does not differ greatly from Sellars' except that he gives
the religious the very highest place as "the values which
are experienced when man takes an attitude towara value
1. Sellars, PPP, 404. 4. nocking, LiGHE, 125.
2. Brightman, ITP, 126. 5. Sellars, PPP, 457.
3. Mackenzie, UV, 126.

experience as a whole ana toward its dependence on powers
beyond man . ° Mackenzie on the other hand makes use of XanUs
famous division of values into "Market value," "fancy val-
ue," and "dignity." The last he conceived as underlying all
relative values and all conditions of value, as the abso-
7lute value. Sellars along witn Brightman ana Mackenzie
distinguisnes between instrumental and intrinsic values,
although Sellars, as will be seen, as against all ideal-
ists, rejects the idea of an absolute value or values.
Both Sellars and the idealists are convinced ox tne cen-
tral place and the significance of values in life and in
philosophy. "That value is central to human living," says
Sellars, "we soon realize when we grasp the fact that val-
ues are objects valued. In The Philosophy of physical
Realism Sellars devotes one whole chapter ox over thirty
pages to the discussion of values, and in The Principles
and problems of inilosopny two chapters which cover over
thirty pages. The importance of tne subject is well ex-
pressed by Mackenzie as follows: "So much has been written
about values in recent times that it may seem almost a
work of supererogation to attempt any fresh discussion of
them.
"
y
.He rightly traces this interest in values today to
the question on so many lips : "is life worth living?"^
6. Brightman, BOR, 99. 8. Sellars, BPP, 424.
7. Mackenzie, UH, 118, see 9. Mackenzie, TJV, Is.
also Abbott HTOE, 52. 10. ibid., 14.
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Finally Brightman goes so far as to say: "aver since man
began to think he has been concerned about the question,
What is truly good or valuable?"^--*- Both Sellars and the
idealists are agreed then as to the meaning and significance
of value. But there are certain important differences be-
tween tne naturalistic view of Sellars and that of the
idealists to which tne discussion must now turn.
2. The Crucial issue
Parker in an interesting passage lays his finger on tne
crucial issue between naturalists and idealists relative
to value.
According to the Platonic-Christian tra-
dition, which constitutes the intellectual
framework of our civilization, the authori-
ty of the ethical idea rests on a basis,
if not supernatural, at least ethical and
transcendent ... .But slowly another view is
gaining fround, and even those who live
under its influence hardly realize how rev-
olutionary it is. It has many forms and
many names, --but all alike maintaining that
the basis of ethical standard is human, or
possibly subhuman. ^
Certainly tne relativistic pragmatic, humanistic, natural-
istic conception is not so new as Parker seems to suggest.
It is at least as old as tne Sophists; for Protagoras of
Abdera who flourished about 440 B.C. is credited with tne
saying: "flan is a measure of all things, of things that are,
that they are; and of things that are not, that they are not." 1 ^1
11. Brigntman, IIP, 109. 13. Protagoras, "Two Sayings,"
12. Parker, HV, 3. in Bakewel'l, SAP, 67.

This was the issue between Plano and tne Sopnists. Plato in
sisted: "It is God who is, for you and me, of a trutn the
'measure of all things, 1 much more truly then, as tney say
'man'."-*-
4 It is interesting now often much that parades
under the name of naturalism appears novel, even to ideal-
ists, when as a matter of fact it is something very old
dressed in tne garb of modernism. At any rate Parser in the
passage quoted certainly defines tne crucial issue as be-
tween the naturalistic and tne idealistic version of values
The former conceives values as entirely 01 human origin and
relative to tne human only, as "of the earth, earthy, "-*-5
while tne latter insists that values have tneir origin in
tiie Supernatural, the Spiritual Order, in God upon ./horn
everything is dependent. Brightman truly says:
Thinkers who agree on many points, dis-
agree about this fundamental question. Are
values simply and solely relative to human
desires and pleasures, customs and insti-
tutions; or are they in some way permanent
,
objective aspects of tne universe. u
how Sellars' philosophy of value, like many o trier aspects
of his philosophy is a half-way house to idealism. Unlike
many naturalists he recognizes that values are as real and
genuine as otner aspects or human experience. In his very
interesting article, "Cognition and Valuation," Sellars
makes the valid distinction between the world as known and
the world as appreciated.
14. Plato, Laws
,
Book IV, 716C . 16. Brightman, I TP, 149.
15. I Cor. 15:47.
t '
r
f
•
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Is there a world of description? The
realist is convinced that it is truer to
the facts to speak of the world as known
and the world as appreciated. In both
cases we are objective in our references
and deal v/ith the same kind of objects. '
As the above quotation indicated Sellars conceives values
as being in some sense objective. In The Philosophy of
Physical Realism he goes so far as to say: ,TI shall myself
18take as objective a view of value as possible.” iiore-
over he rejects factualism, though recognizing elements of
value in it.
I am going to stress the question of
factualism in theory of value because
it seems to me basic. Its implications
are expressed in the old tag that there
is no disputing- about tastes. Tastes
are ultimate facts to be recognized as
such.
The inadequacy of ethical and aesthet-
ic relativism, or subjectivism, has been
tnat it has left us with brute facts
without possibility of revision through
discussion and investigation. .. .Dis-
cussion would seem to be meaningless be-
cause irrelevant. Each one would take
the position that he has exhausted all
that was to be known about the object
and his capacity for sensitive and
intelligent reaction to it.... But sure-
ly this a big assumption for any one
to make. It is at this point, I take it,
that the inadequacy of mere factualism
in the field of value is to be found.
It presupposes a dogmatic attitute of
finality and disregards the possibility
of new knowledge and creative develop-
ment in experi ence . . . .The factualist is
a dogmati st . . . .The real difference be-
17. Sellars, Phil.Rev. 19. Ibid., 451-452
18. Sellars, PPR, 445
c
tween him ana. the authoritarian is that
the latter is in power. In neither is
there the willingness to appeal to rea-
son and experience and open up quesr
tions for more developed response.
'u
ITo idealist could give a more conclusive criticism of
ordinary relativiam or factualism. Moreover the iuealist
could heartily endorse Sellars 1 criteria of value. He sets
aside doth factualism and authoritarianism for a "new
attitude.” "The keys to the new attitude would he love and
knowledge." Again he says:
In judgments of value we are estimat-
ing it with respect to its hearing upon
human life. We ask such questions as
the following: How would it aifect human
life under such ana such conditions?
Would it make for human welfare? Would
people get an aesthetic experence from
it?22
p 'XAgain he looks to "educated and reflective men" to set
the standard. But the difference of his point of view from
that of idealism is clearly expressed in the two following
passages
:
There is no one universal summum bonum
or highest good. It is in biography
and in the sympathetic delineations of
human living by great literary artists
that we obtain our best glimpses of
the modes.of life tnat in some measure
satisfy.
I see no reason to assume transcendent,
absolute values. Hatner do we have the
growth of a more adequate basis for
value-interpretation in the emergence
of well-informed ana sensitive persons. 0
20. Sellars, PPR, 455-454.
21. Sellars, PPR, 456.
22. Ibid., 446.
25. Ibid., 457.
24. Sellars, PPP, 408
25. Ibid., 467-458.
•*r -
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The last quotation in particular points to the crucial
issue between naturalism and idealism. This is even more
clear in the following passage: "We may speak of idealism
in regard to values as transcendentalism or the cosmic
location of values, while the opposing view may he called
, .
26humam sm .
The crucial issue between the two opposing systems can
easily be illustrated from the writings of idealists. All
objective idealists hold to the metaphysical objectivity of
value. The chief difference between idealists is that ex-
isting between Platonists on she one hand, and deists,
theists and personalists on the other. The former think of
values as impersonal entities of wnich concrete human values
are pale reflections. Since Sellars has very little to say
about modern Platonists, but attacks the plaster himself, it
will be in order to briefly summarize Plato’s theory of val-
ue. Plato believed that human values are reflections of
ideal forms, perfect patterns which exist in heaven. These
ideas or forms or patterns constitute an ideal order at
the head of which there stands the Good, the Supreme Iuea.
Plato describes the Good as follows:
You will agree that the Sun not only
makes the things we see visible, but
also brings tnem into existence and
gives tnem growth and nourishment; yet
he is not the same thing as existence.
^nd so with the objects of knowledge:
these derive from the Good not only
their power of being known, bud tneir
26. ibid., 426.
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very being -and reality; and Goodness is
not the same thing as being, but even
beyond being, surpassing it in dignity
and power.
In the Republic
,
Plato at times thus exalted the forms
seemingly above God, though even in the Republic there is
at least one interesting passage in which he speaks of the
28
forms as the work of God, and it may even be that he iden-
tified the Good with God, and conceived it less imperson-
ally than his word imply. At any rate as he became older he
tended to think more and more personalistically until in
the Laws the forms tend to disappear for the most part or
rather to find their home in the mind of God as the Source
„
.
. 29
of all existence.
Taking their one both from the great Hebrew-Ohristian tra-
dition and from Plato the personalistic absolutists and the
personalists ground values or the norms or patterns of ideals
toward which our human values aspire in the Mind of Goa.
Speaking of beauty Sir Henry Jones says:
The beauty of the natural world seems
to carry one further even than its obvious
order. Beauty comes as something gratui-
ously generous. It is a benevolent redun-
dancy, having a value that is quite dif-
ferent from mere utility. .. .Its purpose
seems to be to enrich life, and not
merely to perserve life, and its appeal
is to reason. It is thus difficult to
conceive of beauty as proceeding from
an unintelligent source. We seem forced
to conclude that, if not God, then sure-
ly some kind of cause at once intelli-
gent and benevolent has brought it
27. Plato, Rep., Book VI, 509b. 29. Ibid., 597b.
28. See especially the remark-
able passage in Laws, Book IV,
716c-d
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about that the world shall be clothed
in beauty, ana thus fill' humanity 1 s
cup till it runs over. ^
Similarly, Mackenzie says:
The interpretation 01 the Universe
suggested by Sir Henry Jones in his
recent Gifford Lectures, basea largely
on the teaching of Edward Gaird, is-es-
sentially at one with the view that I
am here advocating. It contains at
least the conception (not altogether
novel) of the Power that shapes the
Universe as containing the three aspects
of ultimate Wortluthat I have been seek-
ing to emphasize.
Likewise, sorley states:
Wherever there is intrinsic worth in
the world, there also, as well as in
moral goodness, we see a manifestation
of the divine* God must therefore be
conceived as the final home of values,
the Supreme Y/orth— as possessing the
fulness of knowledge ana beauty and
goodness and whatever^else is of val-
ues for its own sahe.^
Finally Brightman says: "Only for persons can ideals, obli-
33gations, values, be real." "The objectivity of values would
34then mean their existence as purposes of the Livine Mind."
Moreover for the idealist from the days of Plato on values
form a system. "If we are to compare values at all, we must
give up the idea of a scale for that of a system."*" The
idealist thinks of a system of values containing all values
and itself the Supreme or absolute value. "No value has
30. Jones, FTI
,
220-221. 33 Brightman, RV, 125.
31. Mackenzie, UV, 160. 34 Ibid., 169.
32. Sorley, MVTG, 474. 35. Sorley, MVIG, 51.

199
sovereignty in its national territory: only the league ox
values is sovereign. By the objectivity of values the
idealist means two things: "(a) That an objective value is
one that all minds that think reasonably ought to acknowledge
(logical objectivity),” "(b) That it is valid not only for
human individuals and groups, but for the universe...
(metaphysical objectivity)
The crucial issue then as already intimated turns out
to be twofold. First, are tnere absolute standards or norms
discoverable by the human mind toward which it may pro-
gressively move? Second, what is the status of values in
the cosmos? Bo they have cosmic rootage, or are they merely
human?
3. Four Criticisms
Sellars makes four criticisms of idealistic philosophies
of value. The first is simply tnat idealism tends to reify
values, to make entities out of merely human concepts. Speak-
ing of Plato's system Sellars says:
This ethical metaphysics reifies human
concepts. It does not realize the proper
and relevant place of ethical ideas. Sure-
ly these have significance only in human
affairs as changing ideals of the good
life. It seems to me that evolutionism
and ijragmatism have given the deathblow
to a Platonic metaphysics.*3^
It will be seen tnat this criticism applies only to Platon-
ism. Personalists do not make entities out of human con-
cepts. This is something that they are as much opposed
36. Brightman, POR, 101. 38. Sellars, EN, 163.
37. Brightman, ITP, 150.

to as Sellars. They regard such entities as mere abstrac-
tions. But in so far as Sellars in the second and in the
third sentence -designates ethical ideals as merely human
he is of course attacking all forms of idealism. To the
third sentence in which he insists "that evolution and
pragmatism have given the deathblow to a Platonic meta-
physics," the answer may well be made, that this is true
perhaps of Platonism in the strict sense, but it is not
true of personalistic theories of value. Values may well
exist as ideals, norms, patterns, purposes in the mind of
God, but which He can only imperfectly ana gradually real-
ize. Once assume the idea of a limited God and the diffi-
culty vanishes. But it is hard to see why an omipotent God
cannot perfectly realize His ideals and purposes in concret
form, and why it takes Him so long with so much waste and
suffering.
Sellars' second criticism is directed against; idealism's
insistence that objective values are absolute. Idealists,
as has been seen, think in terms 01 a system of values com-
posed of all the values from the lowest to the higjhest, the
supreme
,
the absolute value. Sellars admits that there are
lower ana higher values, but he denies the existence of a
supreme or highest, an absolute value.
There are controls and demands which
the group always stresses, such as con-
sideration of the common good and concern
for what is generally regarded as aumirable.
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But when we come to describe the good we
can never be formal. There is no unni-
versal summum bonum or highest good. It
is in biography ana. in the symathetic
delineations oi human living by great
literary artists that we obtain our best
glimpses of the modes %f life that in
some measure satisfy.
Here he seems to abandon any attempt to achieve a ration-
al standard for estimating values and to fall bach on mere
satisfaction as a kind of standard or absolute. But else-
where he has emphasized the role of "love and knowledge"^0
in discerning values. And he goes so far as to say in another
passage, "It would seem that, in criticism, we have a sense
of goals, directions, potentialities, developments, princi-
41pals, methods." Here he would certainly make use both of
empirical investigation and of rational criticism. But in
further criticism of absolute values he brings the old charge
that values are always relative. "Is not value always with
respect to? Is not a thing a good because it is such that
it can enter significantly and desirably some one’s life?...
A good which is not a good for some one strikes me as mean-
ingless." This passage contains a personalistic note. Val-
ue is relative to a person’s life. The idealist then can
freely aamit much of this ana also hold that values as ex-
perienced point away from the subjective experience to some-
thing that lies beyond it that gives it meaning, to objective
norms. Better still he may contend that while ail value is
39. Sellars, PPP, 408. 41 Sellars, PPR, 457.
40. Sellars, PPR, 455. 42. Sellars, PPR, 459.
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always experienced relative to the wants and tastes of
an individual, yet by means of rational criticism and
experiment, which Sellars himself aavocates, the race is
more and more coming to certain general norms or standard
which seem to have universal application. In the words of
Sorley
:
The universal of morality is contained
in particulars and at first concealed by
them; and the moralist's problem is to
elucidate tne universal by reason of
which these particular cases are ap-
propriate subjects for the moral judgment. °
Sorely proposes the criteria of "universality, system,
44
and comprehensiveness." Through the application of these
tests he rightly insists standards can be discovered. Even
Sellars when he proposes the criticism of educated men as
a means of reaching agreements must acknowledge the ex-
istence of possible objective standards which intelligent
man can discover and to which they can sincerely give their
allegiance. Thus his arguments against the absoluteness
seems to fall to the ground.
A third criticism which Sellars makes is also directed
against tne idealist & contention that values are absolute.
He contends that the effect of such a contention has been
that of destroying individual initiative in tne quest of
the good life. Morality tended to becomes something ex-
ternal, to which tne one must rigidly conform, instead
43. Sorley, JVIG, 91. 44. Ibid., 106.
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of a quest for the most intelligent way of living together.
It is well, I take it, to relinquish
the "belief in fixed, external norms to
which we must bend our lives. I’o conceive
values as critical expressions of our
nature and situation at a certain cultur-
al level is to give them naturalness and
relevance. It is to make them tentative
and responsible, something to be examined
and, if possible, to be improved. °
In the light of what he says on Pages 424-425 of the same
book, Principles and Problems of milosophy
,
he has in
mind the rigid commands as found in the Old Testament and
similar codes. IIo modern idealist would hold such a con-
ception oi tne absoluteness of values, ne conceives values
not as something handed down from heaven as a rigid formula
to be conserved ana obeyed to the letter without question,
but rather as being based on or springing from norms and
standards--the purposes of God which man Gan never com-
pletely grasp or express but which he can progressively
discover and embody in his human codes. As a result it is
impossible for him to be aogmatic in the old authori-
tarian sense while at the same time he can avoid the dangers
of relativism which has no fixed stars to steer by. The
idealist of today like tne wise Ulysses steers bet7/een the
Scylla of dogmatic authoritarianism and the Charybdis of a
treacherous relativism, and avoids tne dangers of both ex-
tremes. As a matter of fact relativism xias never yet built
a civilization. Tne lesson of history seems to be that its
45. Sellars, PPP, 468

appearance on a large scale is a sign that civilization
in decaying, that it no longer has any fixed stars to guide
it and hence it heads for the rocks. One cannot seriously
survey oui contemporary civilization without asxing the
question whether that is not where it is headed. It may he
that the idealist with his insistence on the existence of
absolute norms or standards progressively discoverable by
man, may have the means tnat can save civilization from
shipwreck. It seems certain that naturalism cannot provide
such means, nor can it for long provide the necessary dy-
namic and enthusiasm. Lien will not continue to die and to
sacrifice for mere vague human dreams which in the bitter
end may appear to be nothing but a will o’ the wisp, xian
does not need absolute certainty. This is impossible for
the frail human mind to attain upon this earth. But man
does need a sense of moral and of practical certainty
which a sense or conviction of the absoluteness of the
moral and spiritual ideal alone can provide. And this
brings the discussion to Sellars’ most fundamental
cri tici sm.
In the fourth place Sellars criticizes the contention
of the idealist that values are transcendent
,
that is that
they have cosmic rootage-- that they are more beautiful
human flowers and have their source in the mind and purpose
of God. Sellars quotes the following passage from Windelband
in which the existence of a Cosmic Hind is affirmed as the
home of values
-T
Ethical and aesthetic judgments dis-
play, in the mind ox any unprejudiced
observer, an extremely great diversity
when one surveys the various peoples
of the earth in succession. Here again,
however, we try to set up a final
standard of values; we speak of higher
and lower stages of morality or of
taste in different peoples and different
ages. \/here do we get the standard for
this judgment? And where is the mind for
which these ultimate criteria are the val-
ues? If it is quite inevitable to rise
above the relativity in individual
appreciations and the morals of various
peoples to some standard of absolute val-
ues, it seems necessary to pass beyond
the historical manifestations of the
entire human mind to some normal con-
sciousness, for which these values are
values.
He criticizes »Vindelband and idealists generally for thus
assuming the existence of a General or Cosmic Hind as the
home of values. The crux of his criticism is simply that
there is no "empirical reason" for assuming the existence
of such « Mind*
Have we any empirical reason for setting
a general mind over against the individual
mind? In the chapter in which we examined
this question in some detail we saw reason
to deny a general, or social, mind....
of course, cultural developments make
cultivated and reflective individuals
possible. But I see no reason to assume
transcendent, alsolute values. Rather do
we have the growth of a more adequate
basis for value-interpretation in the
emergenci^of well-informed and sensitive
persons
.
In answer to the question, "Have we any empirical reason io
46. Windelband, I TP, 215-216. 47. Sellars, PPP, 467-468
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setting up a general mind over against the individual mind?,”
the idealist following in the footsteps of Kant would answer.
No, not in the sense of demonstration. But he would also
answer that a coherent interpretation of the evidence that
is available such as the existence of order, organization,
and design in nature, the facts of mind, of mystical ex-
perience ana of the seeming objectivity of value together
constitute reason enough to make the existence of such a
Llind a practical ana a moral certainty. Moreover returning
to the attack the idealist would insist that Sellars has
no adequate basis for values if he grounds them merely in
the subjective consciousness of "reflective” and "sensitive"
individuals. In so far as they assist each other in "thinking
48
and feeling things through" and arrive at a common basis
of thinking and acting they have come upon something beyond
themselves to which they must give recognition as a discovery
of the nature of things. The very fact of thinking men being
able to think things through assurnes'the existence of the very
thing which Sellars denies--the existence of a rational
order which both must recognize as the goal of their think-
ing.
Moreover the idealist can also insist that the highest val-
ues such as duty and beauty and love have always inspired men
to a devotion which seems to imply that there is something
beyond them which makes such devotion unaerstandable
.
48. Sellar3, PPP. 467.
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Sellars is by no means an exception, but one of the best ex-
examples we have of a man who is interested, in the search
for truth and in the establishment of social justice,
Ideals have a power over men far beyond what the natural-
ist's creed even at its best would allow. There is alto-
gether too much of such to ascribe it to chance emergence.
The emergence of sensitive, reflective, valuers in a uni-
verse that in the final analysis has no real place for
them seems the supreme miracle. And the fact that even the
glory of one sunset means the convergence of so many forces
working in unity and harmony, forces both in nature and
in the body and mind of man, makes it extremely unlikely that
such could have come about as the result of a mere chance
emergence. Values of which one witnesses countless numbers
every day seem to involve purpose and plan which point to
the activity of a Mind which alone could assemble such a
multitude of forces to produce such strange and wonderful
end results.
Sellars makes a criticism of Mackenzie, Jones, and Sorley
that is similar to his criticism of Windelband
,
After charg-
ing Mackenzie with anthropomorphism because he interprets
the universe in terms of value he immediately proceeds to
criticize the three philosophers as follows:
The suspicion will not down that these
writers bow to the space-time system,
call it real-- more real than Plato
admi tted--ana then delve underneath it
f L
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to a Pov/er whieh is the real reality....
It is the assumption that physical
systems are contingent and existentially
secondary, that tnere is a sort of
fourth dimension bach ot them in which
the springs of change are located. In
short, that changes are not expressions
of the nature of tne spatio-temporal
system but of something more real under-
lying it. Let me frankly say that I
cannot—with the best desire in the
world-- see adequate grounds for this
assumption that phys^gal systems are
not self-sufficient.
here the basic issue between naturalism and idealism again
appears. But granted that the idealist cannot finally demon
strate the dependence of the universe on a Source of Power
and Purpose underlying, even less can the naturalist demon-
50
strate, as Kant clearly saw, that tne universe is inde-
pendent and self-existing and creative, hot only from the
realm of nature, not only from the realm of mind, but also
from the realm of value the idealist gleans evidence which
seems to point to the dependence of the univers on a
Supreme Mind. Again this time throwing down the challenge
the idealist would ask how the atoms could have tne 'wonder-
ful power of bringing about the necessary arrangements both
objective and subjective which maxe values on so vast a
scale possible? Clearly idealism seems to outweigh natural-
ism.
Sellars maxes one other criticism in the same vein of two
of the thinkers discussed above, namely Jones and Mackenzie
49. Sellars, PPP, 445-446. 50. Kant, CTJ, 11,1,392;1,
578,22; 11,595.
>
Sir Henry Jones in his recent Gifford
Lectures, based largely on the teaching
of Edward Gaird, advocates a position
very much like Mackenzie' s. It contains
the conception of a Power that shape the
Universe in accordance with truth, good-
ness and beauty. But how can we pass
from such a transcendent Power to our
actual human values? Mackenzie admits
the difficulty and, like Sir Henry Jones,
falls back on the poetic insights of Brown-
ing. 51
The passage to which Sellars refers in wnich Mackenzie
admits the difficulty of passing from God as the transcen
dent Source to concrete human values reads as follows:
The interpretation of the Universe
suggested by Sir Henry Jones in his
recent Gifford Lectures, basea largely
on the teaching of Edward Gaird, is es-
sentially at one with the view that I am
here advocating. It contains at least
the conception. . .of the Power that shapes
the Universe as containing three aspects
of ultimate Worth that I have been seek-
ing to emphasize. It is perhaps less
satisfac tory in explaining how these
aspects can be supposes to produce human
values .
~
Mackenzie's difficulty seems to be that of conceiving the
"tnree aspects", that is "Truth, Beauty, ... and Good-
53
ness" in too abstract and Platonic a sense f Conceived
in terms of ideals or standards or purposes in terms of
which God works, a God who is both immanent and trans-
cendent, ana the difficulty becomes less real. However no
idealist woulu be so bold as to say that he has entered
into the inner councils 01 the Most high and knows just
51. Sellars, PPP, 445 See also 52. Mackenzie, UV, 160.
Jones, FTI , 226-227, and 53. Ibid., 145.
Mackenzie, JV, 160-161
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how being is made. Nevertheless he will again remind the
naturalist that it is far easier to see how a hind can
produce valuers and concrete values then to see how matter
can accomplish such a miracle.
4. Conclusion
In view of what has been said, the idealist is not too
seriously worried about his position when he reads:
There is no central, brooding ,/ill that
has planned it all. The good is not the
sun of things from which they get their
warmth and inspiration. Ethical meta-
physics results from wrong oraering of
categories, a neglect of their setting
and context . 04
For he also reads from the same writer:
It is obvious that I hold that value
judgments do and must fit into the cosmos
as this is revealed in knowledge. Values
concern man's resposes to, and estimation
of things. They are always guided by
knowledge though they contain other
elements of a igore effective and voli-
tional nature. °
Thus Sellars unlike many naturalists, especially those of
the Nineteenth Century admits that value is organic to the
universe. Of course in the next breath he asserts : "Though
they are conditioned objectively by the nature of their
objects, they are yet primarily personal anu social, that
56is, human." ilan in other words is the locus of value.
Moral categories have a limited area
of application. They apply primarily
to human beings since these alone, seem
capable of juaging the value of tneir
-7
acts, morality ana personality go together. 1"
54. Cellars, SN, 345.
55. Ibid.
,
342.
56 . Ibid
. ,
342.
57. cellars, PIP, 396.
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The ultimate, rational sanction of
morality is the fact that it is
grounded in tne nature of man. He who is
social and selective in his valuations
is hy that very fact a moral agent. It
springs out of, and cannojgbe removed
from, intelligent living."
The gist of our conclusion, then is
that morality ana its categories are
intrinsic to that level of nature
which we call human living. The area
of human living is small in the ocean
of existence but the fact is quiet
irrelevant to the validity of its
categories in their field, nothing
can rob us of the fact that we are men
and women or make it seem rational to
us to act like unthinki^ brutes even
were we able so to act.
"Personality and human nature play a justified role in
fiO
value-experiences and value-judgments . " "It is my opinion
that such normative expressions as should and ought indicate
that we have to do with personality as a special kind of
6
1
reality." But for Sellars man is also a part of nature."
I shall seek to show how man is a part of the fabric of the
world and that his doing, his knowing and his valuing cannot
be understood apart from nis status. "^2If man is a part of
the "fabric of tne world" then tne idealist may not be so
far mistaken when he insists that values are not merely
human but are grounded in tne Cosmic order wnicn can best be
understood in terms of a Supreme Mind as its round and
Source. If "ultimately, a living value is tne expression
58. Ibid., 428. 61. Sellars, PPR, 456.
59. Ibid., 426. 62. Sellars, PPP, 462.
60. Ibid., 426.
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65
of personality in contact with things," whence this strange
correlation? Is it too much to conclude that not only is
Sellars unable to answer the idealists, but that he is- him-
self not far from idealism in this as well as in some other
respects?
63. Sellars, PPP, 468

213
CHAPTER IZ
CONCLUSIONS
There are three primary conclusions which emerge from this
present study. The first consists of the fact that when
naturalism tries to become really philosophical today, as
in the case of sellars.it finds itself forced to make many
concessions to idealism* Sellars repudiates the old re-
duction! stic naturalism which found no place for mind and
values, but sought to reduce all the richness and complexity
of life to the level of the bare world of physics. Likewise
he finds himself compelled to renounce the old hard atoms
and he substitutes for them a glorified matter that seems
to be definitely psychic ; for it is dynamic, self-organ-
izing, and out of it emerge all the complexities and wonders
of the universe, order, organization, design, life, mind,
values. It seems as though Sellars is definitely heading
toward some form of panpsychism. But more than this he re-
pudiates behaviorism as a doctrine of mind and tries to
make a place for mind in his system, even to tne extent of
making statements about its efficacy that cause some think-
ers such as Pratt to suspect that he may be imperilling his
naturalism. Moreover he recognizes value as unique, as having
an equal status with other facts of experience, and as having
it locus in man. Since man is a part of the fabric of the
world for Sellars, he is at this point definitely approach-
ing idealism. Finally there is his epistomology
. Though he

contends desperately for the primacy of the category of
"thinghood" yet he has to admit on the basis of his own
epistomology that thing's always come in the garb of thought,
and that knowledge of the mental comes first. Even the very
atoms for which he contends come in terms of the mental.
From this point it is not far to idealism. If things always
come in terms of thought it is reasonable to suppose that
they are of the nature of thought.
The dissertation concludes then that Sellars is moving
in the direction of idealism. Kis repudiation of reduction-
ism, his conception of matter which seems definitely psychic,
his repudiation of behaviorism and his emphasis on -the
efficacy of rnina together with the idealistic implications
of his theory of value and his epistomology, all these
tendencies at these many points seem to indicate that he is
moving toward idealism.
The second conclusion is the inadequacy of the best form
of naturalism as a philosophy. Sellars’ naturalism is inade-
quate because matter however conceived is inadequate as a
principle of explanation. As has been pointed out again and
again it cannot explain order, organization, the many evi-
dences of design in the universe, and least of all mind and
value. Matter as over against mind is too poor a principle
of explanation. Of course one may endow the simple struc-
tured systems which science postulates with the attributes
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of mind, as Sellars does. But then, it seems to be something
difierent than what he started out with.
The third conclusion is that idealism with mind as its
principle of explanation has a principle that is rich enough
to explain the facts which matter cannot, Mind unlike
matter possesses and does not have to import order, unity
amid plurality, purpose, consciousness, will and value.
If we are right, we escape the universe
of perpetual miracle, on which the atheist
sets his heart. The organized structures
ana currents of ascent and evolution,
from the atoms themselves to the lives
of men, cease to be outrageously im-
probable runs of luck and become the
normal expression of something akin
to us • Material nature makes altogether
too many winning throws for us not to
suspect that she is playing with dice
that are loaded, loaded with life and
mind and purpose. 64
64. Montague, BU, 72-74

216
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Abbott, T. K.--KTOE
I
Kant *s Theory of Ethics .
New York: Longman's, Green, and Company, 1898.
Adams
,
R . .7 . - -Art
.
( 1918 )
.
Review of Sellars', The Essentials of Philoso hy.
Phil. Rev
., 27(1918), 209.
Alexander, S.—STD
Space, Time and Deity
,
2 vols
.
London: Macmillan and Company, 1920.
Aristotle—MET
Metaphysics ( tr . V;. D. Ross).
In Ross, 770a, 2 vols.
Bakewell, Charles M.—SAP
ource Book in Ancient Philosophy .
Boston: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1939*
Baldwin, James Mark—DPP
Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology .
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1902.
Balz, Albert G. A.—Art. (1917).
Review of Sellars', The Essentials of Philosophy.
Jour. Phil
., 14(1917), 668-669.
Bergson, Henri,—TSAR
Two Sources of Morality and Religion (tr. .audra and Brerton)
.
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1935.
Berkeley, George—PHK
A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge .
In Fraser, WGB, Vol . I, pages 255-347.
DHP
Three Dialogues Between Hylas and Philonous ( fefl.T . McCormack).
Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1925.
Bowne, Borden P.—TTK
Theory of Thought and Knowledge .
New York: American Book Company, 1897.
-MET
Metaphysics .
New York: American Book Company, 1898.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Brightman, Edgar S.--ITP
An Introduction to Philosophy .
Hew York: Henry Holt and Company, 1925.
py
Religious Values .
Hew York: The Abingdon Press, 1925.
POI
A Philosophy of Ideals .
Hew York: Henry Holt and Company, 1928.
.ML
Moral Laws .
Hew York: The Abingdon Press, 1932.
POR
A Philosophy of Religion .
Hew York: Pr entice -Hall
,
Inc., 1940.
Art. (1943).
Letter to Roy Wood Sellars, Oct. 3,1943*
Art • (1944)
Letter to Roy Wood Sellars, May 19,1944.
Art. (1944).
"Do We Have Knowledge By Acquaintance of the Self?"
Jour. Phil.
,
41(1944), 694-696.
Calkins
,
Mary W . —Art . ( 1926 )
.
"On Certain Difficulties In The Modern Doctrine of Essence.
Jour. Phil., 23(1926), 701-710.
Chambers, L.P. --Art. (1933)
Review of Sellars’ The Philosophy of Physical Realism.
Jour. Phil ., 20(1923), 495-500.
Cooley, Williams Forbes—Art . (1918)
.
Review of Sellars, The Essentials of Logic.
Jour . Phil.
,
15(1918), 51-54.
Cunningham, G. Watts--Art. (1925)
Review of Sellars, "The Double Knowledge .approach to the
Mind-Body Problem."
Phil. Rev.
,
24(1925), 101.
?- ^
'
e
«
-
J
218
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Democritus
"The Fragments"
In Bakewell, SAP, 59-65.
Descartes, Rene 1 --Med .
Lleditations on First Philosophy ( tr. Elizabeth s. Haldane
and G • R • T • Ro s s ) •
In The Philpsophical Uorks of Descartes
,
vol.,1, 151-199.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911.
DeY/olf, L. Harold—Art. (1944)'.
"Toward a Conciliation of Personalism and Behaviorism."
Phil. For
.
,
2(1944), 2-7.
Drake, Durant, Sellars and otners—ECR
Essays In Critical Realism.
London: The Macmillan, and Company, Limited, 1920.
Art. (1917)
Review of Sellars, The Next Step in Democracy.
Jour. Phil
., 14(1917), 500-502.
Eddington, A* S. —HPV/
The Nature of tne Physical World .
Hew York: The Macmillan Company
,
1922.
Ewing
,
A . C . —Art .(1942).
"Kantianism"
•
In Runes, TOP, 252-264.
Fichte, Johann Gottlieb—YQM
The Vocation of man (tr. william Smith).
Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1921.
FIswelling
,
Ralph T. —Art . ( 1942) .
"Personalism.
"
In Runes, TOP, 222-^41.
Fraser, Alexander Campbell--RGB
The Works of George Berkeley
,
In 4 vols.
Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1901.
Harlow, Victor E.—3GS
A Bibiography ana Genetic Study of American Realism .
Oklahoma City: Harlow Publishing Company, 1921.
? f
bibliography
Hegel, G. W. F.--POH
The Philosophy of Hi story (tr. J. Sihree)
Hew York: Willey Book Company, 1900.
POM
The Phenomenology of Mind ftr. J. B. Bailie). 2 vols.
Hew York: The Macmillan Company, 1910.
Hoc-kin# , William Ernest—MGHE
The Meaning of God in Human Exp
e
rience .
Hew Haven: Yale University Press
,
1912.
3BI)
The Self. Its Body and its Freedom.
Hew 'Haven, Yale University Pre s s
,
1928.
TOP
Types of Philosophy .
Boston :fih&rles Scribner 1 s Sons, 1929.
Hoernle', R. F. A.--IAP
Idealism as a Philosopny.
Hew York: Doran, 1927.
- — — — — —
-Art • (1926) .
"Idealism and Evolutionary Haturalism."
The uonist, 86(1926), 561-576.
Art. (1927)
.
"Realism and Evolutionary Haturalism: A Reply to Professor
cellars •
"
The Uonist, 37(1927), 156-160.
Hook, Sidney- -Art
.
(1944)
.
"Is Physical Realism Sufficient?"
Jour. Phil
., 41(1944), 544-551.
J§nes, Sir Henry--FTI
A Faith That Inquir e s.
London: Macmillan and Company, Limited, 1922.
Kant, Immanue1 - -CPR
Critique of Pure Reason (tr.Horman Kemp Smith).
London
:
"Macmillan uacT Company, Limited, 1929.
OOPR
Critique of Practical Reason (tr. Thomas K.
In Ahhott, KTOE.
Ahhott)
.

220
BIBLIOGRAPHY
FPM
Fundamental Principles of the I etanhysics of Morals (tr.
Thomas K. Abbott)
.
In Abbott, FTOS.
PTFM
Prolegomena To Any Future Metarhysic ( tr . Mahaffy and Benard )
.
New York: Macmillan and Company, 1£89.
CTJ
Critique of Teleological Judgment ( tr. J. C. Meredith).
Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1928.
Knudson, Albert—POP
The Philosophy of Personalism .
New York: The Abingdon Press, 1927.
Leibniz, Gottfried william—TM
The Monadology ( tr . Robert Latta).
Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1898.
Locke, John—ECHU
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding ( ed . C. Fraser).
Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1994.
Lotze, Herman—MIC
I-icrocosmos : fln Essay Concerning Man and His Relation To
The World (tr. Elizabeth Hamilton and Constance Jones). 2 vols
.
New York: Scribner and Welford, 1886.
Mackenzie, J. S.—UV
Ultimate Values .
Toronto: Hoader and Stoughton Ltd., 1924.
McDougall, william— BL\_
Body and Mind. A History and Defense of animism .
London: Methuen and Company Ltd., 1913.
Montague, Y;m. Pepper6ll—BU
Belief Inbound .
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1930.
CSD
The Chances of Surviving Death .
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1934.
.WOT
The Nays of Things .
New York: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1940.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
--organ, C. Lloyd—BE
Emergent Evolution .
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1923.
Morris, Charles '.. .—_irt.(1934}.
Review of Sellars', The Philosophy of Physical Realism.
Phil. Rev ., 43(1934), 205 - 208 '.
...orris, George S.--KCPR
Rant's Critique of Pure Reason .
Chicago: S. C. Griggs and Company, 1882.
Muelder, ... G.
,
and clears, L.—HAP
The Development of American Philosophy .
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1940.
Cverstreet, H. A.—art. (1917).
Review of Sellars', The Next Step in Democracy.
Phil. Rev ., 26(1917), 9o-98.
Parker, DeWitt--HV
Human Values .
hew York: Harper and Brothers, 1931.
Art. (1944).
"Some Comments on 'Reformed Materialism and Intrinsic
Endurance .
"
I-hi-i . Rev
.
,
53(1944), 383-391.
Parkhurst
,
Helen Euss—^rt
.
( 1922 )
.
"First Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical
Association—Eastern Division.
"
Jour. Phil ., 19(1922), 210-216.
Paton, H. J.—KME
Kant's Metaphysic of Experience .
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1936.
Perry, Ralph Barton—PPT
Present Philosophical Tendencies .
New York: Longmans, Green and Company, 1929.
Art. (1921)
.
Review of Essays in Critical Realism .
Phil. Rev ., 30(1921), 393-409.

BIBLIOGRAPHY
Picard, Maurice—Art. (1922).
Review of Sellars' Evolutionary Naturalism.
Jour. Phil
,
19(1922), 502
Plato
—
Rep .
The Republic ( tr. and ed. Francis M. Corni'ord).
Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1941.
Laws
Laws ( Tr . and ed. A.E. Taylor)
•
London : J.M. Deut and Sons Ltd., 1904.
Pratt, James Bissett--
Llatter and Spirit .
New York: The i.iacmillan Company, 1922.
Art. (1922)
.
"The New Materialism."
Jour. Phil
., 19(1922), 347-051.
Art. 1936.
"The £ resent Status of the i.And-Body Problem."
Phil. Rev
., 45(1936), 144-166.
Pringle-Pattison, Andrew Seth—Art. (1902).
"Idealism.
"
In Baldwin, DPP, 500-503.
Ross
,
W . D.--W0A.
The Works of Aristotle
,
2 vols. Second Edition
Oxford: Tne Clarendon Press, 1940.
Royce, Josiah—SLIP
The Spirit of Modern Philosophy .
Cambridge: The Riverside Press, 1892.
Runes, Dagobert ( ed
.
)
--D0P
The Dictionary of Philosophy .
New York: Philosophical Library, 1942
(ed.) --V/WP
V/ho's Who in Philosophy .
New York: Philosophical Library, 1942.
(ed.)TOP
Twentieth Century Philosophy .
New York: Philosophical Library, 1943.
I
223
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Sabine, George H.—Art. (1917).
Review of Sellars, Critical Realism : A Study of the Nature
and Conditions of Knowledge.
Phil. Rev .
,
26(1917)
,
87-91.
Schaub, Edward Leroy--PT
Philosophy Today .
Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1928.
S ohopenhaue r , Arthur--*AT I
The World as Will and Idea ftr. R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp).
London: Ye gan Paul, Trench frubner and Company, Ltd., 1896.
Sellars, Roy Wood—NSD
The Next Step in Democracy .
New York:The Macmillan Company, 1916.
OR
Critical Realism: A Study of the Nature and Conditions of
Knowledge .
New York: Rand McNally and Company, 1916.
BOP
The Essentials of Philosophy .
New York: The MacMillan Comp my
,
1917.
bol
The Essentials of Logic .
Boston: Hougnton Mifflin Company, 1917.
IIS3
The Neat Step in Religion .
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1918.
EN
Evolutionary Naturalism .
Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company, 1922.
PPP
The Principles and. Problems of Philosophy .
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1926.
RCA
Religion Coming of Age .
New York: The Macmillan Company, 1928.
• r
s
( *
BIBLIOGRAPHY
PPR
-ha Philosophy of Physical Realism •
ifaw York:" The Macmillan Corrrpany, 1932.
Art. (1909)
.
"Causality.
"
Jour. Phil., 6(1909), 523-328.
Art. (1917).
"The Status oi Epistemology.
"
Jour. Phil
.
,
14(1917), 673-680.
Art. (1?18)
Review oi P. Cofiey’s Epistemology.
Jour. Phil ., 15(1918)," 567-558.
Art. (1918)
"Our Knowledge of the Physical World."
Phil. Rev ., 27(1918), 502-512.
Art. (1918)
"An Approach to the i.lind-Body Prohlem."
Phil. Rev., 27(1918), 150-163.
-Art. (1920) .
'"Knowledge and Its Categories."
In Drake, ECR, 187-219.
Art. (1920)
"Space ana Time."
The Lionist
,
50(1920), S21-564.
Art. (1920) .
"The Status of the Categories."
The Monist
,
30(1920), 220-239.
Art
.
( 1921)
"Epi stemological Dualism Vs. Metaphysical Dualism."
Phil. R ev. , 30(1921), 482-493.
Art • ( 1921 )
"The Requirements of An Adequate liaturalism."
The Monist . 31(1921), 249-270.
Art. (1922)
"The Double-knowledge Approach to tne Mind-Body Problem.
Arist. Soc. Proc., 23(1922), 55-70

225
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Art
.
(1922)
.
"Is Consciousness Physical?"
Jour. Phil ., 19(1922), 690-694.
Art
.
( 1924)
•
"Critical Realism ana its Critics."
Phil. Rev ., 33(1924) ,579-397.
Art • ( 1926 )
.
"Cognition and Valuation."
Phil. Rev
.
,
35(1926),. 124-144.
Art. (1927)
"What is the Correct Interpretation of Critical Realism?"
Jour. Phil
., 24(1927), 238-241.
Art. (1927)
"Realisjn and Evolutionary Naturalism: A Reply to Professor
Eo.ernle
The Llonist, 37(1927) ,150-155.
Art. (1927)
"Why Naturalism and Not Materialism?"
Phil. Rev.
,
36(1927). 216-225.
Art
.
( 1928 )
"Current Realism."
In Schaub, PT, 19-36.
Art. (1929)
"A Re-examination of Critical Realism."
Phil. Rev.
,
38(1929), 439-455.
Art
.
(1938) .
"An analytic Approach to the mind-body Problem."
Phil. Rev
., 47(1938), 461-487.
Art. (1941)
"A Correspondence Theory of Truth."
Jour. Phil
., 38(1941), 645-654.
Art
.
( 1943) •
Letter to Dr. E. 3. Brightman, Oct. 20, 1943.
Art • ( 1943)
"Causality and Substance."
Phil. Rev., 52(1943), 1-27.

bibliography
Art. (1943)
.
"Dewey on Materialism.
"
Phil. Phen. Res ., 3(1943), 381-392.
Art • (1944)
"Reformed Materialism and Intrinsic Endurance.
Phil. Rev ., 53(1944), 359-382.
Art • ( 1944)
"Causation and Perception."
Phil . Rev .
,
53(1944), 534-556.
Art. (1944)'.
"Is Naturalism Enough?"
Jour. Phil
.
,
41(1944), 533-544.
Art. (1944)
Review of Runes, Twentieth Century philosophy .
Phil. Phen. Res ., 4(1944), 434-441
•
Art. (1944).
"The Meaning- of True and Raise."
Phil. Phen. Res
., 5(1944), 98-103.
Art. (1944)
"Does Naturalism Need Ontology?"
Jour. jL'hil
.
,
41(1944), 686-694.
Art
.
(1944)
"Reflection on Dialectical Materialism."
Phil, and Phen. Res., 5(1944), 157-179.
Sheldon, W. H.--SSPD
The strife of Systems and Productive Duality .
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1918.
Smith, Norman Hemp—CCPR
A Commentary to j£ent f s Critique of Pure Reason
London : Macmillan and Company, Limited, 1918
So rley, W. R. =-MVIG
Moral Values and the laea of God .
New York: G. P
.
' Putman 1 s Sons
,
1919.
Thilly, Prank—HOP
History of Philosophy .
" New York : Henry Holt and Company, 1927.

227
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Art. (1926)
.
T,Cont emporary American Philosophy."
Phil Rev
., 35(1926), 522-538^.
Windelhand, ./.—HOP.
A History of Philosophy . (tr. James J. Tufts).
New York: The liacmillan Oomp,any, 1907.
X ip
An Introduction to Philosophy (tr. Joseph McOahe)
•
Lev/ York: Henry Holt and Company, 1921.
Winn, Ralph B.—Art. (1943).
"Philosophic Naturalism."
In Runes, TOP, 513-537.
Wright
,
H. W . —Art . ( 1917 ) •
Review of Sellars, Critical Realism: A Study of Jhe Nature
and Condition of Knowledg e .
"
Jour.'THi
., ±411917) ;' 2x8-221.
Wright, w . K. —Art. (1919)
Review of Sellars, The Next Step in Religion.
Phil. Rev
., 28(1919), 426-427.
Art. (1927)
Review of Sellars, The Principles and Problems of Philo sonny .
Jour. Phil., 24(1927), 215-217.
>?
t
t
c r
*
*
f *
-
ROY WOOD SELLARS ’ CRITICISES OF IDEALISE
Abstract of a dissertation
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for
the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
BOSTON UNIVERSITY GRADUATE SCHOOL
Sy
ARTHUR WILLIAM LUNK
A. B. Southwestern University, 1931
B. D. Southern Lethodist University, 1933-
Department: Philosophy
Field of Specialization: Philosophy of Religion
kajor instructor: Dr. E. S. Brightman
1945

The problem of the dissertation is threefold. First, it
attempts a clear statement of the fundamental features of
Sellari 1 system and of the various idealistic systems which
he criticizes taking into account important likenesses and
differences. Second, it attempts a statement of the various
criticisms which Sellars makes of idealism. Third, it
ventures a criticism of criticisms, a criticism of Sellars’
criticisms of idealism with a view toward a final appraisal
of the two systems.
Chapter I begins with a statement of the fundamental
issue between idealism and naturalism. Is the universe of
the nature of mind and dependent on it, or of matter and
independent of mind? This is followed by a discussion of
the three characteristic features of Sellars’ system, Real-
ism, Naturalism, Humanism. T^e discussion begins with an
exposition of his epistemological dualism. Knowledge is not
a direct intuitive process, but a mediated, interpretative
process. The essence of his metaphysics is the concept of
matter. The ultimate structure of matter is not conceived
in terms of the hard atoms of Democritus but in terms of
the simplest organized enduring systems of energy as dis-
closed by science. From the atoms thus conceived in terms
of primary endurants emerge all the complexitj'- and novelty
in the universe, a new quality appearing at each new level
of organization which dynamic, self—organizing matter is
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capable of achieving. By means of this theory of emergence
Sellars seeks to save himself from the tendency of the old
materialism to reduce reality to the bare level of the
world of physics. Sellars then conceives the universe as
pluralistic, self-existent and self-sufficient. Values
are conceived as unique and irreducible but at the same
time as having no cosmic rootage, as relevant only to
human life.
In Chapter II idealism is broadly defined as the system
which holds that reality is of the nature of mind and that
values are objective. Four forms are recognized and dis-
cussed, the Platonic, the Berkeleian, the Speculative com-
prising both the critical idealism of Eant and the absolut-
istic types stemming from Hegel, and the Personalistic com-
posed of two types, the Leibnizian and the Bowne-Lotzean.
Chapter III explores the likenesses and differences be-
tween idealism and Sellars’ naturalism. The likenesses are
as follows: (1) . In common with many idealists, notably the
personalists
,
he is an epistemological dualist. (2).. Ee
holds that matter is always revealed through mind and in
terms of mind. (3) His concept of matter as dynamic and
self-organizing tends toward panpsychism. (4) . He rejects
reductionism. The fundamental differences are twofold:
(1), Nature as a system is independent of mind, self-
existent and self-sufficient. (2) Matter is the ulti-
c
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mate principle of explanation.
Chapter IV consists of Sellars’ criticisms of idealistic
epistemological monism. He attacks Berkeley at two vital
points, the latter’s insistence that ” esse is percipi,”
and that things are sensations. He fails in his attempt
to drive Berkeleians to solipsism, but is more successful
in revealing the defects in Berkeley’s theory of perception,
and in his view of things as mere presentations. Sellars'
charge against the absolutists as being unempirical is more
relevant to Bradley than it is to Hegel. But he is mistaken
in charging Bradley with reducing the phenomenal world to
illusion. He is more convincing in his attack upon the
coherence theory of reality, and upon the tendency of ab-
solutists to fall back upon the blanket-term, "experience.”
Chapter V deals with Sellars 1 criticisms of the* idealistic
doctrine of the categories. The fundamental issue is whether
the categories are to be derived from mind or from things.
Sellars makes two criticisms, first that idealism is unempir*
ical in its search for the categories in mind, and second,
following Perry, he insists that idealists in reality derive
categories from the object.
Sellars singles out Kant for special attack. He is convinc-
ing in his criticisms of Kant’s subjectivism. But in so far
as he criticizes Kant along with idealists in general for
looking to mind as the seat of the categories he is far from
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convincing# The chief reason for this failure is the funda-
mental fact that mind is known at first hand, things at sec-
ond hand, ana things always in terms of mind, Things being
products of Objective Hind reveal certain aspects of reality,
but what things reveal dimly at second hand mind reveals at
first hand and more clearly.
Ghapter VI concerns a discussion of Cellars 1 criticisms
of idealistic philosophies of nature. The issue is twofold:
(1) What is the nature of things? (2) Is tne natural order
independent and self-sufficient or dependent on Hind?
Sellars makes five criticisms: (1) Idealists reduce nature
to tne phenomenal and even the illusory. (2) They are un-
empirical. (3) They iiave not solved the problem of the
distinction between the physical and the psychical. (4)
They are anthropomorphic. (5) They cannot explain tne
dysteleological facts. These criticisms are significant,
searching and penetrating, but not conclusive. The order,
unity, organization, and design which nature displays seems
to outweigh these criticisms and to point in the direction
of idealism. The fifth, usually considered the most weighty,
can be answered on tne assumption of a limited God.*
Ghapter VII constitutes an approach to tne difficult but
fundamental problem of tne mind-body relationship. The crucial
issue is the nature oi consciousness. Cellars regards it as
but a part of mind, as only a qualitative aspect oi tne func-
tioning of the brain . Personal idealists differ in regarding
~.
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consciousness as oi the essence of mind, and in regarding
mind as the fundamental reality of which matter is an aspect.
Though directing certain criticisms to non-interactionists
such as Hocking, Cellars directs not less than seven criti-
cisms at interactionists . (1) The self is fragmentary and
unstable. (2) Interaction! sm is based on traditional out-
grown assumptions. (2) Consciousness apart from an organism
is an abstraction. (4) Int eractionism does not do justice
to tne essential unity of the organism. (5) It is unempir-
ical and unscientific
. (6) It presupposes tne neealess
multiplication of entities. (7) It is inconceivable
.
Thougn significant and searching, Sellars' criticisms be-
tray two weaknesses: (1) He tends to think of modern inter-
action! sm in terms of the old rigid dualism of Descartes.
(2) Sellars taxes for granted tne truth of his tneory of
mind as merely an aspect of brain process. Since the brain in
tne last analysis is composed of atoms in motion, mind can-
not be explained in terms of brain process. Sellars does not
do justice to at least four vital aspects of mind: (1) the
uniqueness of mind as knower, (2) the non-spatial aspects
of mind, (2) tne time -transcending capacities of mind, (4)
the efficacy of mind and its implications.
Chapter VIII consists of Sellars' criticisms of idealistic
philosophies of value. The issue is the absoluteness and
the metapnysical objectivity of values, sellars m xes four
. V .
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criticisms : (1). Idealists tend to reify values. (2). Val-
ues are relative. (3) Absolute values hinder progress. (4)
Values have no cosmic rootage. But in spite of these criti-
cims he is nearer the idealistic view in at least three
respects than he realizes. (1) In spite of his relativism
he holds that teflective men can arrive at objective
standards and norms. (2) Ilan is the locus and center of
values--values are personal. (3)< Man is a part of the
fabric of the world
.
The main conclusions of this dissertation follow:
I. As naturalism ceases to be naive, as it develops
into a comprehensive system as in the case of Sellars the
tendency is in the direction of idealism. This is evident
in Sellars in five ways:
1. His repudiation of reductionism.
2. Eis repudiation of the old "lumpish" matter
.
Sellars’ atoms are simple enduring systems of energy con-
ceived as dynamic, self-organizing, and laden with the
possibilities of mind. Hence he approaches panpsychism.
3. At times he gives such prominence to the efficacy
of mind that one suspects that he has advanced beyond natu**
ralism.
,
4. Values have their locus in man. Man is a part of
the world’s fabric.
5. Latter does not stamp itself on mind in the
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fashion of Democritus. It is only known through mind and
in terms of mind.
II. Latter is insufficient as a principle of ultimate
explanation.
1. It cannot explain the facts of order, organ-
ization, unity, and seeming design in nature.
2. It cannot explain the facts of consciousness.
3. It vannot explain values which do not seem to
be material
.
III. “While there are difficulties in taking mind as
the ultimate principle of explanation, yet the difficulties
are far less real than those of naturalism. Lind by its
very nature possesses order, organization, unity amid plural-
ity, purpose, dynamism in the form of will. These factors do
not have to be imported, as seems necessary in the case of
so restricted a concept as matter. Hence when a comprehensive,
coherent view of the whole is attempted, mind seems to be the
more adequate principle of final explanation.
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